Anderson v. Bell

• Decision Date: 22 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. 20100237.,20100237.
• Citation: 234 P.3d 1147,2010 UT 47
• Parties: Farley ANDERSON; Helen Anderson; Steven G. Maxfield; and Steven K. Maxfield, Petitioners,v.Lt. Governor Gregg BELL; Mark Thomas; Paul Neuenschwander; Spencer Hadley; and John Does 1-10, Respondents.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

234 P.3d 1147

2010 UT 47

Farley ANDERSON; Helen Anderson; Steven G. Maxfield; and Steven K. Maxfield, Petitioners,v.Lt. Governor Gregg BELL; Mark Thomas; Paul Neuenschwander; Spencer Hadley; and John Does 1-10, Respondents.

No. 20100237.

Supreme Court of Utah.

June 22, 2010.

Brent V. Manning, Tyson B. Snow, Karen McCreary, Marina Baginsky Lowe, Salt Lake City, Joann S. Secrist, St. George, Utah, for petitioners.

Steven G. Maxfield, Kanosh, Utah, Pro Se, Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Thom D. Roberts, Asst. Att'y Gen., Lohra L. Miller, Jason Rose, Salt Lake City, David L. Patterson, Brock R. Belnap, St. George, Utah, for respondents.

David R. Irvine, Alan L. Smith, Salt Lake City, for intervenor.

DURHAM, Chief Justice:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 This petition for extraordinary writ asks us to resolve whether a candidate may use electronic signatures to satisfy the signature requirement that the Utah Code imposes on those who wish to run for statewide office but do not affiliate with a registered political party. In other words, does an electronic signature count toward a “signed” nomination certificate under section 20A-9-502 of the Utah Code.

¶ 2 Petitioner Farley Anderson wishes to run for governor without affiliating with a registered political party. As an unaffiliated candidate, Mr. Anderson must, among other requirements of Title 20A, collect the signatures of 1,000 registered voters before his name may be placed on the statewide ballot. Mr. Anderson collected the necessary signatures in two forms: hand-signed signatures, and electronic signatures entered through a computer website advocating his candidacy. Mr. Anderson then followed the statutory procedure that requires him to first submit the signatures to county clerks throughout the state for verification that each signor is a registered voter and has not signed the petition of any other unaffiliated candidate. Clerks in seven counties apparently certified that 1,055 of the signatures submitted by Mr. Anderson were valid. Upon county-clerk verification, unaffiliated candidates must submit their signatures and a completed certificate of nomination to the Lt. Governor by a statutorily defined date.

¶ 3 On March 19, 2010, Mr. Anderson submitted his petition and the supporting signatures to the Lieutenant Governor's Office. The Lt. Governor, however, excised the electronic signatures from Mr. Anderson's nomination, taking the position that electronic signatures do not constitute signatures under the Utah Election Code. Without those signatures, Mr. Anderson's nomination fell short of the mandatory 1,000 signatures and the Lt. Governor rejected him as a candidate for the forthcoming gubernatorial election.¹

¶ 4 Mr. Anderson responded to the Lt. Governor's decision by filing this petition for extraordinary writ under rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.²

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5 Because rule 19 authorizes this court to entertain petitions for extraordinary writ under rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the standards enumerated in the latter rule dictate our standard of review. Walker v. Weber County, 973 P.2d 927, 929-30 (Utah 1998). Given that Mr. Anderson's argument is founded on a theory that the Lt. Governor lacks authority to remove signatures from a certificate of nomination under Utah Code section 20A-9-502 (Supp.2009), the petition is best articulated as falling within subpart c of rule 65B; a party may seek relief where an individual “unlawfully ... exercises a public office.” Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(c)(2)(A). We review whether a government actor has “ ‘unlawfully’ exercised the authority of their office” through an “abuse of discretion standard.” Walker, 973 P.2d at 929 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(c))(“[W]e determine only whether the officials have so exercised their discretion that it can be said that they have failed to do what the statute requires, or have done something which the statute does not permit.”).

ANALYSIS

¶ 6 Mr. Anderson's petition for extraordinary writ presents two primary arguments supporting his position that he is entitled to have his name placed on the forthcoming ballot for the governor's seat. First, he argues electronic signatures plainly satisfy the requirements of Utah Code section 20A-9-502 (Supp.2009). A corollary to this argument is a theory that the statutory scheme does not give the Lt. Governor the authority to define what constitutes to a valid signature. Alternatively, Mr. Anderson makes a number of constitutional arguments. The most notable of these is a claim that the Election Code's early statutory deadline imposed upon unaffiliated candidates to file a certificate of nomination violates the protections of the United States and Utah Constitutions.

