Amico's Inc. v. Mattos

Decision Date15 February 2002
Docket NumberNo. 2001-118-Appeal.,2001-118-Appeal.
Citation789 A.2d 899
PartiesAMICO'S INCORPORATED, d/b/a Pal's Family Restaurant et al. v. Thomas MATTOS et al.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

Present WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Brian A. Goldman, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Edmund L. Alves, Jr., Jeffrey B. Pine, Providence, for Defendant.

OPINION

LEDERBERG, Justice.

Does the Town of East Greenwich have the authority to regulate smoking in bars and restaurants located within its borders? We hold that it does. In 1999 the Rhode Island Department of Health issued a health alert, reporting that "the vast majority of restaurants in Rhode Island still allow smoking and in so doing represent one of the last public exposures to [secondhand smoke] for children." The alert "strongly recommended" that parents not take children into restaurants that allow smoking, and it proceeded to identify numerous risks of secondhand smoke to children — including bronchitis, pneumonia, middle ear and lung abnormalities, and new and worsening asthma — and to the general population, including "lung cancer and other significant health threats." The next year, a dispute between local restaurants and the town flared after an ordinance was enacted that restricted or banned smoking in restaurants and bars. Several restaurants and a hospitality and tourism trade association sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was void and sought injunctive relief from its enforcement. The Superior Court granted a summary judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiffsappealed. For the following reasons, we deny and dismiss the plaintiffs' appeal and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Facts and Procedural History

On April 25, 2000, in response to the health alert from the department of health, the East Greenwich Town Council (council) adopted Ordinance No. 686 (ordinance), which required licensed restaurants and bars either to ban smoking entirely or to provide a separate, enclosed smoking area. The plaintiffs, a group of twelve licensed eating and drinking establishments in the Town of East Greenwich (town) and the Rhode Island Hospitality and Tourism Association, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in Superior Court, seeking to prevent enforcement of the ordinance. The plaintiffs averred, inter alia, that the cost of complying with the segregated smoking area requirements of the ordinance are so onerous that, in effect, they result in a smoking ban.1 The plaintiffs also claimed that the town lacked authority to enact Ordinance No. 686 and that the ordinance not only conflicted with state law, but was preempted by it. Accordingly, they sought relief from its enforcement.

The defendants, Thomas Mattos, who was finance director of the town, members of both the council and the board of licenses, and the town manager, argued that the home rule charter as well as the town's clear authority to regulate victualing establishments under G.L.1956 § 5-24-1, and liquor establishments under G.L.1956 § 3-1-5, G.L.1956 §§ 3-5-15 and 3-5-21, conferred upon the town the authority to enact the ordinance.

The American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, and the American Lung Association of Rhode Island participated in the trial court proceedings as amici curiae and submitted a brief to this Court. Pending trial, plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction and for a summary judgment. The Superior Court granted the temporary restraining order and scheduled a hearing on the motion for summary judgment. The defendants cross-moved for summary judgment, and the amici filed a memorandum supporting their position.

On March 9, 2001, the trial justice granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, denied plaintiffs' motion, and terminated the temporary restraining order as of March 19, 2001, finding that:

"the Town of East Greenwich has implied power to impose conditions upon liquor and victualing licenses which includes the power to enact an ordinance regulating smoking in restaurants and bars. Ordinance 686 imposes conditions which are both reasonable and lawful. The ordinance does not violate the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island and reflects a valid exercise of municipal power over local concerns. The Legislature has delegated authority to municipalities to regulate smoking in licensed facilities and has not preempted the field."

In addition, the trial justice denied plaintiffs' motion to stay the judgment or for an injunction pending appeal, whereupon plaintiffs appealed and moved for a stay of the judgment in this Court. On March 19, 2001, we granted the stay and granted defendants' request for an expedited appeal.

Standard of Review

We review a trial justice's rulings on cross-motions for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as those used by the trial justice, and viewing all the facts and the inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 859 (R.I.1997). After undertaking such a review, if we determine that no genuine issue of material fact remains in dispute, summary judgment is appropriate as a matter of law. Id.

