American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3090 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority
| Decision Date | 22 November 1985 |
| Docket Number | LOCAL,No. 84-1439,AFL-CI,84-1439 |
| Citation | 777 F.2d 751 |
| Parties | 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3393, 250 U.S.App.D.C. 92, 54 USLW 2312 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,3090, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Petition for Review of an Order of the Federal Labor Relations authority.
William J. Stone, with whom Mark D. Roth, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for petitioner.
William E. Persina, Associate Sol., Federal Labor Relations Authority, with whom Ruth E. Peters, Sol., Steven H. Svartz, Deputy Sol., and Robert J. Englehart, Atty., Federal Labor Relations Authority, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for respondent.
Before MIKVA and SCALIA, Circuit Judges, and HAROLD H. GREENE, * District Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by District Judge HAROLD H. GREENE.
Petitioner American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) seeks review of a dismissal by the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) of an unfair labor practice complaint initiated by AFGE against a federal agency on account of that agency's refusal to comply with an arbitrator's award. The agency had filed exceptions to the arbitrator's decision but it had neither sought nor obtained a stay of that decision. We agree with petitioner that, absent a stay, the agency was obligated to comply with the arbitration decision, and that the dismissal of the unfair labor practice complaint was improper.
The facts are undisputed. 1 In March, 1981, officials of the United States Soldiers' Home and Airmen's Home (Home) suspended, and then fired, a nursing assistant who had been accused of mistreating patients. Petitioner AFGE, the employee's bargaining representative, grieved the employee's suspension and discharge. The grievance was submitted to arbitration under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between petitioner and the Home. After extensive hearings and briefing, the arbitrator, on March 25, 1982, issued an opinion and order sustaining the grievance and ordering the grievant reinstated, with backpay, within ten days of the order.
On April 22, 1982, the Home timely 2 filed with the FLRA exceptions to the arbitrator's award in accordance with Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act. 3 However notwithstanding FLRA regulations codified in 5 C.F.R. Sec. 2429.8 which specify that the filing of exceptions does not, by itself, stay an arbitration award, 4 the Home neither requested a stay of the arbitration award nor did it comply with the award.
Three weeks later, when it had become apparent that the Home would not comply, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Home with the FLRA. 5 The charge alleged that the Home's refusal violated 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7122(b) which requires government agencies to comply with final arbitration awards, 6 and that this violation constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. Secs. 7116(a)(1), (8). 7 On July 29, 1982, the FLRA General Counsel issued an unfair labor practice complaint based on the charge, and the case was assigned to an Administrative Law Judge for the issuance of a recommended decision and order.
On November 24, 1982, the ALJ issued a decision recommending that the complaint be dismissed. His decision cited essentially two factors: (1) that the language of section 7122(b) does not, in so many words, provide that arbitration awards to which exceptions have been filed are final and binding, 8 and (2) that the FLRA, in a notice of proposed rulemaking (which was subsequently withdrawn), had indicated its view that an arbitration award should not be regarded as final if exceptions thereto had been filed. See p. 19, infra.
Some nineteen 9 months later, the FLRA affirmed the ALJ's decision. 10 The Authority, in a brief decision, 11 adopted the ALJ's analysis; AFGE timely requested reconsideration; and when reconsideration was denied, it petitioned this court for review. 12
The basic question 13 in this case is whether the FLRA properly construed 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7122(b) as not requiring agency compliance with arbitration awards to which unresolved exceptions have been taken on the ground that such awards are not "final" within the meaning of the statute. If the awards are final, as petitioner contends, the Home's failure to comply (absent a stay) was a violation of section 7122 and an unfair labor practice under 5 U.S.C. Secs. 7116(a)(1), (8). If, on the other hand, such awards are not final, as the FLRA held in this case, then neither a violation of section 7122 nor an unfair labor practice has occurred.
The scope of our review of the FLRA's decision is governed by section 701 of the Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7123, which subjects Authority decisions to review under the Administrative Procedure Act's arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion standard, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706. See National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 721 F.2d 1402, 1405 (D.C.Cir.1983). As the Supreme Court has recognized, under this standard the Authority is entitled to "considerable deference when it exercises its 'special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities' of federal labor relations." Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97, 104 S.Ct. 439, 444, 78 L.Ed.2d 195 (1983) (citation omitted). At the same time, the Court has also noted that, while reviewing courts should uphold reasonable and defensible agency constructions of their organic statutes, they should not "rubber stamp ... administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute." Id. It is with these guidelines in mind that we examine the FLRA decision and the statute.
We begin our analysis, as always, by considering the relevant statutory language. 14 See Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980); National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 170 (D.C.Cir.1982). As indicated, 15 section 7122(b) provides in relevant part as follows:
If no exception to an arbitrator's award is filed under subsection (a) of this section [within 30 days], the award shall be final and binding. An agency shall take the actions required by an arbitrator's final award.
It is apparent from an examination of this language that it does not directly address the issue presented in this case; i.e., the status of arbitral awards to which exceptions have timely been taken. Clearly, the statute requires agencies to take actions required by an arbitrator's final award, and it further provides that awards to which no exceptions have been taken are "final and binding." The statute does not say, however, that awards to which exceptions have not been taken are the only awards that are "final" within the meaning of the statute, nor does it say that awards to which exceptions have timely been taken are not "final." On both of these questions, the statute is simply silent.
To be sure, if the phrase "arbitrator's final award" could not reasonably in context be read to include arbitration awards to which unresolved exceptions are pending, then any statutory ambiguity would only be illusory. See Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 483, 101 S.Ct. 2468, 2475, 69 L.Ed.2d 171 (1981); Petry v. Block, 697 F.2d 1169, 1171 (D.C.Cir.1983) (per curiam). That, however, is not the case. There are at least two analogous legal contexts, of which the Congress undoubtedly was aware, 16 in which adjudicative decisions are characterized as "final" notwithstanding the availability of further review.
The most obvious analogy is to private sector labor arbitrations. Such arbitrations are characterized as final decisions with which parties must comply, even though, like federal employee arbitrations, they are subject to limited review in subsequent proceedings to determine their compliance with applicable law. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596, 599, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1360, 1362, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960); Devine v. White, 697 F.2d 421, 436 (D.C.Cir.1983); see generally, Elkouri and Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, 65-66, 87-88 (4th ed. 1985); Updegraff, Arbitration and Labor Relations, 275-92 (3d ed. 1970). Indeed, it is a cardinal principle of arbitration that such awards are reviewable and enforceable only if they are "final"--that is, if they purport to resolve all aspects of the dispute being arbitrated. See Matter of Michaels and Mariforum Shipping, S.A., 624 F.2d 411, 413-14 (2d Cir.1980); see generally, Elkouri, supra, at 255; Updegraff, supra, at 279-81.
Congress clearly was aware of the private sector labor arbitration experience, 17 and it is therefore reasonable to conclude that, in drafting the language of section 7122(b), Congress had the private sector model in mind, and that the statutory phrase "arbitrator's final award" may properly be read in light of the meaning generally assigned to that phrase in the private sector arbitration context. See Devine v. White, supra, 697 F.2d at 432-33.
Another analogy of which the Congress may be deemed to have been aware is the federal judicial process. The general rule in the federal courts is that appellate review may be had only of "final decisions" of district courts--that is, of judgments that constitute full resolutions on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291; Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 743-44, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 1206-07, 47 L.Ed.2d 435 (1976). Compliance with such final judgments is, of course, required, unless the particular judgment is stayed by the district court or the court of appeals pending resolution of the appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 8; Fed.R.Civ.P. 62; see generally, 11 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal...
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