Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

• Decision Date: 09 July 2002
• Docket Number: (AC 21320)
• Citation: 70 Conn. App. 790,802 A.2d 126
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: ROXANN AMES v. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES

70 Conn. App. 790

802 A.2d 126

ROXANN AMES v. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES

(AC 21320)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 18, 2002.

Officially released July 9, 2002.

Schaller, Mihalakos and Dranginis, Js. Joanne S. Faulkner, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Gary M. Case, for the appellee (intervening defendant Western Surety Company).

Opinion

DRANGINIS, J.

The plaintiff, Roxann Ames, appeals from the judgment of the trial court affirming the decision and award by the defendant commissioner of motor vehicles (commissioner) that, in accordance with General Statutes § 14-52,¹ she is not entitled to recover punitive damages and attorney's fees under the surety bond issued by Western Surety Company (Western Surety).² On appeal, the plaintiff, in essence, raises two claims, namely, that (1) the doctrine of res judicata barred the commissioner from finding Western Surety liable under the surety bond for actual damages only and (2) the court improperly concluded, as a matter of law, that § 14-52 precludes an award for punitive damages and attorney's fees. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are relevant to our resolution of the plaintiffs appeal. The underlying event in this case involved the plaintiff and A.P.L. Auto Consulting, Inc., also known as Discount Auto Sales, a used automobile dealer (dealer). In 1995, the plaintiff purchased a motor vehicle from the dealer. Over protest by the plaintiff, in 1997, the dealer repossessed the vehicle. As a result of the repossession, the plaintiff filed an action against the dealer, alleging, in pertinent part, breach of contract and unfair trade practices in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The plaintiff demanded statutory, actual, punitive and treble damages. The court rendered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff after the dealer failed to appear and awarded damages in the amount of $20,286.40 plus costs of $280.60. The award included punitive damages and attorney's fees.³

Subsequently, the dealer went out of business and failed to pay the judgment. Pursuant to § 14-52, however, the dealer had obtained a surety bond for $20,000, which was issued by Western Surety. After the expiration of the 180 day waiting period of General Statutes § 52-400e,⁴ the commissioner invoked the surety bond on the plaintiffs behalf. The commissioner noted the court's prior award of damages, but found that the plaintiff suffered actual damages of $5650, an amount consisting of her down payment, financing payment and costs. The commissioner then concluded that the balance of the court's award of attorney's fees and punitive damages was not "recoverable under the subject bond," as set forth in § 14-52, and thus ordered Western Surety to pay $5650 to the state of Connecticut for the benefit of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff filed a petition for reconsideration, which the commissioner denied. The plaintiff then appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183. In affirming the decision of the commissioner, the court concluded that § 14-52, the surety bond requirement statute, precludes an award of punitive damages and attorney's fees. This appeal followed.

I

The plaintiff first contends that the court's award of damages of $20,286.40 constituted a final judgment, and, therefore, the doctrine of res judicata barred the commissioner from disturbing that award and finding the surety liable for only $5650. We are not persuaded.

"The doctrine of res judicata holds that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated as to the parties and their privies in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.... If the same cause of action is again sued on, the judgment is a bar with respect to any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made.... The applicability of res judicata raises a question of law that is subject to our plenary review.... We therefore must determine whether the trial court's decision is legally and logically correct." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Richards v. Richards, 67 Conn. App. 381, 383, 786 A.2d 1247 (2001). "It is axiomatic that in applying the doctrine of res judicata we remain cognizant that [t]he scope of matters precluded necessarily depends on what has occurred in the former adjudication." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 384.

We conclude that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar the commissioner's, and subsequently the court's, determination in the present case. The issues before the court that rendered judgment against the dealer greatly differed from those before the commissioner and the court in the subsequent action. In the action against the dealer, the court was faced with a controversy solely between the dealer and the plaintiff after the dealer wrongfully had repossessed the plaintiffs motor vehicle.

The issue regarding the extent of the liability of Western Surety pursuant to the surety bond provision was not before the court in the prior action against the dealer. In fact, it was not until after the judgment was rendered against the dealer that the dealer went out of business, thereby implicating Western Surety in the situation. Moreover, the issues before the commissioner, and subsequently before the court on appeal from the commissioner's decision, consisted of whether the dealer's actions triggered the surety bond provision, and Western Surety's liability, pursuant to § 14-52. The determinations of the commissioner and the court solely referred to Western Surety's liability and did not disturb the prior judgment regarding the dealer's liability for wrongful repossession. We conclude, therefore, that the commissioner's decision holding Western Surety liable for an amount of $5650 pursuant to the surety bond was not precluded by the doctrine of res judicata.⁵

II

We now address the plaintiffs primary claim that this court should set aside the judgment of the trial court because, pursuant to § 14-52, she was entitled to recover punitive damages and attorney's fees from Western Surety. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the phrase contained in § 14-52 (b) (4) that the surety bond will be "provided as indemnity for any loss sustained by any person by reason of any acts of the licensee constituting grounds for suspension or revocation of the license or such licensee going out of business," necessarily includes punitive damages and attorney's fees. (Emphasis added.) Therefore, the plaintiff argues, the court improperly concluded, as a matter of law, that § 14-52 precludes an award of punitive damages and attorney's fees. We are not persuaded.

In this case, because the surety bond itself is not part of the record, nor do the parties invoke its terms, the dispositive issue to determine is whether § 14-52 confers on the plaintiff the right to recover punitive damages and attorney's fees. That issue is a matter of statutory interpretation, as well as an issue of first impression for this court, over which our review is plenary.⁶ See Smith v. Smith, 249 Conn. 265, 280, 752 A.2d 1023 (1999). Several well settled principles govern our interpretation of § 14-52. "When we construe a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.... Furthermore, [w]e presume that laws are enacted in view of existing relevant statutes ... because the legislature is presumed to have created a consistent body of law.... We construe each sentence, clause or phrase to have a purpose behind it.... In addition, we presume that the legislature intends sensible results from the statutes it enacts." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Southington v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 254 Conn. 348, 357, 757 A.2d 549 (2000).

"When the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous, we need look no further for interpretive guidance because we assume that the words themselves express the intention of the legislature.... When we are confronted, however, with ambiguity in a statute, we seek to ascertain the actual intent by looking to the words of the statute itself ... the legislative history and circumstances surrounding the enactment of the statute... and the purpose the statute is to serve.... We note also that [a] statute should not be interpreted in any way to thwart its purpose ... and that [i]n construing a statute, common sense must be used and courts will assume that [the legislature intended to accomplish] a reasonable and rational result...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Caltabiano v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 662, 666-67, 560 A.2d 975 (1989).

Before directly analyzing the issue, an explanation of basic principles governing suretyship law provides guidance. "[T]he general purpose of a suretyship contract is to guard against loss in the event of the principal debtor's default.... [T]he obligation of a surety is an additional assurance to the one entitled to the performance of an act that the act will be performed.... [T]he liability of sureties is to be determined by the specified conditions of the bond .... [W]hen a bond is required by statute, a court will read the statute into the contract between the principal, surety and obligee." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Southington v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., supra,...