Anchorage Plantation Homeowners Ass'n v. Walpole
Decision Date | 25 July 2018 |
Docket Number | Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-337,Appellate Case No. 2016-000281 |
Parties | Anchorage Plantation Homeowners Association, Respondent, v. John B. Walpole and Theodora W. Walpole, Appellants. |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Appeal From Charleston County
R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
AFFIRMED IN PART AND AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED IN PART
Charles S. Altman and Meredith L. Coker, both of Altman & Coker, LLC, of Charleston, for Appellants.
George Trenholm Walker, of Walker Gressette Freeman & Linton, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondent.
Anchorage Plantation Homeowners Association (the Association) of Wadmalaw Island in Charleston County brought suit to determine the rights, if any, John and Theodora Walpole (the Walpoles) had to access, use, and transfer access and use of a private drive and boat dock located within land subject to the "Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for the Anchorage" (Declaration). In this declaratory judgment and injunction action, the After a bench trial, the circuit court found the Walpoles had no access or easement rights to the private drive and boat dock, and as a result, issued a "Court Ordered Cancellation of Easement Agreement," finding the express easement that had been granted to the Walpoles by the developer of the Association (Southern Lifestyles, Inc.) and recorded in the Charleston County registrar of deeds (Recorded Easement)1 was invalid and void ab initio. The Walpoles appeal the circuit court's order. We affirm in part and affirm as modified in part.
1. We find Section 10.3 of the purchase agreement between the Walpoles and Southern Lifestyles, Inc. for the property known as Phase I and Phase II of the Anchorage Plantation did not create an easement for the Wadpoles' (1) personal use of any road within Phase I and Phase II for the purposes of ingress and egress to properties owned or leased by the Walpoles; or (2) personal access to Bohicket Creek over the community boat ramp and courtesy dock located in Phase II because at the time the parties executed the purchase agreement, the Wapoles still retained legal title to both Phase I and Phase II, as well as their other properties. See Windham v. Riddle, 370 S.C. 415, 635 S.E.2d 558 (Ct. App. 2006) (), aff'd, 381 S.C. 192, 672 S.E.2d 578 (2009). Moreover, the deed transferring title of Phase I and Phase II to Southern Lifestyles, Inc. does not contain such an easement. See Wilson v. Landstrom, 281 S.C. 260, 264, 315 S.E.2d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1984) ( . Accordingly, we affirm as modified the circuit court's finding that the Wadpoles were not entitled to an easement based upon the purchase agreement and the deed to Phase I and Phase II.
2. We find the Phase I and Phase II land was encumbered by the Declaration whenSouthern Lifestyles, Inc. granted the Recorded Easement to the Walpoles. See Kinard v. Richardson, 407 S.C. 247, 259, 754 S.E.2d 888, 894-95 (Ct. App. 2014) ( ). We also agree with the circuit court's construction of the Declaration: Southern Lifestyles, Inc. was explicit and specific about the rights it reserved for itself within the Declaration, and unless Southern Lifestyles, Inc. followed the procedure set forth in the Declaration when adding new property to the Association and subjugating that new property to the Declarations' covenants and restrictions, Southern Lifestyles Inc. could not grant that property access to or use of the Association's private road and boat dock. See Snow v. Smith, 416 S.C. 72, 89-90, 784 S.E.2d 242, 251 (Ct. App. 2016) ( ). To hold otherwise would contravene Section 16.12 of the Declaration. See Palmetto Dunes Resort v. Brown, 287 S.C. 1, 6, 336 S.E.2d 15, 18 (Ct. App. 1985) ( ). Accordingly, we find the Declaration did not give Southern Lifestyles, Inc. the authority to transfer the type of interest it was attempting to transfer to the Walpoles in the Recorded Easement; thus, we affirm the circuit court's finding that the Recorded Easement was invalid and, therefore, void ab initio. See Belue v. Fetner, 251 S.C. 600, 606-07, 164 S.E.2d 753, 756 (1968) ( ); Snow, 416 S.C. at 84, 784 S.E.2d at 248 .
3. Because we find the Recorded Easement was invalidly conveyed, we need not address the circuit court's additional findings that the Recorded Easement was substantively invalid. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) ( ).
4. We find that, as a real party in interest, the Association had standing to bring this suit. See Bailey v. Bailey, 312 S.C. 454, 458, 441 S.E.2d 325, 327 (1994) (); id. ( ). We find the Walpoles' argument that the Association was acting outside the scope of its corporate powers in commencing this suit is not appropriate for a standing analysis, but rather, must be asserted by the Attorney General, or a director of the corporation, or a member of the corporation in a derivative action. See S.C. Code Ann. § 33-31-304 (2006). Further, even if the Walpoles' ultra vires argument was appropriate, we find it is without merit, because, under the Declaration, the Association is only required to achieve a seventy-five percent member vote to commence litigation on a matter when the amount-in-controversy is over $25,000; whereas, in this case, the relief requested was declaratory and injunctive. See Nichols Holding, LLC, 416 S.C. at 336, 785 S.E.2d at 617 .
5. Because we find the question of whether an express easement is valid sounds in equity, we find the statute of limitations does not bar the Association from challenging the validity of the Recorded Easement. See Parr v. Parr, 268 S.C. 58, 67, 231 S.E.2d 695, 699 (1977) ( ); Harvey v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 338 S.C. 500, 506, 527 S.E.2d 765, 768-69 (Ct. App. 2000) () ; see also SPUR at Williams Brice Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Lalla, 415 S.C. 72, 82, 781 S.E.2d 115, 120 (Ct. App. 2015) ; Skipper v. Perrone, 382 S.C. 53, 57, 674 S.E.2d 510, 512 (Ct. App. 2009) ( ); O'Cain v. O'Cain, 322 S.C. 551, 560, 473 S.E.2d 460, 465 (Ct. App. 1996) ( ).
6. We find the circuit court was within its discretion in finding the Association was not barred from challenging the validity of the Recorded Easement by the doctrine of laches. See Brown v. Butler, 347 S.C. 259, 265, 554 S.E.2d 431, 434 (Ct. App. 2001) (). While the Association waited at least nine years after having constructive notice of the Recorded Easement to file the present lawsuit—and, in that time, the Walpoles expended time, energy, and money applying for the approval of their property's subdivision—the Walpoles were aware of the Association's objections to the validity of the...
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