Amory v. Kelley

Decision Date27 May 1941
Citation34 N.E.2d 507,309 Mass. 162
PartiesAMORY et al. v. KELLEY et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Swift, Judge.

Proceeding by Roger Amory and others for a writ of mandamus commanding Edward T. Kelley, and others as assessors of Boston, to refrain from valuing taxable property in the City of Boston otherwise than at its fair cash value. A judgment was entered and thereafter certain words were added to the judgment, and the respondents bring exceptions.

Exceptions sustained and judgment ordered to stand as originally entered.

Argued before FIELD, C. J., and DONAHUE, QUA, DOLAN, and COX, JJ.

A. Lincoln, of Boston, for petitioners.

R. H. Hopkins, of Boston, and N. Moger, of Roxbury, for respondents.

QUA, Justice.

When this petition for a writ of mandamus was before this court on a previous occasion we held that a demurrer to the petition should have been sustained solely on the ground that there was an adequate statutory remedy. Amory v. Assessors of Boston, 306 Mass. 354, 28 N.E.2d 436. The present bill of exceptions states that after the filing in the Superior Court of the rescript Demurrer sustained’ and after the case had become ripe for judgment in that court, ‘judgment * * * was entered’ on July 15, 1940, in these words, ‘Judgment for respondents.’ Thereafter, on August 2, 1940, on motion by the petitioners, the judge ordered that there be added on the docket after the words ‘Judgment for the respondents' the words, ‘Petition dismissed without prejudice to the bringing of other proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court.’ The question now before us is whether there was error in adding these words to the judgment as previously entered.

Commonly the entry of judgment is the last step in the decision of a case. Subject to such appellate procedure as may be available, to statutory proceedings to vacate or review, and possibly to one or two other exceptions with which we are not here concerned, the judgment as entered is final. The trial court has no further power over it and cannot add to it or amend it, although it may correct mere clerical errors, mistakes in computation, and similar blunders which occasionally occur. Barnes v. Smith, 104 Mass. 363, 364;Mason v. Pearson, 118 Mass. 61;Blanchard v. Ferdinand, 132 Mass. 389;Pierce v. Lamper, 141 Mass. 20, 6 N.E. 223;Davis v. National Life Ins. Co., 187 Mass. 468, 73 N.E. 658;White v. Gove, 183 Mass. 333, 340, 67 N.E. 359;Karrick v. Wetmore, 210 Mass. 578, 97 N.E. 92. The provisions of G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 56, likewise refer only to ‘Formal defects or imperfections,’ Barnes v. Smith, 104 Mass. 363, 364, and to amendments, if justice requires them, ‘in affirmance of the judgment’ already entered, not in modification of it.

In this case there was no error, clerical or otherwise, in the judgment as originally entered. A simple entry of ‘Petition dismissed’ would have been in exact accord with prevailing practice in cases of this kind, but the entry first made had the same meaning. A petition for a writ of mandamus is a proceeding at law. Mansfield v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 228 Mass. 262, 264, 117 N.E. 311. It is not common practice to include words indicating that the judgment in an action at law is without prejudice, even though it is entered upon a nonsuit or for some other reason is not conclusive of the merits of the case. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the original entry was not that which was intended or that the judge set out to correct a clerical error in it without changing the legal effect of that which was first intended. Karrick v. Wetmore, 210 Mass. 578, 97 N.E. 92;Hall v. Maloney, 269 Mass. 228, 231, 168 N.E. 724;Prenguber v. Agostini, 289 Mass. 222, 224, 225, 193 N.E. 743;Boston v. Santosuosso, 308 Mass. 202, 207, 208, 31 N.E.2d 572. If the amendment had any effect at all it had the effect of changing in some manner the legal consequences of the judgment as first entered and not of correcting a mistake in the form of the entry. An error of law in the first entry, if there had been one, could not be corrected in this way, where the entry made was the one...

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5 cases
  • Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 8 d3 Dezembro d3 1943
    ... ... 202, 207, 208, 31 N.E.2d 572; Kennedy v. Simmons, 308 Mass. 431, 32 N.E.2d 215;Seder v. Kozlowski, 311 Mass. 30, 39, 40 N.E.2d 14. See, also, Amory v. Assessors of Boston, 309 Mass. 162, 34 N.E.2d 507. When a final decree is entered, a preliminary injunction has served its purpose. If the ... ...
  • In re Keenan
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 13 d6 Fevereiro d6 1943
    ... ... Santosuosso, 308 Mass. 202, 207, 31 N.E.2d 572. The rule as to the conclusive nature of a judgment in an action at law is stated in Amory v. Assessors of Boston, 309 Mass. 162, 163, 34 N.E.2d 507, 508, as follows: Commonly the entry of judgment is the last step in the decision of a ... ...
  • In re Keenan
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 13 d6 Fevereiro d6 1943
    ... ... 202 , 207 ...        The rule as to the ... conclusive nature of a judgment in an action at law is stated ... in Amory v. Assessors of Boston, 309 Mass. 162 , ... 163, as follows: "Commonly the entry of judgment is the ... last step in the decision of a case ... ...
  • In re Harris
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 27 d2 Maio d2 1941
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