Amine v. King

• Decision Date: 21 September 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 09-13454
• Parties: ALI AMINE, Plaintiff, v. BRENTON KING and EDWARD VILLEMAIRE, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

ALI AMINE, Plaintiff,
v.
BRENTON KING and EDWARD VILLEMAIRE, Defendants.

Case No. 09-13454

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Dated: September 21, 2011

Honorable Julian Abele Cook, Jr.
ORDER

This case involves a complaint by the Plaintiff, Ali Amine, who has accused the two Defendants, Brenton King and Edward Villemaire - both of whom are law enforcement officers with the Dearborn, Michigan Department of Police - of (1) assault and battery; (2) false imprisonment; (3) false arrest; (4) malicious prosecution; and (5) a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹

Although this case was originally filed in a state court (Wayne County Circuit Court of Michigan), it was removed to this Court on the basis of its federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441, and 1446. Currently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.

I.

The parties' respective versions of the salient facts in this case are highly contested and summarized succinctly below.

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On July 24, 2007, Amine and his friend, Ali Al-Khalidi,² were traveling in Amine's father's black Jeep Cherokee automobile. At approximately 9:00 p.m., the vehicle was stopped in Dearborn, Michigan by King who - in his official capacity while on road patrol as a law enforcement officer - made a preliminary observation from his police car that the Jeep did not have a visible license plate. According to King, at the time of this stop, Amine was situated in the driver's seat and was not wearing a seat belt, and Al-Khalidi was located in the front passenger seat. King further states that, subsequent to the stop, he (1) realized that the Jeep did have a temporary license plate affixed to the interior of its back window which had been difficult to see through the vehicle's tinted window, and (2) observed the Jeep rock back and forth and, upon directing his spotlight toward the vehicle, saw the driver and passenger exchange their positions in the front seat. Believing this to be suspicious behavior, King made a radio request for backup police assistance. Amine, on the other hand, argues that Al-Khalidi was the driver of the vehicle the entire time and that the two individuals never switched places.

Thereafter, King approached the Jeep and asked its occupants for their respective operator's licenses and documentation of the Jeep's ownership. He also ran a search on the Law Enforcement Information Network ("LEIN"), from which he learned that Amine had a suspended driver's license and two prior convictions or pending charges for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated ("OWI"). Amine, in response to further questioning, advised King that he had consumed "a beer" while at a restaurant with Al-Khalidi. King then handcuffed Amine and placed him in the back of

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his police car, informing him that he was being arrested for OWI. King has stated - and Amine does not dispute - that Amine consented to a preliminary "field" breath test which indicated he had a blood alcohol level of .09%.

Shortly thereafter, the other Defendant, Edward Villemaire, arrived on the scene in response to King's earlier call for backup. The Defendants handcuffed Al-Khalidi and placed him in the back of Villemaire's police car. Both officers conducted a search of the Jeep and found no drugs or other contraband. King began to question Al-Khalidi while he was still in the back of the police car. In what the Defendants claim is a common police tactic to elicit admissions, King told Al-Khalidi that drugs had been found in the car and that he saw him and Amine switch seats. He further warned Al-Khalidi that the driver of the vehicle would be held responsible for the drugs found in the car. Nevertheless, Al-Khalidi maintained that he, and not Amine, was in fact the driver of the vehicle. Al-Khalidi was then released and the Jeep was impounded. Amine was taken to the Dearborn police station where he was charged with OWI, third offense, and held without bond. After being arraigned the following day, he was released on $2,500 bond.

During the preliminary examination which followed, King and Al-Khalidi each gave testimony that was consistent with the Defendants' and Amine's versions, respectively, of the incident.³ Notwithstanding the conflicting testimony, the presiding judge concluded that the

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prosecution had produced a sufficiency of evidence upon which to establish probable cause to believe that Amine had committed the offenses of OWI and driving with a suspended license. As a result, he was bound over for trial. A jury subsequently found him not guilty and the charges against him were dismissed.

This lawsuit followed. Both parties have submitted motions for summary judgment which are now before the Court for resolution.

II.

The purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 "is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupportable claims or defenses . . . ." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Therefore, the entry of a summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if its proof "would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or a defense advanced by the parties." Aqua Grp., LLC v. Fed. Ins. Co., 620 F. Supp. 2d 816, 819 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (citing Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1984)). A dispute is "genuine" only if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When assessing a motion for the entry of a summary judgment, a court "must view the facts and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987).

The moving party has the initial obligation of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of a material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Thereafter, the nonmoving party must "come forward with some probative evidence to support its

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claim and make it necessary to resolve the differences at trial." Boyd v. Ford Motor Co., 948 F.2d 283, 285 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The presence or absence of a genuinely disputed issue of a material fact must be established by (1) a specific reference to "particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials," or (2) a "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

III.

Amine submits that he is entitled to a summary judgment in connection with his § 1983 claim because there is no genuine issue of a material fact that his rights under the Fourth Amendment were violated by his seizure, arrest, search, and subsequent prosecution without probable cause. U. S. Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."). In response, King submits that he (1) had probable cause to arrest Amine, and (2) is entitled to qualified immunity which provides him with protection from Amine's § 1983 claim.

In order to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff - such as Amine - must set forth those facts that - when construed in his favor - clearly establish "(1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) [that has been] caused by a person

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acting under the color of state law."⁴ Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).

The doctrine of qualified immunity generally protects "government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Its purpose is "to shield the official from suit altogether, saving him or her from the burdens of discovery and costs of trial." Klein v. Long, 275 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

This doctrine has also been described as a broad standard which is designed to protect "'all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Humphrey v. Mabry, 482 F.3d 840, 847 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). "If no reasonably competent officer would have taken the same action, then qualified immunity should be denied; however, 'if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on [the legality of the action], immunity should be recognized.'" Id. (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 341).

"Once [this doctrine has been] raised, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that a defendant is not entitled to...