Anaya v. People
| Decision Date | 07 November 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 86SC428,86SC428 |
| Citation | 764 P.2d 779 |
| Parties | John Steven ANAYA, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
David F. Vela, State Public Defender Douglas D. Barnes, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for petitioner.
Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Cynthia D. Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondent.
In People v. Anaya, 732 P.2d 1241 (Colo.Ct.App.1986), the court of appeals concluded that the trial court erroneously disqualified the trial counsel retained by the defendant but held that the error was harmless because the defendant did not show that he received ineffective assistance from his replacement counsel or that he was harmed or prejudiced by the disqualification. We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' determination that the error was harmless and we now reverse. Under the facts of this case, we conclude that the trial court's erroneous disqualification of a criminal defendant's retained counsel violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and necessitates a new trial.
John Steven Anaya retained Steven Polidori and Marshall Fogel of the law firm of Fogel, Keating and Wagner (the law firm) to represent him in Jefferson County court on charges of second degree assault, attempted second degree kidnapping, felony menacing, and a crime of violence. Prior to the preliminary hearing in the case, the law firm hired Alan Shafner who had been a Jefferson County deputy district attorney for the previous three years. The special prosecutor 1 appointed to prosecute the case for the Jefferson County district attorney's office moved to disqualify the law firm from representing Anaya. The prosecutor alleged that Shafner had knowledge concerning the district attorney's case against Anaya which gave the defense an unfair advantage in the case and raised an appearance of impropriety.
At the hearing to consider the motion for disqualification, Jefferson County deputy district attorney John Byron testified that Shafner attended an informal meeting with other deputy prosecutors where a discussion took place concerning weaknesses in the victim's identification of Anaya and how the weaknesses might be counteracted. Shafner testified that he knew practically nothing about the case and his participation in the discussion was limited to advice regarding similar transaction evidence. Based upon the testimony at the hearing, the county court found that the situation raised an appearance of impropriety and disqualified any member of the law firm from representing Anaya.
Anaya appealed the disqualification ruling to the Jefferson County District Court by seeking relief in the nature of prohibition. On August 19, 1983, the district court affirmed the county court's order based on C.P.R. DR 9-101(B) () and Osborn v. District Court, 619 P.2d 41 (Colo.1980) ().
Anaya then retained new counsel, Ethan Feldman, who entered his appearance on September 2, 1983. At that time, Feldman renewed Anaya's objection to the disqualification of his original counsel and the objection was noted for the record.
The case came to trial almost a year later in August 1984 and Anaya again objected to the disqualification of his original trial counsel. While the jury deliberated, the trial court took up several matters which, as it stated, "the court [had] ruled on during the trial proceedings" and now considered in order "to perfect the record as counsel sees fit on that matter." One such matter was the disqualification of Anaya's original counsel. Feldman represented to the court that Polidori and Fogel (two members of the law firm which had been disqualified) had represented Anaya for many years, that Anaya regarded them as friends, and that Anaya trusted them. Feldman made an offer of proof that Anaya would testify that, at all times throughout the case, it had been Anaya's desire that his original counsel represent him. Feldman argued that the disqualification was erroneous and prejudicial to Anaya. The trial court held that it could not reconsider the disqualification motion and denied the motion.
The jury convicted Anaya of all charges. The trial court made a finding of extraordinary aggravating circumstances, based upon the crime of violence conviction, and sentenced Anaya to an aggravated prison term of eight years for second degree assault and concurrent two-year sentences for the remaining counts.
Anaya appealed the conviction, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by disqualifying his original counsel from the case for appearance of impropriety. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences. It held that although the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying the law firm, the petitioner was not harmed by the trial court's erroneous disqualification of the law firm because Anaya made no showing that the disqualification prejudiced him or caused him to receive ineffective assistance of counsel. The court stated:
Defendant makes no showing of hardship or prejudice as a result of his attorney's disqualification, nor does he claim to have been denied effective assistance of counsel. See Armstrong v. People, 701 P.2d 17 (Colo.1985). On the contrary, defendant asserts only that the court unnecessarily deprived him of representation by the attorney of his choice. While the constitutional right to counsel is absolute, there is no right to a particular counsel. Osborn v. District Court [619 P.2d 41 (Colo.1980) ].
We granted certiorari to determine whether a defendant must demonstrate constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel on the part of his trial attorney in order to receive the remedy of a new trial when his original counsel of choice was erroneously disqualified by the trial court. The People did not cross-petition for review of the court of appeals' holding that the trial court erroneously disqualified the defendant's retained counsel. That issue is not before us and we express no opinion on the correctness of the court of appeals' holding. Our analysis, therefore, is based on the assumption that the law firm was erroneously disqualified and it is limited by the facts of this case to the criminal context. We conclude that a new trial is required in this case.
Anaya's constitutional claim was based on the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution which provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." It long has been recognized that "an accused who desires and is financially able should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S.Ct. 55, 58, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). See also Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9-10, 75 S.Ct. 1, 4-5, 99 L.Ed. 4 (1954). We recognized a defendant's right to retain counsel of choice in Rodriguez v. District Court, 719 P.2d 699 (Colo.1986), where we stated:
A defendant's right to be represented by counsel of choice is grounded in the jurisprudence of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and is entitled to great deference. This guarantee reflects the substantial interest of a defendant in retaining the freedom to select an attorney the defendant trusts and in whom the defendant has confidence.... Because the preservation of this freedom of choice of counsel is a central feature of our adversary system, it is of substantial importance to the integrity of the judicial process.
Id. at 705-06 (citations omitted).
The right to defend is a personal right given directly to the defendant because it is the defendant "who suffers the consequences if the defense fails." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20, 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533, 2540-41, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). As the Supreme Court emphasized:
[a]n unwanted counsel "represents" the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense.
Id. at 820-21, 95 S.Ct. at 2534 (emphasis in original). In the case now before us, there is no indication that Anaya acquiesced in his representation by the attorney who replaced his original counsel of choice. On the contrary, as the facts recited above indicate, he continually renewed his objection to the disqualification of the law firm.
The question before us now is whether the erroneous disqualification of a defendant's counsel of choice may be harmless error. The United States Supreme Court has not addressed this precise issue although, in other contexts involving the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, that Court has held that the error cannot be considered harmless. For example, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1719, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), the Court held that unconstitutional multiple representation is never harmless error. When an actual conflict of interest is shown, the Court said that it refused "to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice" attributable to the conflict (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76, 62 S.Ct. 457, 467, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942)). We reached the same conclusion in People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 943-44 (Colo.1983), where we held that "[i]f an accused demonstrates that his lawyer labored under an actual conflict of interest during the trial, a showing of actual prejudice is not a...
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