McMichael v. McMichael

• Decision Date: 26 July 1996
• Docket Number: Docket No. 171983
• Citation: 217 Mich.App. 723,552 N.W.2d 688
• Parties: Mike M. McMICHAEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jacqueline Y. McMICHAEL, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 688

552 N.W.2d 688

217 Mich.App. 723

Mike M. McMICHAEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jacqueline Y. McMICHAEL, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 171983.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 18, 1996, at Detroit.

Decided July 26, 1996, at 9:10 a.m.

Released for Publication Sept. 13, 1996.

Osstyn, Bays, Ferns & Quinnell by William B. Ferns, Marquette, for plaintiff.

McDonald, Marin & Kipper by Paul M. Marin, Marquette, for defendant.

Before: HOOD, P.J., and GRIFFIN and J.F. FOLEY ^*, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right that portion of the circuit court's judgment of divorce that awards defendant a portion of his pension benefits that accrued during the parties' first marriage (prior-acquired benefits). We affirm.

Plaintiff and defendant were first married on October 19, 1974, and divorced in Arkansas on September 28, 1984. Three children were born to the parties during their first marriage: Gary, eighteen years of age at the time of trial, Michael, sixteen, and Tessa, thirteen. Gary resides with plaintiff while the two minor children reside with defendant. The parties remarried each other on April 4, 1987. They divorced on September 24, 1993. No additional children were born to the parties during their second marriage.

The divorce judgment followed a one-day bench trial. Plaintiff testified that he was thirty-nine and an E-7 Master Sergeant aircraft mechanic on active duty in the United States Air Force since 1974. Defendant was thirty-seven at the time of trial. She was unemployed at the time of trial but had recently worked as a receptionist for $6 an hour for twenty hours a week. Defendant had a general equivalency diploma (GED) and a certificate for a year and a half of vocational school and business training. There were several allegations of fault against each party. Plaintiff was to begin receiving pension benefits on May 1, 1994, when he planned to retire. He believed the payments would amount to $926 a month.

The trial court added together the duration of both marriages and awarded defendant one-half of those benefits that plaintiff earned over the sixteen years the parties were married. (This amounts to forty percent of the pension, or $378.74 a month.) The court did not award any pension to defendant for the interim period during which the parties were not married. The court explained that it was awarding the pension in this way because there was mutual fault in the divorce, the pension appeared to be plaintiff's sole source of support, the law of pension division has been developing rapidly in recent years with courts becoming more willing to grant a share in a pension to a spouse following a longstanding marriage, the Arkansas judgment did make provision for a property settlement, and, as a matter of equity and fairness, the court should

award the pension as though the marriage were a sixteen year marriage, and not a six year marriage, and that is my view of the equities of the case. I could be wrong about it. I may be wrong as a matter of law, but if [I] am, Mr. McMichael, I think what you will have to do is talk with your lawyer about taking an appeal of that decision that I have made, and having it looked at by a higher court, but it is my view of the equities of the situation that we should consider this as a sixteen year marriage for purposes of awarding rights in the pension.

Plaintiff moved for a new trial. He argued that the trial court had improperly relied on non-Michigan authority, Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Ohio App.3d 194, 468 N.E.2d 784 (1984), to combine the duration of the two marriages, that the award of prior-acquired benefits was precluded by the Arkansas divorce decree, and that the court should follow the Kilbride v. Kilbride, 172 Mich.App. 421, 432 N.W.2d 324 (1988), line of cases that held that prior-acquired benefits cannot be treated as marital assets.

The trial court denied plaintiff's motion on the basis of the "equity of the situation." The trial court observed that the parties had been married a considerable length of time and that there were very few assets of any kind to be distributed. Addressing the claim of collateral estoppel, the court noted that the Arkansas divorce decree did not mention the pension and there was no indication that the Arkansas divorce court gave any consideration to any future rights defendant might have in the pension.

Plaintiff's sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in awarding defendant a fifty percent interest in the pension benefits earned during the first marriage (i.e., twenty-five percent of the total pension, or $236.71 a month). Plaintiff appeals only that portion of the award to defendant. He does not dispute the award to defendant of half of the pension benefits that he earned during the second marriage (i.e., fifteen percent of the total pension, or $142.03 a month).

Plaintiff first argues that because the 1984 divorce judgment actually and necessarily determined all of defendant's rights in his pension with regard to the period of the first marriage, she is precluded from relitigating her share of plaintiff's pension with regard to that period of marriage. We disagree. The applicability of collateral estoppel is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. Husted v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 213 Mich.App. 547, 555, 540 N.W.2d 743 (1995). Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent, different cause of action between the same parties when the prior proceeding culminated in a valid final judgment and the issue was actually and necessarily determined in the prior proceeding. Porter v. Royal Oak, 214 Mich.App. 478, 485, 542 N.W.2d 905 (1995).

In this case, there is no evidence in the record that the issue of the pension was actually litigated or necessarily decided in the Arkansas divorce. The decree is silent with regard to the pension. Defendant testified that the reason the Arkansas decree was silent about the pension is that she was unaware that it existed then. Additionally, in his brief on appeal, plaintiff states that

at the time of that first divorce in 1984, the Plaintiff did not have a vested interest in a military pension, and had in fact only served 50% of the time that was necessary in order to vest his pension.

Thus, plaintiff himself in effect concedes that the pension was not considered in the Arkansas proceedings. Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to provide this Court with any Arkansas authority to support the contention that in 1984 the Arkansas divorce courts were compelled to rule regarding the allocation of unvested pension benefits. Having reviewed Arkansas law, we find that at the time the parties were divorced, the Arkansas court that presided over the parties' 1984 divorce proceeding was not required to consider plaintiff's unvested pension. See Durham v. Durham, 289 Ark. 3, 708 S.W.2d 618 (1986); Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984). We therefore conclude that the trial court properly determined that collateral estoppel did not apply and defendant was not precluded from litigating the issue of prior-acquired benefits.

Plaintiff further argues that the trial court erred in relying on Anderson, supra, to "tack" the marriages together for property division purposes. ¹ However, the trial court in the instant case denied that it relied on Anderson. In fact, in granting defendant a portion of the prior-acquired benefits, it stated that it acted according to the "equities of the case." Therefore, this issue is without merit and an analysis and application of Anderson is unnecessary to resolve this issue.

Plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in granting defendant the portion of his pension that accrued during the first marriage because prior-acquired pension benefits may not be divided as marital property. We disagree. In deciding the instant case, this Court must first review the trial court's findings of facts under the clearly erroneous standard. Sparks v. Sparks, 440 Mich. 141, 150, 485 N.W.2d 893 (1992). If the findings are upheld, we must decide whether the dispositive ruling was fair and equitable in light of those facts. Id., pp. 150-151, 485 N.W.2d 893. The ruling should be affirmed unless this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id., p. 151, 485 N.W.2d 893.

Plaintiff incorrectly contends that the court should have followed the Kilbride, supra, line of cases that held that prior-acquired benefits cannot be treated as marital assets. Previously, a conflict existed in this Court with regard to whether a pension accrued before a marriage may be divisible. The Kilbride line of cases on which plaintiff relies held that the portion of a pension that accrued before the marriage could not be considered part of the marital estate subject to distribution. Lesko v. Lesko, 184 Mich.App. 395, 457 N.W.2d 695 (1990); Kurz v. Kurz, 178 Mich.App. 284, 292, 443 N.W.2d 782 (1989). The Kilbride line of cases relied in large part on M.C.L. § 552.18(1...