Anderson v. Commissioner of Highways, 39028
| Decision Date | 14 February 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 39028,39028 |
| Citation | 9 A.L.R.3d 746,267 Minn. 308,126 N.W.2d 778 |
| Parties | , 9 A.L.R.3d 746 James Herman ANDERSON, Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF HIGHWAYS, State of Minnesota, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The standard expressed by the term 'habitual violator' in Minn.St. 171.18(4), which statute gives the commissioner authority to suspend the license of any driver without preliminary hearing upon a showing that such driver is a 'habitual violator,' is not unconstitutional as vague in failing to provide a clear and precise standard for action by the commissioner. The many and varied factors involved in making a determination to suspend a license require a broad and flexible standard which is sufficiently expressed by the term 'habitual violator' as used in the statute.
2. The term 'traffic laws' must be construed to include driver's license laws to make fully effective the policy of the legislature in the enactment of §§ 171.16 and 171.18.
3. Suspension of a driver's license is an exercise of police power for the protection of the public rather than the imposition of an additional penalty; accordingly, usual guarantees against double jeopardy, as well as the statute of limitations, do not apply.
4. The review of the action of the highway commissioner by hearing in district court satisfies constitutional requirements of due process.
Ben R. Toensing, Hopkins, for appellant.
Walter F. Mondale, Atty. Gen., Perry G. Voldness, Deputy Atty. Gen., John R. Murphy, Sp. Asst., St. Paul, for respondent.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court denying a petition to set aside a 1-year suspension of a driver's license.
Under authority of Minn.St. 171.18, the commissioner of highways suspended petitioner's license on the ground that he was a habitual violator of traffic laws. That statute provides, in part, as follows:
'The commissioner shall have authority to and may suspend the license of any driver without preliminary hearing upon a showing by department records or other sufficient evidence that the licensee:
'(4) Is an habitual violator of the traffic laws.'
From the record it appears that petitioner's driver's record is as follows:
'October 20, 1953. Driving while intoxicated in the City of Edina, Minnesota.
'October 20, 1953. Driving with no driver's license in possession in the City of Edina, Minnesota.
'November 19, 1954. Driving after suspension of driver's license in the City of Shakopee, Minnesota.
'April 8, 1955. Driving after suspension of driver's license in the City of Shakopee, Minnesota.
'June 25, 1955. Driving with no driver's license in the City of Chaska, Minnesota.
'April 17, 1959. Driving while intoxicated in the City of Hopkins, Minnesota.
'July 29, 1959. Driving after revocation of license in the City of Shakopee, Minnesota.
'January 9, 1961. Driving after suspension of driver's license in the City of Bloomington, Minnesota.
'January 9, 1961. Driving through a school stop sign in the City of Bloomington, Minnesota.
It further appears from the record that subsequent to the offense of March 24, 1962, petitioner appeared with counsel in the municipal court of Shakopee, Minnesota, and represented to the court that at the time of the alleged offense petitioner 'was erroneously relying upon his chauffeur's license as his right to drive an automobile after suspension of his driver's license.' It further appears from the record, as reflected in an affidavit by petitioner's attorney, that he 'induced the (petitioner) to reinstate his driver's license, file a financial responsibility policy, and subsequent thereto and before the trial of said cause, said (petitioner) filed a financial responsibility policy and his driver's license was reinstated.' Petitioner contended in municipal court that the offense was 'made under a misapprehension of law and a more or less technical violation' and his attorney 'suggested' that he would advise his client to enter a plea of guilty to the offense providing the court would recommend that his driver's license be not disturbed.
It appears that petitioner was given a 90-day suspended sentence by the municipal court and it was recommended by the court that his driver's license not be suspended. Notwithstanding this recommendation, petitioner's license was again suspended for a period of 1 year by the director of drivers' licenses. Petitioner then instituted proceedings in the district court for an order to vacate and cancel the order of the director of drivers' licenses. After a hearing in district court an order was made denying the petition. The appeal from the judgment entered on that order presents several issues involving the construction and interpretation of certain provisions of c. 169 (Highway Traffic Regulation), c. 170 (Safety Responsibility), and c. 171 (Drivers Licenses).
