Staples v. Brown

• Decision Date: 24 February 1905
• Parties: STAPLES v. BROWN.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

85 S.W. 254

113 Tenn. 639

STAPLES v. BROWN.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

February 24, 1905

Appeal from Circuit Court, Roane County; Geo. L. Burke, Judge.

Certiorari by S. H. Staples against S. C. Brown to review the action of the city council of Harriman, Tenn., in a contest by the plaintiff of the defendant's election as city attorney. The circuit court dismissed the petition, and the plaintiff brings the case to the Supreme Court by appeal in the nature of a writ of error. Reversed.

Wright Wright & Haggard, for appellant.

H. M Carr and S.E. Young, for appellee.

SHIELDS J.

This is a contested election case for the office of city attorney of Harriman, Tenn. An election was held in Harriman on June 2 1903, for the election of city officers, and the complainant and the defendant were candidates for the office of city attorney. The officers holding the election made returns to the election commissioners of Roane county, showing that the plaintiff had received 171 votes and the defendant 172 votes and a certificate of election was issued to the latter. Thereupon the plaintiff gave the defendant notice that he would contest the election before the city council of Harriman under a provision of the charter of the city vesting the council with jurisdiction to hear and determine contested elections of city officers, and afterwards filed with it a formal statement of the grounds of his contest, averring that in said election he had received 173 votes and the defendant only 168 votes, but that the ballots were wrongfully and erroneously counted by the election officers so as to make it appear that his opponent had received a majority of one, when, in fact, contestant had received a majority of five votes, and was duly elected and entitled to the office.

The defendant filed an answer, in which he denied and put at issue all of the grounds of the contest. The case was heard by the city council upon the evidence introduced by the parties, including the ballots cast in the election, which had been preserved.

The council canvassed and recounted the ballots, but, declining to announce the result, adopted a resolution to the effect that it would abide by the count made by the officers holding the election, and dismissed the contest.

Plaintiff prayed an appeal to the circuit court of Roane county, which was granted, but at the next term of that court, upon motion of defendant, the appeal was dismissed, because the statute vesting jurisdiction in the council to try the contest did not provide for an appeal from its judgment.

The plaintiff then filed his petition for certiorari in that court, averring therein the facts here stated, to remove the case into it for a retrial upon the merits, and obtained a proper fiat thereon from the judge of that judicial circuit. This petition, on motion of the defendant, was dismissed, upon the ground that the judgment of the council in dismissing the contest was final and not subject to review by the circuit court, and the case is now in this court upon an appeal, in the nature of a writ of error, to reverse that judgment.

The trial judge was of the opinion that, since the statute conferring upon the city council of Harriman jurisdiction to try contested elections of officers in the city provided for no review of its judgment in such cases, they were final and conclusive upon the parties, and the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to review them by certiorari.

We cannot concur in this conclusion. The clause of the charter under which the council assumed jurisdiction of the contest, and which is the entire enactment upon the subject, is as follows:

"If the election of any city officer shall be contested, the contest shall be heard and determined by the city council under such rules as the said city council shall have previously established for such hearing."

This confers judicial powers upon the council in contests of elections of its officers, and authorizes it to hear and determine them under the rules to be adopted by it. There is an entire absence of any provision for a review of its action or a retrial of the case by any other tribunal, and it is clear that no appeal or writ of error will lie from its judgment, and the trial judge was correct in dismissing the appeal taken by the plaintiff; but it by no means follows that plaintiff is not entitled to a retrial of his case upon the merits in the circuit court of his county.

The Constitution (article 1, § 17) provides that all courts shall be open, and every man having an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial, or delay.

The obvious meaning of this is that there shall be established courts proceeding according to the course of the common law, or some system of well established judicature, to which all of the citizens of the state may resort for the enforcement of rights denied, or redress of wrongs done them.

Jurisdiction of certain controversies, including contests of this character, may be vested in county courts, city councils, or boards of commissioners or supervisors, and quasi judicial powers conferred upon them; but their judgments must be, and are, subject to review by the circuit court of the county in which the proceedings are had. These inferior jurisdictions are not courts within the meaning of this provision of Constitution, and their judgments cannot be made final and conclusive of the rights of litigants. The right of every one to his day in court cannot be denied him. Railroad v. Bate, 12 Lea, 577.

