Malinou v. Board of Elections

• Decision Date: 21 December 1970
• Docket Number: No. 1150-M,1150-M
• Citation: 271 A.2d 798,108 R.I. 20
• Parties: Martin S. MALINOU v. BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al. P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 798

271 A.2d 798

108 R.I. 20

Martin S. MALINOU v. BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al.

No. 1150-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Dec. 21, 1970.

[108 R.I. 41] Martin S. Malinou, pro se.

Moore, Virgadamo, Boyle & Lynch, Salvatore L. Virgadamo, Francis J. Boyle, Laurent L. Rousseau, Newport, Maurice W. Hendel, Pawtucket, Stephen F. Achille, John Quattrocchi, Jr., Herbert F. DeSimone, Atty. Gen., W. Slater Allen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Providence, for respondents.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

The petitioner aspires to be the Democratic Party's nominee for the office of United States Senator in the November 1970 general election. We issued a writ of certiorari ¹ to review a decision of the State Board of Elections holding that the petitioner was not a qualified candidate for the party's primary election because he had not procured the required number of signatures that would authorize the Secretary of State to place the petitioner's name on the primary election ballot. Hereafter, we shall refer to the State Board of Elections as either the respondent board or the state board.

On June 26, 1970, petitioner, acting in pursuance of G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 17-14-1, filed in the Secretary of State's office a declaration of candidacy which signified his intention to be a candidate for the United States Senate at the September 15, 1970 Democratic Party's primary. Thereafter, the Secretary of State furnished petitioner with sets of duly authorized nomination papers. The petitioner and his supporters then began their efforts to comply with § 17-14-7 ² and thereby obtain signatures of at least, 1,000 'party voters.' On July 24, 1970, and again on July 25, 1970, petitioner filed his nomination papers with the Boards of Canvassers located in some 28 various municipalities throughout the state.

The canvassing boards checked the signatures and the addresses appearing on the papers and in early August 1970 rendered reports to the Secretary of State which certified that petitioner's nomination papers contained a total of 856 valid signatures. The petitioner appealed the canvassers' findings to the respondent board. The board conducted a lengthy and extensive hearing on petitioner's appeal. During the hearing, the board validated an additional 17 signatures previously invalidated by the local boards. The respondent board's action still left petitioner 127 signatures 'shy' of the required 1,000.

In his petition, Malinou contends that the state board erred in disallowing 195 other signatures appearing on his papers. A study of these disputed signatures shows that they may be categorized as follows: 149 persons who had signed petitioner's nomination papers in a form which varies from the form in which the names or addresses of the signatories appear on the voting lists; 17 persons who, at the time they signed petitioner's papers, were not qualified voters; 26 signatories who had within the prior 26-month period signed nomination papers of candidates of a party other than the Democratic Party ³; and finally, 3 signatures were invalidated after a diligent search of the records of the Providence Board of Canvassers failed to show that the signatories were registered voters.

Of the 149 names in the first category, 124 thereof were invalidated because the names as they appear on the nomination papers differ in form from the names as they appear on the voting list. Simple mathematics show that, if the state board was correct in refusing to validate the 124 names referred to in the first category of disputed signatures, petitioner's cause is lost. For even if we were to assume that the state board should have validated all of the remaining contested signatures, petitioner's nomination papers would not contain the 1,000 signatures demanded by the statute. Because of our ultimate conclusion, we shall limit our consideration to petitioner's entitlement to have the 124 names ⁴ certified as being valid signatures.

The respondent board bases its refusal to validate the 124 names on § 17-14-8 (1969 Reenactment), which reads as follows:

'Not all endorsers of a candidate need sign on the same nomination papers, but endorsers who are voters in different cities and towns shall not sign the same sheet. Every voter signing a nomination paper shall sign in person with his name, place of residence and street number, if any, as it appears on the voting list; but any voter who is unable to write may sign by making his mark (X) on the nomination paper in the presence of two witnesses who shall subscribe their names on the paper as witnesses to the signing.' (italics ours.)

