Anantha v. Clarno
| Decision Date | 12 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | A172786 |
| Citation | 461 P.3d 282,302 Or.App. 196 |
| Parties | Vikram ANANTHA and Micha Gross, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Beverly CLARNO, Oregon Secretary of State, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Jesse A. Buss argued the cause for appellants. Also on the briefs were Willamette Law Group, Thomas M. Christ, and Sussman Shank LLP.
W. Michael Gillette, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were David A. Anderson, Jessie A. Schuh, and Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, PC.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief amicus curiae for State of Oregon.
Steven C. Berman and Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter P.C. filed the brief amicus curiae for Our Oregon.
Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and Armstrong, Judge, and Ortega, Judge.
Plaintiffs seek to amend Oregon’s Forest Practices Act, ORS 527.610 to 527.770 ; ORS 527.990(1) ; ORS 527.992, and related statutory provisions through Oregon’s initiative process. To that end, they proposed three initiative petitions for the November 3, 2020, general election: Initiative Petitions (IPs) 35, 36, and 37. The Oregon Secretary of State rejected each proposed measure; she determined that each one violated the so-called "single subject" requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d), of the Oregon Constitution, that is, the requirement that a "proposed law * * * shall embrace one subject only and matters properly connected therewith." On review under ORS 246.910(1), the trial court upheld the secretary’s determination, and plaintiffs appealed, ORS 246.910(3). Reviewing for legal error, State v. Mercer , 269 Or. App. 135, 137, 344 P.3d 109, rev. den. , 357 Or. 299, 353 P.3d 594 (2015), we conclude that none of the measures violates the single-subject requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d), and that plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We therefore reverse and remand with directions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs.
Our state constitution reserves to the people the power to propose laws. Or. Const., Art. IV, § 1 (2). As with laws proposed in and by the legislature, a law proposed by initiative must "embrace one subject only and matters properly connected therewith." Or. Const., Art. IV, § 1 (2)(d); Or. Const., Art. IV, § 20 (); OEA v. Phillips , 302 Or. 87, 100, 727 P.2d 602 (1986) ().
Plaintiffs seek to amend the Forest Practices Act and other statutory provisions addressing forestry. Specifically, they propose to place three prospective initiatives on the November 3, 2020, ballot: IP 35, IP 36, and IP 37. We have included the text of each measure in the appendix to this opinion so do not recite that text in full here. A summary, however, is in order to give context for our analysis, and plaintiffs have supplied an able one in their brief that the secretary does not seriously dispute:
As required by ORS 250.045(1), plaintiffs submitted the prospective petitions to the secretary for her review. After reviewing public comments, the secretary notified plaintiffs that she was rejecting all three proposed measures because she "has determined [that each measure] does not comply with the procedural requirements established in the Oregon Constitution for initiative petitions, particularly the single subject requirement."
Plaintiffs then filed this action under ORS 246.910(1), seeking judicial review of the secretary’s rejection of each of the proposed measures. Plaintiffs alleged that the secretary had erroneously determined that each of the measures violated the single-subject requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that "each of the Initiative Petitions violates the ‘single-subject’ provision of Article IV, section 1(2)(d) of the Oregon Constitution and finds [the secretary] properly rejected the three (3) initiative petitions." Accordingly, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, granted the secretary’s motion for summary judgment, and entered a general judgment in favor of the secretary. Plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in determining that each proposed measure violates the single-subject requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d) ; they argue that each measure comports with the requirements of that provision as it has been construed by the Supreme Court and by our court. The secretary responds that the trial court correctly affirmed her decision to reject the proposed measures, arguing in the main that the secretary’s decision to reject the measures was proper in light of the statutes and rules that govern the secretary’s review of proposed initiative measures.
"We generally review a trial court’s ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment to determine whether there are any disputed issues of material fact and whether either party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hicks v. Central Point School Dist. , 270 Or. App. 532, 540, 348 P.3d 307, rev. den. , 357 Or. 743, 361 P.3d 608 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, no factual disputes exist; the only question is whether the rejected measures comply with the constitutional single-subject requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d). That question is one of law, so we review for legal error. Mercer , 269 Or. App. at 137, 344 P.3d 109.
As noted, the Oregon Constitution contains two single-subject provisions: Article IV, section 1(2)(d), which applies to initiative measures, and Article IV, section 20, which applies to legislative acts. Although the relevant wording of the two provisions varies in minor respects, the Supreme Court has determined that they "should be given the same meaning." Phillips , 302 Or. at 100, 727 P.2d 602. That means that the case law interpreting either provision informs our analysis of whether a particular proposed initiative satisfies the single-subject requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d).
Under that case law, a two-part framework governs the determination whether a proposed law or constitutional amendment comports with the single-subject requirement. Under the first step of the analysis, a reviewing court asks whether it can identify a "unifying principle logically connecting all provisions" in the measure, such that it can be said that the measure embraces a single subject. State ex rel. Caleb v. Beesley , 326 Or. 83, 91, 949 P.2d 724 (1997) ; McIntire v. Forbes , 322 Or. 426, 443-44, 909 P.2d 846 (1996). If a reviewing court cannot identify that type of logical "unifying principle," then the measure violates the single-subject requirement. Phillips , 302 Or. at 100, 727 P.2d 602. If the court is able to identify the necessary unifying principle, the court examines whether any "other matters" contained in the measure are "properly connected" to the unifying principle identified by the court. Id . ; see also Caleb , 326 Or. at 93, 949 P.2d 724.
As the Supreme Court has explained, the standard "should be liberally construed to uphold legislation." Phillips , 302 Or. at 95, 727 P.2d 602. "The conflict between the constitution and the law should be palpable and clear before the courts should disregard a legislative enactment upon the sole ground that it embraces more than one subject." State of Oregon v. Shaw , 22 Or. 287, 289, 29 P. 1028 (1892). In view of that liberal construction, a proposed law that addresses a single substantive area of the law, even if the proposal "includ[es] a wide range of connected matters intended to accomplish the goal of that single subject," generally satisfies the single-subject requirement. Caleb , 326 Or. at 91, 949 P.2d 724. Said another way, the term "subject" for purposes of the constitutional single-subject requirements "is to be given a broad and extensive meaning" to give legislative drafters "full scope to include in one act all matters having a logical or natural connection." Lovejoy v. Portland , 95 Or. 459, 466, 188 P. 207 (1920).
Although by now plenty of cases illustrate the analysis, the Supreme Court’s decision in Eastman v. Jennings-McRae Logging Co. , 69 Or. 1, 138 P. 216 (1914), is a useful comparator because it addressed a measure not too different from IP 35, IP 36, and IP 37. At issue in Eastman was whether Oregon Laws 1911, chapter 278, section 13, complied with the requirement of Article IV, section 20, that a legislative act embrace only one subject, and that that subject be contained in the legislative title of the act. That measure, like IP 35, IP 36, and IP 37, contained a number of different provisions aimed at protecting...
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Chapter § 19.4
...a single act is permitted as long at those provisions have "a logical or natural connection." Anantha v. Clarno, 302 Or App 196, 201, 461 P3d 282 (2020) (quoting Lovejoy v. Portland, 95 Or 459, 466, 188 P 207 (1920)). To determine whether an act violates Article IV, section 20, a court will......