¶ 7 Given our ultimate holding that an electronic signature satisfies the signature mandate imposed on unaffiliated candidates, we decline to address Mr. Anderson's constitutional claims. See State ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 5, 165 P.3d 1206 (stating that we need not address “ ‘constitutional issues unless required to do so’ ” and resolving an appeal on statutory grounds while not addressing the parties' constitutional arguments (quoting Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ¶ 10, 5 P.3d 616)). Additionally, we can strike Mr. Anderson's early-deadline argument because it was not in his original petition for extraordinary writ and first surfaced at oral argument and in his supplemental briefing. See Utah R.App. P. 19(b)(7) (requiring petitioners to file a memorandum with “points and authorities in support of the petition”); see also Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring appellants to provide “contentions and reasons ... with respect to the issues presented”).

I. THE SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 20A-9-502 MAY BE SATISFIED WITH AN ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE

¶ 8 Mr. Anderson's petition for extraordinary writ can be resolved by answering a single, distinctive question: what is a “signature” under section 20A-9-502? Or more specifically, does an electronic signature qualify as a valid signature under this statutory subsection?

¶ 9 Our goal when confronted with questions of statutory interpretation “is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature.” Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, ¶ 16, 158 P.3d 540 (internal quotation marks omitted); Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562-63 (Utah 1996). It is axiomatic that the best evidence of legislative intent is “the plain language of the statute itself.” Duke, 2007 UT 31, ¶ 16, 158 P.3d 540 (internal quotation marks omitted). But our plain language analysis is not so limited that we only inquire into individual words and subsections in isolation; our interpretation of a statute requires that each part or section be “ ‘construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.’ ” Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, ¶ 7, 162 P.3d 1099 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ¶ 54, 63 P.3d 621); State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ¶ 8, 63 P.3d 667. Moreover, “the purpose of the statute” has an influence on the plain meaning of a statute. R & R Indus. Park, L.L.C. v. Utah Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 2008 UT 80, ¶¶ 23, 36, 199 P.3d 917.

¶ 10 The statute we are called upon to interpret to resolve Mr. Anderson's petition is section 20A-9-502. In subpart one of this statute, individuals must circulate a certificate of nomination and obtain “the required number of signatures of registered voters required by law.” Utah Code Ann. § 20A-9-502(1) (Supp.2009) (emphasis added) (providing a certificate of nomination form). Subpart two of this section describes the procedures the prospective candidate must follow to gain access to the ballot. It states:

(a) The candidate shall circulate the nomination petition and submit it to the county clerk for certification when the petition has been completed by: (i) at least 1,000 registered voters residing within the state....

(b) In reviewing the petition, the county clerk shall count and certify only those persons who signed the petition who: (i) are registered voters ...; and (ii) did not sign any other certificate of nomination for that office.

Id. § 20A-9-502(2) (emphasis added). The legislature, however, did not define what the terms “signature,” “signed,” or “completed” mean within this subsection. Moreover, the parties have alerted us to no other provision within Title 20A that provides a definition of these terms. See generally id. § 20A-1-102 (providing definitions governing Title 20A but not including the terms “signature,” “sign,” or “complete” within the list).

A. We Must Liberally Construe the Statutory Framework Covering Unaffiliated Candidates to Give Them Every Reasonable Opportunity to Make Their Candidacy Effective

¶ 11 The legislature has provided us with specific guidance when considering the statutory framework controlling nomination petitions of unaffiliated candidates. The legislature directed that “[t]he courts shall construe this part liberally so as to give unaffiliated candidates for public office every reasonable opportunity to make their candidacy effective.” Id. § 20A-9-501(3) (2007) (emphasis added). As we stated previously, the legislative purpose underlying a statute influences the plain language employed by the legislature. R & R Indus. Park, 2008 UT 80, ¶ 36, 199 P.3d 917. The language directing courts to “liberally” construe part 5 of chapter 9 reveals a legislative purpose that favors unaffiliated candidates' access to the ballot. Section 20A-9-501(3) plainly directs us to liberally construe part 5 to give this category of candidate every reasonable opportunity to get on the ballot and campaign for political office. Moreover, the directive to liberally construe the statutory framework appears in only one other place in the Election Code. Part 4 of chapter 9 opens with the mandate that the statutory scheme governing primary elections “be construed liberally so as to ensure full opportunity for persons to become candidates....” Id. §...