The petitioner argues that the italicized portion of this section violates both the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and a certain portion of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971. In the alternative, he asks that we construe § 17-14-8 so as to hold that a substantial compliance with the statute cited above will satisfy the mandate of this section.

We find no merit in any of the positions espoused by petitioner.

The petitioner's constitutional attack on the statute is based upon his bald assertion that this legislation 'unreasonably requires perfection' of a signatory's memory and manual dexterity. Before determining the constitutionality of the law, we shall restate certain well-established rules of law governing the determination of a challenge addressed to the constitutionality of a legislative enactment.

Any act passed by the General Assembly and approved by the Governor carries with it a presumption of constitutionality, and the challenger, in seeking to overcome this presumption, has the burden of proving the statute's unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Chartier Real Estate Co. v. Chafee, 101 R.I. 544, 225 A.2d 766. If any state of known or assumed facts would justify the law, the court's power of inquiry ceases. Morrison v. Lamarre, 75 R.I. 176, 65 A.2d 217. The wisdom, need, or appropriateness of a statute are for the legislative but not the judicial branch of our government. The guaranty of due process demands only that the law shall not be arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious and that it be reasonably related to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Avella v. Almac's Inc., 100 R.I. 95, 211 A.2d 665; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940. Our function then is to decide whether the purpose of § 17-14-8 is legitimate and whether this statute is designed to accomplish its purpose in a fair and reasonable manner. If the legislation meets this test, the constitutional requirement of due process has been satisfied. Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606.

The Rhode Island constitution vests in the General Assembly the exclusive jurisdiction over the manner of conducting elections. Bilodeau v. Dolan, 85 R.I. 348, 131 A.2d 686. Further, we have said that it is the Legislature's prerogative to provide for the recognition of political parties, to define membership therein, and by appropriate measures to prescribe procedures for the orderly conduct of their affairs and secure stability for the political system created thereby. Parise v. Board of Canvassers and Registration, 92 R.I. 493, 170 A.2d 292; DeCesare v. Board of Elections, 104 R.I. 136, 242 A.2d 421.

Section 17-15-1 states that the primary election for the nomination of candidates for each political party shall be held on the second Tuesday after the first Monday in September of each evenly numbered year. The General Assembly has also established a timetable which the candidates and state and local election officials must meet in order to assure that the primary will be held as scheduled. Chapter 14 of title 17 contains this timetable.

Declarations of candidacy for state office must be filed with the Secretary of State within the last 10 days of June in the even years. Upon receipt of the declarations, the Secretary of State prepares nomination papers for the candidates for state office which must be delivered to the respective candidates any time between six and nine days after the final day for filing declarations of candidacy. Section 17-14-11 requires that the nomination papers be filed with local boards of canvassers on or before five o'clock in the afternoon of the fifty-second ⁵ day before the primary. The boards shall '* * * proceed forthwith to check all signatures, on each nomination paper filed with it, against the voting list * * *' and '* * * shall certify the number of names of qualified electors * * * appearing thereon * * *.' The local board of canvassers must, because of § 17-14-13, file with the Secretary of State not later than forty-five days prior to the primary the candidate's nomination papers together with a certificate showing the number of qualified electors appearing on the nomination papers. The chapter goes on to detail procedures for determination of the objections to the eligibility of a candidate or the sufficiency of the nomination papers.

It is clear from a reading of chap. 14 of title 17 that the local boards of canvassers have no more than seven days to check all the signatures on all nomination papers of all candidates seeking either state or local office. The candidates belong to the Democratic or Republican Party and they seek a variety of offices ranging from the rather exalted position of United States Senator to the posts of ward committeeman in a city, or town committeeman in one of the smaller municipalities in this state. The torrent of signatures pouring into the canvassers' offices can easily be imagined.

The task confronting a local board as it attempts to comply with the schedule set forth in §§ 17-14-11 and 17-14-12 is a formidable one. We think that a primary aim of the Legislature in enacting the requirement of exact conformity called for in § 17-14-8 was to insure that the local boards can check all the nomination papers filed with them and report to the...