Circuit courts have original jurisdiction of all cases where jurisdiction is not conferred upon some other court, and a general appellate and revisory jurisdiction over all inferior tribunals, councils, and boards which may from time to time be created by the Legislature and vested with judicial functions, to review their proceedings in all cases where they have exceeded their jurisdiction, or acted illegally or erroneously. Where no appeal or writ of error will lie, this jurisdiction may be exercised by writs of certiorari and supersedeas, and the case retried upon the merits. In this respect they are analogous to the Courts of the King's Bench of England. Kendrick v. State, Cooke, 474; Duggan v. McKinney, 7 Yerg. 21.

They are by the express mandate of the Constitution (article 6, §§ 1 and 10) required to be established in every county of the state, and are authorized to issue writs of certiorari to remove all civil cases, for sufficient cause, into them from any inferior jurisdiction. Their appellate and original jurisdiction, applicable to this case, is found in Code, §§ 4225 and 4234, which are as follows: "The circuit courts of this state are courts of general jurisdiction, and the judges thereof shall administer right and justice according to law in all cases where the jurisdiction is not conferred upon another tribunal."

"They have an appellate jurisdiction of all suits and actions, of whatsoever nature or description, instituted before any inferior jurisdiction, whether brought before them by appeal, certiorari, or in any other manner prescribed by law." Code (Shannon's Ed.) §§ 6063 and 6072.

"They may grant writs of certiorari whenever authorized by law, and also in all cases where an inferior tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded the jurisdiction conferred, or is acting illegally, when, in the judgment of the court, there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy."

"Certiorari lies: (1) On suggestion of diminution; (2) where no appeal is given; (3) as a substitute for appeal; (4) instead of audita querela; (5) instead of writ of error." Code (Shannon's Ed.) §§ 4853 and 4854.

This jurisdiction of the circuit court to supervise and review upon the merits the proceedings of all inferior jurisdictions, especially those proceedings not according to the course of the common law, by certiorari and supersedeas, where no appeal is allowed or writ of error will lie, has been recognized and exercised from the earliest days of our judicial history, and is now too firmly established by constitutional provision, statutory enactment, and judicial decision to be a subject of controversy.

These are some of the cases in which it has been upheld and enforced:

Murfree v. Leeper, 1 Tenn. 1; Beck v. Knabb, 1 Tenn. 56; Stuart v. Hall, 2 Tenn. 179; Durham v. United States, 4 Hayw. 54, 69; Kendrick v. State, Cook, 477; Linebaugh v. Rinker, Peck, 362; Bob v. State, 2 Yerg. 173; Duggan v. McKinney, 7 Yerg. 23; Rogers v. Ferrell, 10 Yerg. 254; Mayor v. Pearl, 11 Humph. 251; Cooper v. Summers, 1 Sneed, 456; Dodd v. Weaver, 2 Sneed, 671; State v. Green, 2 Head, 359; Shields v. Justices, 2 Cold. 61; McGrath v. Logue, 6 Cold. 340; Spears v. Loague, 6 Cold. 421; Wilson v. Lowe, 7 Cold. 154; Hundhauser v. Insurance Co., 5 Heisk. 702; Friedman v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. 488, 502; Boyers v. Webb, 1 Lea, 696; Saunders v. Russell, 10 Lea, 295; Hawkins v. Kerchevall, 10 Lea, 540; Railroad v. Bate, 12 Lea, 574; State v. Taxing District, 16 Lea, 245; Shelby County v. Railroad, 16 Lea, 412, 1 S.W. 32; Scovell v. Nashville, 2 Tenn. Cas. 260; Nashville v. Smith, 86 Tenn. 213, 6 S.W. 273; Hayden v. Memphis, 100 Tenn. 583, 47 S.W. 182; Tennessee Central Railway v. Campbell, 109 Tenn. 646, 75 S.W. 1012.

In Murfree v. Leeper, supra, a caveat case in the county court, it was held that certiorari would lie to remove the proceedings into the superior court, to the jurisdiction of which the circuit court has succeeded, notwithstanding a statute providing that the judgment of the county court in such matters should be final and conclusive, without any appeal to the superior court.

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