Anderson v. Armstrong

• Decision Date: 29 May 1943
• Citation: 171 S.W.2d 401,180 Tenn. 56
• Parties: ANDERSON v. ARMSTRONG et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

171 S.W.2d 401

180 Tenn. 56

ANDERSON v. ARMSTRONG et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

May 29, 1943

Error to Circuit Court, Wilson County; R. W. Smartt, Judge.

Personal injury action by Miss Ruth Anderson against Harry L Armstrong and others. The trial court sustained defendant's motion for a directed verdict and dismissed the action, and on plaintiff's appeal in error the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a trial on its merits and Bernarr MacFadden Foundation, Inc. petitions for writ of certiorari.

Certiorari denied.

W. S Faulkner, of Lebanon, for plaintiff in error.

Walker & Hooker, of Nashville, and S. B. Gilreath, of Lebanon, for defendant in error.

DeHAVEN Justice.

The question presented is whether a judgment in a tort action will be permitted to be entered against an organization administering a charitable trust when it does not appear there is property not used exclusively in the business of the trust out of which the judgment can be satisfied.

This case is before the court on the petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals filed by Bernarr MacFadden Foundation Inc., a charitable corporation engaged in conducting a school for boys near Lebanon, Tennessee, known as Castle Heights Military Academy.

The action is one to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff as the result of defendant's alleged negligence in permitting certain horses, kept and used by defendant in training the students, to run unattended upon the public highway. It is alleged that one of these horses, in the night time, ran into plaintiff's automobile, which she was driving, causing the wreck of the automobile and serious personal injuries to herself.

The trial judge sustained defendant's motion for a directed verdict and dismissed the suit. On plaintiff's appeal in error the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for a trial on its merits.

It is contended by petitioner that the claim of plaintiff cannot be reduced to judgment since it is a charitable organization and owns no property not directly and exclusively used in the operation of the trust, or any property subject to taxation.

It is perfectly true that the property of a charitable trust used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such charitable purposes is immune from execution under judgment for tort; but property not so used, is subject to such judgment. Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Couillens, 176 Tenn. 300, 140 S.W.2d 1088; McLeod v. St. Thomas Hospital, 170 Tenn. 423, 95 S.W.2d 917; Gamble v. Vanderbilt University, 138 Tenn. 616, 200 S.W. 510, L.R.A. 1918C, 875; Hammond Post No. 3, American Legion v. Willis, Tenn. Sup., 165 S.W.2d 78; Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn.App. 135, 127 S.W.2d 284, (certiorari denied). In all of these cases, it appears that the charity was either possessed of property subject to execution on a judgment in tort, or was carrying insurance protecting against such executions.

The protection afforded a charitable organization is not immunity from suit in tort, but is one extended to the trust property itself from execution under a judgment in tort. In McLeod v. St. Thomas Hospital, supra [170 Tenn. 423, 95 S.W.2d 919], the court said:

"Upon consideration of the cases dealing with the question, and reflecting upon the true principle involved, we think it fairly may be said that the exemption and protection afforded to a charitable institution is not immunity from suit, not nonliability for a tort, but that the protection actually given is to the trust funds themselves. It is

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