Amos v. Conkling

• Citation: 99 Fla. 206,126 So. 283
• Parties: AMOS, Comptroller v. CONKLING et al.
• Decision Date: 01 February 1930
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

126 So. 283

99 Fla. 206

AMOS, Comptroller v. CONKLING et al.

Florida Supreme Court

February 1, 1930

Commissioners' Decision.

Error to Circuit Court, Leon County; John B. Johnson, Judge.

Petition by Ernest Amos, as comptroller, praying for an order confirming petitioner's order freezing the deposits of the First American Bank & Trust Company of West Palm Beach opposed by C. M. Conkling and another. To review an order sustaining a demurrer to the petition and dismissing the petition, petitioner brings error.

Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Under the provisions of section 6102, Compiled General Laws of Florida 1927, section 4162, Revised General Statutes of 1920 enacted in 1915 as section 1 of chapter 6807, Laws of Florida, the comptroller, on becoming satisfied that any bank doing business in this state under the state laws has 'become insolvent' and 'is in default,' or that the affairs of any bank doing business in this state under state law 'is in an unsound condition' or 'threatened with insolvency because of illegal or unsafe investments,' or that 'its liabilities exceed its assets,' or that 'it is transacting business without authority of law' or 'in violation of law,' or if the directors or other named officers 'shall knowingly violate, or knowingly permit any of its officers * * * to violate any of the provisions of law relative to such bank, * * * may forthwith designate and appoint a receiver to take charge of the * * * affairs of such bank.'

Section 4162, Revised General Statutes 1920, has continued in force without material change in the language of the section merely the word 'liquidator' being substituted in section 19 of chapter 13576, Laws of 1929, for the word 'receiver,' and section 20 of chapter 13576 added providing for appointment of a General Liquidator.

Before 1927, where affairs of bank taken over by comptroller were restored to sound condition without receivership comptroller should surrender possession to officers for resumption of business (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 4167). Under the provisions of section 4167, Revised General Statutes 1920, in force when the Legislature assembled in 1927, where the comptroller had concluded that a bank was in an unsound or unsafe condition or had taken possession of the property and business of such bank and retained possession thereof and the affairs of such bank had been restored to a sound and safe condition without a receiver having been appointed to take charge of the affairs and assets of such bank, the comptroller should surrender possession of such bank to its officers for the purpose of permitting such bank to resume business.

Where prior to 1927, receiver was appointed for bank in unsafe condition, comptroller was without statutory authority to reopen bank restored to safe condition (Rev. Gen. St. 1920 §§ 4162, 4167). When the Legislature of 1927 convened, the comptroller had authority, under sections 4162 and 4167, Revised General Statutes of 1920, to take charge of the assets and affairs of banks doing business in this state, under the laws of this state, found to be in an unsound or unsafe condition, and appoint a receiver therefor and proceed towards winding up such banks, but he was without statutory authority to surrender for reopening any bank restored to a sound and safe condition when a receiver had been appointed therefor.

Statute authorizing freezing of deposits and reopening of closed bank was enacted to facilitate surrender and reopening of banks taken over by comptroller (Laws 1927, c. 11849). Chapter 11849, Laws of Florida, was enacted by the Legislature of 1927 to facilitate the surrender and reopening of banks taken over by the comptroller which had restored their affairs to a sound and safe condition or were susceptible of being placed in a sound and safe condition.

The Legislature of 1927, in enacting chapter 11849, Laws of Florida, declared an emergency to exist for the immediate taking effect thereof.

Conditions in 1972 held not to require emergency legislation for surrender and reopening state bank which could not continue as going concern (Laws 1927, c. 11849). The conditions of the state in 1927 did not require passage of an emergency act for surrender and reopening of any state bank which could not continue as a going banking institution and meet its obligations in the usual course of business or upon reasonable terms and conditions.

