Anderson v. Board of Sup'rs of San Diego County

• Decision Date: 21 September 1964
• Citation: 229 Cal.App.2d 796,40 Cal.Rptr. 541
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Erwin F. ANDERSON et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF the COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 7300.

Page 541

40 Cal.Rptr. 541

229 Cal.App.2d 796

Erwin F. ANDERSON et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF the COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 7300.

District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, California.

Sept. 21, 1964.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 9, 1964.

Hearing Denied Nov. 19, 1964.

Wencke, Carlson & Kuykendall, and Paul Hofflund, San Diego, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Bertram McLees, Jr., County Counsel, Robert G. Berrey, Asst. County Counsel and Lawrence Kapiloff, Deputy County Counsel, for defendants and respondents.

McCABE, Justice pro tem.

Appellants, classified civil service employees of the County of San Diego, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, petitioned the Superior Court for a writ of mandate to require the respondent Board of Supervisors of the County of San Diego to comply with Section 40 of the charter of San Diego County. From the judgment denying the mandate this appeal has been filed.

Included in the original charter of the County, adopted in 1932, was Section 40, Chapter 10, Article VIII which reads as follows:

'In fixing compensation, the Board of Supervisors shall at least annually, by ordinance, provide in each instance for the payment of not less than the prevailing or general current rate of compensation or wages paid by private employers in the County of San Diego for similar quality or quantity of service, in case such prevailing compensation or wages can be ascertained.'

Effective July 1, 1935, the charter was amended to incorporate civil service provisions. In so amending and adding civil service provisions, Section 79, Chapter 10, Article XVII became part of the charter:

'The Commission shall prescribe, amend and enforce rules for the Classified Service, which shall have the force and effect of law; shall keep minutes of its proceedings and records of its examinations and shall, as a Board or through a single Commissioner, make investigations concerning the enforcement and effect of this article and of the rules and efficiency of the service. Such rules shall provide:

'(a) For the standardization and classification of all positions in the classified service. This classification into groups and subdivisions shall be based upon and graded according to the duties and responsibilities of such positions, and shall be so arranged as to permit and encourage the filling of the higher grades through transfers and promotions. All salaries of employees in the classified service shall be uniform for like service in each grade, as the same shall be classified and standardized by the Commission. No such standardization or classification of salaries shall become final until approved by the Board of Supervisors in the annual appropriation ordinance and no such salaries shall be paid except in accordance with such standardization and classification. The Board of Supervisors shall not approve of any such standardization or classification of salaries until at least thirty days after it shall have been submitted to the Board of Supervisors by the Commission, and shall have been considered at not less than two meetings of said Board. For the purpose of making the first standardization and classification, the Board of Supervisors shall, upon request of the Commission, furnish to the Commission such assistance as may be necessary.' Fundamentally petitioners assert that § 79 does not amend or abridge the function of the Board of Supervisors as delineated in § 40 and the duty cannot be delegated.

The 'functions of the civil service commission are administrative, ministerial and executive'. (Cornell v. Harris, 15 Cal.App.2d 144, 153, 59 P.2d 570, 574.) The mandatory words which are a part of § 40 have not been changed by § 79. The legislative authority to determine salaries rests solely upon the Respondent Board of Supervisors. This authority it may not, and did not, delegate.

The procedure followed by the Respondent Board of Supervisors was similar to that followed in Fresno and the City and County of San Francisco. (See Goodrich v. City of Fresno, 74 Cal.App.2d 31, 167 P.2d 784, and City and County of San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Cal.2d 685, 140 P.2d 666.) The procedures followed in each of the above named counties were specifically provided for in the county charter.

The procedure followed was that prior to Respondent Board passing the 1961-62 salary ordinance, the Respondent Civil Service Commission made contacts with various departments, obtained suggestions, took part in the survey which was carried on by four governmental departments, and analyzed the data. All this data and information was transmitted to the Griffenhagen-Kroeger Company, which had been employed by the County. This company had as its principal business analysis of data. This company then submitted its recommendations to the Respondent Civil Service Commission which in turn submitted all of the data, information, the Griffenhagen-Kroeger recommendations and made its recommendations to the Respondent Board of Supervisors. After consideration, the Respondent Board passed the salary ordinance.

'The courts will not interfere with the board's determination of whether proposed rates of compensation are in accord with generally prevailing rates unless the 'action is fraudulent or so palpably unreasonable and arbitrary as to indicate an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.' City and County of San Francisco v. Boyd, supra, 22 Cal.2d 685, 690, 140 P.2d 666, 668.' (Walker v. County of Los Angeles, 55 Cal.2d 626, 639, 12 Cal.Rptr. 671, 678, 361 P.2d 247, 254.)

In the Walker case the Board, because of an evenly split vote, could make no determination of the mandatory factors at the time it adopted a salary ordinance and as required by its ordinance. Because of this impasse, the Board passed an ordinance adopting a previous year's schedule of salary. The Supreme Court stated this was improper and the Board had failed to comply with the charter mandate. In so doing, this court said, 55 Cal.2d at page 635, 12 Cal.Rptr. at page 678, 361 P.2d at page 252:

'Here section 47 provides for a specific test with which the salary ordinance adopted by the board must comply. While it does not expressly provide...