Anderson v. Board of Public Instruction for Hillsborough County

• Decision Date: 03 August 1931
• Citation: 102 Fla. 695,136 So. 334
• Parties: ANDERSON v. BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

136 So. 334

102 Fla. 695

ANDERSON v. BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY et al.

Florida Supreme Court

August 3, 1931

En Banc.

Suit by John G. Anderson, Jr., against the Board of Public Instruction for the County of Hillsborough and others. From a final decree denying the injunction and dismissing the bill plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and rendered.

Syllabus by the Court.

SYLLABUS

The Supreme Court will take judicial notice of the contents of the Journals of the Legislature to determine whether necessary proof of publication was attached to a special or local law when it was introduced, as required by section 21 of article 3 of the Constitution, as amended at the General Election of 1928.

Where a legislative bill is introduced and treated by the Legislature as a general law, but in truth and in fact it clearly appears to be operative as a local or special act, and the courts can so determine from its obvious purpose or legal effect as gathered from its language or its context, the courts will regard such enactment as a local or special act within the purview of section 21 of article 3 of the Constitution in passing on its validity, regardless of the guise in which such act may have been framed, and regardless of whether the particular county or locality intended to be affected by it is in terms named or identified in such act, or not.

Within reasonable limits, the Legislature may classify counties for governmental purposes according to population or otherwise for the purpose of enactment of general laws, and where a proper and reasonable classification is made according to population or otherwise, such act will nevertheless be regarded as a general law and not as a special or local law even though the result be an act whose operation is confined to a single county falling between two specified populations. But in every case the classification adopted must be reasonable and not arbitrary.

Classification in law is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another or in certain particulars, and differ from other things in those same particulars. Classification must always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without any such basis. Whether or not a classification adopted is purely arbitrary or is a reasonable and practical one within the legislative discretion, is a subject for judicial review and determination in contested cases presenting justiciable controversies.

When a classification of counties for governmental purposes based upon population or otherwise is made by the Legislature in the enactment of general laws for governmental purposes in regard to the counties classified, if any state of facts can reasonably be conceived that will sustain the classification attempted by the Legislature, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted will be presumed by the courts, and the deference due to the legislative judgment in the matter will be observed in all cases where the court cannot say on its judicial knowledge that the Legislature could not have had any reasonable ground for believing that there were public considerations justifying the particular classification and distinction made.

A bill is still to be considered a local or special act for which notice of intention to apply for its passage must be published as required by the Constitution, in every case where it appears that such act applies only to a county or counties of a particular classification according to population, and it further appears that no state of facts can reasonably be conceived that would justify a determination by the Legislature that the act is intended to be of general uniform operation throughout the state in the particular counties affected, because the counties embraced within the classification made, agree with one another in certain particulars, and differ from other counties in those same particulars so as to warrant the grouping of the affected counties as a class, and their segregation for legislative purposes from the other counties of the state, with respect to the object intended to be accomplished by the enactment.

House Bill No. 200XX, enacted at Second Extraordinary Session of the Legislature 1931, approved by the Governor July 24, 1931 and providing for the calling and holding of special school district tax elections in all counties of the state of Florida having a population of not less than 145,000 and not more than 155,000, held to be a special or local law and not constitutionally enacted in accordance with section 21 of article 3 of the Constitution, as amended in 1928, because no notice of intention to apply for passage of same appears to have been given, as required by organic law. Appeal from Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; L. L. Parks, judge.

COUNSEL

C. Edmund Worth, of Tampa, for appellant.

W. F. Himes, of Tampa, for appellees.

OPINION

DAVIS J.

This was a taxpayers' suit brought by the appellant, John G. Anderson, Jr., as complainant in the court below, suing on behalf of himself and all other taxpayers of special tax school district No. 4 in Hillsborough county, Fla., to enjoin the board of public instruction of said county from holding or canvassing the result of a proposed election required to be held with reference to special tax school districts of the county by the provisions of an act of the Second Extraordinary Session of the 1931 Legislature so providing, and to enjoin the paying out or expending any funds of said special tax school district of which the complainant was a taxpayer in or about the conduct and holding of said election and the publication of notice thereof. The court below denied the application for injunction, although the chancellor in this order expressed the belief that the act requiring the election to be held was probably unconstitutional. The appeal is from a final decree denying the injunction and dismissing the bill.

At the second Special Session of the Legislature of the State of Florida held in the year 1931, the Legislature passed and the Governor approved on July 24, 1931, the following act:

'An act providing for the calling of elections in the special tax school districts in all of the counties of the state having a population of not less than 145,000 and not more than 155,000; providing for the calling of said election within thirty days from the time this act becomes a law; providing for the giving of notice of said election; providing that the question of millage to be levied for the fiscal year July 1st, 1931 to June 30th, 1932, be submitted to the electors, and the millage determined by such election shall control the levy for said fiscal year, and providing that elections so called be controlled in other respects by existing laws.

'Whereas, many of the Special Tax School Districts in the counties of the State of Florida having a population of not less than 145,000 nor more than 155,000 have heretofore held elections and determined the Special Tax School District levy, and

'Whereas, by virtue of appropriations made for the aid and benefit of the school funds of the various counties and Special Tax School Districts, it is desirable that the question be re-submitted to the taxpayers of the various Special Tax School Districts as to whether or not the millage heretofore determined upon should not be reduced,

'Now therefore, be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Florida:

'Section 1. That the Board of Public Instruction in each and every county in the State of Florida having a population of not less than 145,000 or not more than 155,000, according to the last State or Federal census, shall within fifteen days after this Act becomes effective as a law call an election within each Special Tax School District within the county; said election to be held not later than thirty days from and after the taking effect of this Act as a law, and notice of said election shall be published once in a newspaper published within the county, said publication being at least ten days prior to the date of said election.

'Section 2. That at said election there shall be submitted to the qualified electors entitled to vote at said election the question of the millage to be levied in said Special Tax School District for the fiscal year July 1st, 1931, to June 30th, 1932, and that the millage determined and fixed by such election shall be the controlling millage to be levied for said year.

'Section 3. That the electors qualified at the time of the taking effect of this Act shall be qualified electors in each of said Special Tax School District who shall be entitled to vote and said election shall be held in substantial compliance with all other laws pertaining to the holding of elections in Special Tax School Districts.

'Section 4. That all laws or parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.

'Section 5. This Act shall take effect immediately upon becoming a law.'

It is only necessary to consider one ground of objection urged by the appellant in support of his appeal for reversal of the decree below in order to arrive at the conclusion that the act under consideration is in legal effect and operation a special or local law applying to Hillsborough county which was not constitutionally enacted by the Legislature under the provisions of section 21 of article 3 of the Constitution of the State of Florida.

Section 21 of article 3, just referred to, prohibits the passage of any such special or local laws unless notice of intention to apply therefor has been published in the manner provided by...