American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. City of St. Louis

• Decision Date: 23 June 1981
• Docket Number: No. 42220,42220
• Citation: 622 S.W.2d 267
• Parties: AMERICAN MOTORCYCLIST ASSOCIATION, et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. The CITY OF ST. LOUIS and Eugene Camp, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 267

622 S.W.2d 267

AMERICAN MOTORCYCLIST ASSOCIATION, et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. The CITY OF ST. LOUIS and Eugene Camp, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 42220.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Two.

June 23, 1981.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied

Sept. 21, 1981.

Application to Transfer Denied Nov. 10, 1981.

Michael E. Hughes, Asst. City Counselor, St. Louis, for defendants-appellants.

Shepherd, Sandberg & Phoenix, Reed W. Sugg, Herzog & Kral, Richard B. Specter, St. Louis, for plaintiffs-respondents.

PER CURIAM.

Judgment in a court tried case declared a City of St. Louis, Missouri, ordinance unconstitutional. We reverse.

On March 9, 1979, the Board of Aldermen of the City of St. Louis passed Bill 119. This bill prohibited the operation of motorcycles in all city parks, on-duty police motorcycles excepted. Shortly after its enactment plaintiffs, the American Motorcycle Association and six City of St. Louis residents, sought a temporary restraining order and permanent injunction against enforcement of the ordinance. On April 17, 1979, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order. Subsequently, a hearing was conducted and the order was made permanent. The court held such action was required because enactment and enforcement of the ordinance was "a violation of the due process and equal protection guaranties of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Missouri and in excess of the (city's) police power ...."

As this is a court tried case the lower court's decision must be upheld unless there is no substantial evidence to support the judgment, or the judgment is against the weight of the evidence, or the trial court erroneously declared or applied the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). Because no findings of fact were made we presume that all facts were found in accordance with the result reached. Hoefel v. Hoefel, 533 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Mo.App.1976). Further, due regard shall be given to the trial court's ability to judge the credibility of witnesses. Rule 73.01.

The city's first contention is that enactment and enforcement of the ordinance is an exertion of its police power. We agree. "It is abundantly clear that the City of St. Louis had full police power to regulate and control traffic on its streets...." Automobile Club of Missouri v. City of St. Louis, 334 S.W.2d 355, 363 (Mo.1960); § 304.120.2. ¹ Because it sought to control traffic on the streets within city parks the ordinance was obviously an exertion of the municipality's police power. However, plaintiffs argue Bill 119 is in excess of the city's police power because the ordinance violates the equal protection and due process provisions of the Missouri and United States Constitution. U.S.Const. amend. XIV; Mo.Const. art. 1, §§ 2, 10; art. III § 40(30).

We think it axiomatic that all ordinances, including those regulating the use of streets, must not be repugnant to the federal or state constitutions. However, ordinances enacted pursuant to a city's police power, including Bill 119, enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. Home Builders Association v. Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Mo. banc 1977). Also, because plaintiffs challenge the ordinance's constitutionality they bear the burden of proof on that issue. Bellerive Investment Co. v. Kansas City, 13 S.W.2d 628, 639 (Mo.1929). Plaintiffs contend the ordinance should be subjected to "strict scrutiny," under both due process and equal protection analysis, because it infringes upon their fundamental rights to speech and assembly. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Paterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666, 45 S.Ct. 625, 629, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925). This argument is without merit. The record shows that plaintiffs failed to introduce one iota of evidence that the ordinance would prohibit any person from speaking or assembling. Nor was there any evidence any person would be denied access to the parks. Rather, the evidence only showed that the ordinance would prohibit the operation of motorcycles in city parks. Plaintiffs did not even attempt to establish that the operation of a motorcycle is a symbolic form of speech which the ordinance trammels. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-410, 94 S.Ct. 2727, 2729, 2730, 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974). Our examination of the record compels us to reach the common sense conclusion that the operation of a motorcycle is merely a mode of transportation, not a form of communication or assembly. Furthermore, from the record presented we must conclude plaintiffs failed to carry the burden of proving the ordinance affected their fundamental rights of speech and assembly.

Because the ordinance concerns no fundamental right we cannot hold that it violates either the due process or equal protection guarantees unless it fails to withstand the "rational relation test." The substantive due process aspect of this test mandates that the ordinance have a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 58 S.Ct. 778,...