1. The first point raised by petitioner is directed to the provision of § 171.18(4) which gives the commissioner authority to suspend the license of a 'habitual violator of the traffic laws.' He argues that the term 'habitual violator' is vague and does not provide a clear and precise standard for the guidance of the commissioner in acting upon the suspension of driver's licenses, and is therefore unconstitutional and void. We have held that discretionary power may be delegated to administrative officers '(i)f the law furnishes a reasonably clear policy or standard of action which controls and guides the administrative officers in ascertaining the operative facts to which the law applies, so that the law takes effect upon these facts by virtue of its own terms, and not according to the whim or caprice of the administrative officers.' Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 113, 36 N.W.2d 530, 538; 3 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 1600(b); Reyburn v. Minnesota State Board of Optometry, 247 Minn. 520, 78 N.W.2d 351; State ex rel. Brown v. Johnson, 255 Minn. 134, 96 N.W.2d 9.
There are, however, exceptions and qualifications to the rule that a statute which vests discretion in a public official must prescribe precise rules of action. The modern tendency is to be more liberal in permitting grants of discretion to administrative officers in order to facilitate the administration of laws as the complexity of economic and governmental conditions increase. 1 The rule which requires an expressed standard to guide the exercise of discretion is subject to the exception that where it is impracticable to lay down a definite comprehensive rule--such as, where the administration turns upon questions of qualifications of personal fitness, or where the act relates to the administration of a police regulation which is necessary to protect the general health, welfare, and safety of the public--it is not essential that a specific prescribed standard be expressly stated in the legislation. 2 This is so because it is impossible for the legislature to deal directly with the many details in the varied and complex conditions on which it legislates, but must necessarily leave them to the reasonable discretion of administrative officers. 3
With respect to the standard expressed by the words 'habitual violator,' it may be said that there is a division among the courts of the various states as to the validity of traffic and license laws using that term. In Harvell v. Scheidt, 249 N.C. 699, 706, 107 S.E.2d 549, 554, the Supreme Court of North Carolina considered a statute identical to ours so far as the relevant subclause is concerned. The court held that such a statute 'does not contain any fixed standard or guide to which the Department must conform in order to determine whether or not a driver is an habitual violator of the traffic laws.' The Supreme Court of South Carolina, in construing a statute more similar to § 171.18(3) than to § 171.18(4), which is involved in this case, also held, with reasoning and authority similar to that of the North Carolina court, that the term 'habitual' is an inadequate standard. South Carolina State Highway Department v. Harbin, 226 S.C. 585, 86 S.E.2d 446. It may also be noted that the legislatures of other states have, by statute, enacted a more specific rule. The states of Texas, Missouri, and Florida have by legislative specification defined a habitual violator by the number of his offenses, and the legislatures of North and South Carolina, following the decisions above referred to, have by legislative enactment established a point system for guidance of the commissioner in determining the status of a licensee as a habitual violator.
The sufficiency of the standard expressed by the term 'habitual violator' must be viewed in light of the purpose for which the statute was enacted. It should be realistically conceded that in carrying out the objects of the statute the commissioner is required to make judgments based upon many and varied factors involving a great amount of detail. It is not unreasonable to assume that the legislature may well have considered that to prescribe a more specific standard would only place the commissioner in a straitjacket and interfere with the fair and efficient administration of his duties. It appears from oral argument that for the year 1962 there were 53,610 actions taken by the commissioner on suspension and revocation of licenses which involved 10,430 presuspension interviews. 4 In dealing with this vast area of administrative action, a flexible and practical guide is necessary.
The New York court recognized this fact in Ross v. Macduff, 309 N.Y. 56, 127 N.E.2d 806. In that case they considered a license suspension provision under the following statute:
'3. Permissive suspensions and revocations. Such licenses * * * may be suspended or revoked:
'(d) for habitual or persistent violation of any of the provisions of this chapter, or of any lawful ordinance,...
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