Anderson v. City of Memphis

• Decision Date: 23 June 1934
• Parties: ANDERSON et al. v. CITY OF MEMPHIS.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

72 S.W.2d 1059

ANDERSON et al. v. CITY OF MEMPHIS.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

June 23, 1934.

Error to Circuit Court, Shelby County; M. R. Patterson, Judge.

Petitions by Blanche Porter Anderson and others for writs of certiorari to review the action of the Board of Equalization of the City of Memphis in its valuation of two parcels of real estate of petitioners. Petitions were dismissed and petitioners bring error.

Affirmed.

Anderson & Leftwich, of Memphis, for plaintiffs in error.

Walter Chandler, of Memphis, for defendant in error.

SWIGGART, Justice.

The plaintiffs in error filed their petitions in the circuit court of Shelby county for the writs of certiorari, to review the action of the board of equalization of the city of Memphis in its valuation of two parcels of real estate, as the basis of ad valorem taxation by the city.

The petitions charge that the valuations so made were "grossly beyond the real and actual value" of the property described, and so excessive as to become confiscatory. No facts are alleged from which the conclusion of confiscation is drawn, except that in the case of one of the pieces of property, an office building, it is charged that the revenue therefrom has not been sufficient for several years to pay the expenses of operation and the taxes assessed against it.

The charter of the city of Memphis, as amended by Priv. Acts 1921, c. 112, § 1, provides that the action of the board of equalization in matters of valuation "shall be final."

The petitions for certiorari containing no charge that the board of equalization had acted fraudulently or illegally, the circuit court held them insufficient in law and dismissed them. From that action, the petitioners appealed to this court.

The action of the circuit court is clearly supported and sustained by the previous rulings of this court. Tomlinson v. Board of Equalization, 88 Tenn. 1, 12 S. W. 414, 6 L. R. A. 207; Staples v. Brown, 113 Tenn. 639, 85 S. W. 254; Carriger v. Mayor, etc., of Morristown, 148 Tenn. 585, 256 S. W. 883; Mossy Creek Bank v. Jefferson County, 153 Tenn. 332, 284 S. W. 64; State ex rel. v. Dixie Portland Cement Co., 151 Tenn. 53, 257 S. W. 595.

The petitioners contend, however, that the authority of the cases cited has been abrogated by Code 1932, §§ 9008-9018, and that by these sections the Legislature has provided a judicial review of the assessment of property for taxation, when made by a board or commission functioning under the laws of the state, with a hearing de novo on the question of valuation, in the court assuming jurisdiction.

This contention, presented to this court in W. J. Savage Company v. City of Knoxville, was rejected and overruled in an opinion of November 18, 1933 (filed for publication July 5, 1934), 72 S.W.(2d) 1057. Petition for certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States, April 2, 1934, 54 S. Ct. 628, 78 L. Ed. ___. In the opinion in that case, the Chief Justice said:

"We are of opinion that section 9008 et seq. of the Code, the new statutes authorizing a review of the actions of boards and commissions, do not work any repeal of the charter provision of the city of Knoxville making the valuation of property fixed by its board of equalization final. The Code sections are general in their nature and the charter provision special. A general law does not by implication repeal a special law, unless such legislative intent clearly appears. Vertrees v. State Board of Elections, 141 Tenn. 645, 214 S. W. 737; Burnett v. Maloney, 97 Tenn. 697, 37 S. W. 689, 34 L. R. A. 541; Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 274 et seq.

"We are satisfied it was not intended by the legislature in enacting the Code provisions just mentioned to overturn a long settled policy of this state, and throw open the courts to a controversy upon every assessment of property with which a taxpayer disagreed."

We adhere to the conclusion thus expressed, and are further of the opinion that the sections of the Code cited were intended and are effectual only to prescribe the procedure to be followed in cases of review by certiorari, and that they do not have the effect of enlarging the scope of the writ in any case.

Prior to the adoption of the Code of 1932, the extent and limitation of review by certiorari had been extensively treated and defined in published opinions...