Anderson v. Anderson
Decision Date | 02 March 1984 |
Citation | 468 N.E.2d 784,13 Ohio App.3d 194 |
Parties | , 13 O.B.R. 242 ANDERSON, Appellant, v. ANDERSON, Appellee. * |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. R.C. 3105.65 does not confer jurisdiction upon a domestic relations court to modify either agreed alimony or a property division.
2. A domestic relations court lacks jurisdiction to modify a property division in a separation agreement which has been incorporated into a decree of dissolution of marriage.
3. Where a person has benefited from the entry of a decree of dissolution of marriage by relying on the decree for purposes of remarriage, he is estopped from attacking the judgment of dissolution.
4. Section 1408(d)(2), Title 10, U.S.Code of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act does not require that the ten-year threshold be met by consecutive years of marriage, i.e., the ten-year requirement may be obtained by "tacking" on "credit" from two marriages to the same spouse.
Fred J. Andary, Dayton, for appellant Loren A. Anderson.
J. Timothy Campbell, Xenia, for appellee Ione LeMay Anderson (King).
Colonel Loren A. Anderson, and Ione LeMay Anderson (now King) were remarried on June 8, 1975. At that time Loren was on active duty as an officer in the United States Air Force. He remained on active duty until his retirement in 1978.
The parties herein were divorced on February 4, 1975 after nearly twenty-five years of marriage. As noted, they remarried three months later and remained so for the next seven years. On January 15, 1982, the Andersons filed a petition for dissolution of marriage and attached their separation agreement pursuant to R.C. 3105.63.
In addition to the usual division of real and personal property, the separation agreement included the following provision:
Loren Anderson had been receiving his military pension since his retirement in 1978.
A decree of dissolution was entered on February 19, 1982, wherein the separation agreement was incorporated as part of the decree. The entry stated that both parties had appeared before the court and had "acknowledged under oath that they voluntarily entered into the Separation Agreement." In August of that year Ione married her present husband, Robert J. King.
On February 18, 1983, nearly one year to the day after the parties' marriage was dissolved, the appellee, Ione LeMay King, moved for relief from judgment and requested the following three branches of relief:
Accompanying the motion for relief from judgment was an affidavit of the movant wherein she stated:
A hearing was held on this motion on May 6, 1983. Per decision entered May 20, 1983, the trial court overruled branches two and three of the requested relief while sustaining the movant's first branch, to wit: vacate and amend the separation agreement so as to permit Ione LeMay King to share in her exhusband's military retirement pay. In its decision the court stated:
The trial court therefore granted movant's request to vacate and amend Paragraph 13 of the separation agreement. The court ordered a hearing to be held in order to determine the amount of pension benefits to which the movant was entitled. The hearing is pending the outcome of this court's decision.
From this judgment the respondent, Loren A. Anderson, timely filed a notice of appeal to this court. On appeal he has set forth the following three assignments of error:
Under his first assignment of error appellant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to amend the alimony provisions of the separation agreement. This court has had two prior occasions to address this issue and did indeed conclude as appellant asserts, to wit, the domestic relations court does indeed lack jurisdiction to amend a separation agreement as it pertains to alimony pursuant to a dissolution. See Holtz v. Holtz (May 11, 1982), Montgomery App. No. 7401, unreported; Havlin v. Havlin (Aug. 24, 1982), Montgomery App. No. 7663, unreported. This conclusion is further supported by the decision of the Franklin County Court of Appeals in Alban v. Alban (1981), 1 Ohio App.3d 146, 439 N.E.2d 963. The syllabus of this decision states:
"R.C. 3105.65(B) does not confer jurisdiction upon a court of common pleas to modify periodic alimony payments provided for in a separation agreement incorporated in a decree of dissolution of marriage, at least in the absence of a provision in the separation agreement for such modification."
In her brief appellee does not dispute the status of the case law on this point, rather she maintains this case deals with the division of property as opposed to alimony. It is appellee's position we should treat the division of property differently from alimony in determining whether a trial court may invoke jurisdiction over the modification of a separation agreement.
We would agree with appellee's argument that the military retirement pension is an asset which should appropriately be classified as property. However, whether or not it is so classified makes no difference for the purposes of this appeal. It is our opinion that R.C. 3105.65 does not confer jurisdiction upon a court of common pleas to modify either agreed alimony or a property division. R.C. 3105.65(B) provides in part:
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