Court will look to conditions of country to be affected by act as well as purposes declared to ascertain legislative intent, and all parts of act will be read together. The court will look to the conditions of the country to be affected by an act, as well as to the purpose declared, to ascertain the legislative intent, and will read all parts of an act together.

Rule that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed is limited by principle that statute conferring authority on officer under police power is to be strictly construed against grant. While remedial statutes are to be liberally construed so as to suppress he evil and advance the remedy intended, this principle of construction is circumscribed and limited in its scope by the further principle of statutory construction that a statute conferring authority upon an officer under the police power of the state should be strictly construed and all powers not specifically granted or necessarily implied are reserved.

Purpose of valid statute, within constitutional limits, controls, and effect should be given act as harmonious whole. The intent of a valid statute is the law, and the purpose to be accomplished within constitutional limitations is to be considered as controlling and effect given to the act as a consistent and harmonious whole.

All acts relating to same subject or having same general purpose may be read together as constituting one law; history of legislation may be considered in ascertaining legislative intent; in seeking legislative intent, by tracing history of legislation, it is proper to consider acts passed at prior or subsequent sessions, including those repealed, as well as those passed at same session. In the construction of a particular statute, or in the interpretation of any of its provisions, all acts relating to the same subject, or having the same general purpose, may be read in connection with it, as together constituting one law. The endeavor may be made, by tracing the history of the legislation on this subject, to ascertain the uniform and consistent purpose of the Legislature or to discover how the policy of the Legislature with reference to the subjectmatter has been changed or modified from time to time. With this purpose in view, therefore, it is proper to consider, not only acts passed at the same session of the Legislature, but also acts passed at prior or subsequent sessions, and even those which have been repealed.

Where pleadings clearly show that comptroller's freezing order is not reasonable, just, or practicable, it will not be enforced by court (Acts 1927, c. 11849; Laws 1929, c. 14487). Chapter 11849, Acts of 1927, and its re-enactment by chapter 14487, Laws of 1929, provide for the making of freezing orders upon reasonable terms and conditions, and where it clearly appears from the pleadings that a freezing order made by the comptroller is not reasonable or just or practicable with reference to all the interests directly affected thereby, such order will not be enforced by the court.

Chapter 14487, Acts of 1929, provides that before a freezing order shall become effective, the comptroller shall give notice of his intention to apply to the court to have such order confirmed, at which time any person interested may appear and present objections why such order should not be confirmed.

On application for order confirming freezing order, question is whether conditions existing warrant confirmation (Acts 1927, c. 11849; Laws 1929, c. 14487). Upon application for an order confirming and making effective a freezing order, the question to be considered and decided by the court is whether the conditions existing warrant the court in confirming and making effective the freezing order.

Where conditions of freezing order are unreasonable or indicate bank cannot be placed in safe condition, court should decline to confirm it (Acts 1927, c. 11849; Laws 1929, c. 14487). Where the terms and conditions of a freezing order are not reasonable or indicate that the bank is not susceptible of being placed in a sound and safe condition, the court should decline to confirm such freezing order.

Prima facie effect of administrative officer's order may be overcome by admissions in pleading clearly showing invalidity or unreasonableness of order. The prima facie effect of an order made by an administrative officer may be overcome by admissions in the pleadings that clearly show the invalidity of the order or admit that the order is unreasonable and was arbitrarily made without evidence or due consideration.

Where pleadings show official act is unjust, unreasonable, or arbitrary, court, in absence of emergency or public necessity, will not sustain act. Where it is admitted by the pleadings or appears therefrom that the official act under investigation is unjust, unreasonable, or arbitrarily made, the court, in the absence of an emergency or public necessity, will not sustain the action.

Comptroller's freezing order is subject to court confirmation (Laws 1929, c. 14487). Chapter 14487, Laws of Florida, does not contemplate that administrative acts of the comptroller are infallible nor that his acts will be conclusive, but provides for review and confirmation before a freezing order shall become effective.

Freezing order postponing payment of 70% of bank's deposits beyond 3 1/2 years...