Authority Under Home Rule Charter

Traditionally, municipalities had no inherent right to self-government. Lynch v. King, 120 R.I. 868, 876, 391 A.2d 117, 122 (1978) (citing City of Providence v. Moulton, 52 R.I. 236, 246, 160 A. 75, 79 (1932)). The 1951 enactment of the home rule amendment, now designated article 13 of the Rhode Island Constitution, "altered this traditional view by empowering cities and towns to legislate with regard to all local matters." Id. Specifically, article 13, section 1, of the Rhode Island Constitution provides, "It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the people of every city and town in this state the right of self government in all local matters," and section 2 states, "Every city and town shall have the power at any time to adopt a charter, amend its charter, enact and amend local laws relating to its property, affairs and government not inconsistent with this Constitution and laws enacted by the general assembly in conformity with the powers reserved to the general assembly."

But the legislative power conferred by article 13 is not unfettered. The Legislature continues to retain "the power to act in relation to the property, affairs and government of any city or town by general laws which shall apply alike to all cities and towns, but which shall not affect the form of government of any city or town." R.I. Const. art. 13, sec. 4. Thus, municipalities may not legislate on matters of statewide concern, and the power of home rule is subordinate to the General Assembly's unconditional power to legislate in the same areas. Town of East Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d 104,111 (R.I.1992); Westerly Residents for Thoughtful Development, Inc. v. Brancato, 565 A.2d 1262, 1264 (R.I.1989); Marro v. General Treasurer of Cranston, 108 R.I. 192, 195, 273 A.2d 660, 662 (1971). And, as has long been the case, the Legislature continues to exclusively occupy the fields of education, elections, and taxation, thereby precluding any municipality's foray into these areas, absent specific legislative approval. Malinou v. Board of Elections, 108 R.I. 20, 26, 271 A.2d 798, 801 (1970); Royal v. Barry, 91 R.I. 24, 31, 160 A.2d 572, 575 (1960); Opinion to the House of Representatives, 79 R.I. 277, 280, 87 A.2d 693, 696 (1952); see also R.I. Const. art. 13, sec. 5.

Article III, section 3170 of East Greenwich's home rule charter provides:

"All legislative powers of the Town shall be vested in the Town Council except those delegated within this Charter. The Town Council may enact, repeal or amend ordinances relating to the Town's property, affairs and government subject to the provisions of the State Constitution and laws enacted by the General Assembly * * *. The Town Council may exercise all additional powers and authority that are consistent with this Charter, and have been granted to it by this Charter, the Constitution or laws of the State or by the Financial Town meeting. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing[,] the Town Council has and exercises the following specific powers:

A. To enact, amend or repeal ordinances for the preservation of the public peace, the health, safety, comfort and welfare of the inhabitants of the Town and for the protection of persons and property."

The defendants took the position that the charter's specific provision authorizing the enactment of ordinances for the "health, safety, comfort and welfare" of the town's citizens vested the council with authority to enact Ordinance No. 686. After describing the dangers of smoking and of exposure to secondhand smoke, the ordinance directs that:

"East Greenwich licensed restaurants must operate in one of the following two options:

"(1) the entire restaurant completely smoke-free; or

"(2) provide a separate, enclosed smoking area. No one under 18 years of age may be served in a smoking area of the restaurant.

"Bars shall be exempt providing no customer under the age of 21 years is permitted on the premises." Town of East Greenwich Code of Ordinances, Sec. 10-302.

The trial justice found that the town's inherent power under its home rule charter permitted the regulation of smoking in public restaurants. She also determined, however, that because the ordinance in effect imposed a condition on the issuance of licenses, the town's authority to regulate smoking must flow from a specific legislative delegation of power.

Notwithstanding defendants' claim that the regulation of smoking falls within the realm of "health, safety, comfort and welfare," we have repeatedly and unequivocally held that licensing is not a local matter, and therefore, the General Assembly retains exclusive power over the licensing of Rhode Island businesses....

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