Harvell v. Scheidt

• Decision Date: 18 March 1959
• Docket Number: No. 454,454
• Parties: Frederic March HARVELL v. Edward SCHEIDT, Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles for the State of North Carolina.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 549

107 S.E.2d 549

249 N.C. 699

Frederic March HARVELL v. Edward SCHEIDT, Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles for the State of North Carolina.

No. 454

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 18, 1959

Malcolm B. Seawell, Atty. Gen., Lucius W. Pullen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Department of Motor Vehicles.

Charles W. Daniel, for petitioner.

DENNY, Justice.

The question presented for determination on this appeal is whether or not the authority granted to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles by the General Assembly in G.S. § 20-16(a) (5) to revoke the petitioner's driver's license constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

G.S. § 20-16(a) provides: 'The Department shall have authority to suspend the license of any operator or chauffeur without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records or other satisfactory evidence that the licensee: * * * 5. Is an habitual violator of the traffic laws * * *.'

It appears from the record that during a period of five years, six months, and twenty-seven days, the petitioner was convicted six times of various offenses in violation of the traffic laws, as hereinabove set out. During this period the petitioner accumulated twenty-six points under the point system set up by the Director of the Driver License Division of the Department. It further appears by stipulation that neither the Commissioner nor the Department has adopted or promulgated any written rules and regulations designed to enforce or administer G.S. § 20-16(a) (5).

Moreover, under the point system used by the Director of the Driver License Division of the Department there is nothing to indicate how many points a driver must accumulate or over what period of time he must accumulate them, before he is deemed an habitual violator of the traffic laws. Therefore, it must be conceded that neither under the point system presently used by the Department but not adopted by it, nor under the statute G.S. § 20-16(a) (5), is there any fixed standard or guide to which the Department must conform in order to determine when a driver is an habitual violator of the traffic laws. The Department is given the authority to suspend a driver's license without a preliminary hearing, upon a showing by its records or other satisfactory evidence that the licensee is an habitual violator of the traffic laws, but the number and character of such violations of the traffic laws and the period of time during which such violations may have occurred, upon which the Department may base its finding, are left solely to the discretion of the Department.

In the case of Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway v. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 237 N.C. 52, 74 S.E.2d 310, 316, this Court, speaking through Johnson, J., said: 'Here we pause to note the distinction generally recognized between a delegation of the power to make a law, which necessarily includes a discretion as to what it shall be, and the conferring of authority or discretion as to its execution. The first may not be done, whereas the latter, if adequate guiding standards are laid down, is permissible under certain circumstances. 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, Sec. 234; See also Pue v. Hood, Com'r of Banks, 222 N.C. 310, 22 S.E.2d 896.

'As to this, it may be conceded that the line of demarkation between those essentially legislative functions which must be exercised by the Legislature itself, and those of an administrative nature, or involving mere details, which may be conferred upon another body or administrative agency, is sometimes vague and difficult to define or discern. Durham Provision Company v. Daves [190 N.C. 7, 128 S.E. 593], supra.

'Nevertheless, the legislative body must declare the policy of the law, fix legal principles which are to control in given cases, and provide adequate standards for the guidance of the administrative body or officer empowered to execute the law. This principle is implicit in the general rule prohibiting the delegation of legislative power, and is affirmed by numerous authoritative decisions of this Court. Motsinger v. Perryman [218 N.C. 15, 9 S.E.2d 511], supra; Durham Provision Company v. Daves, supra; State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854, 128 A.L.R. 658; State v. Curtis [230 N.C. 169, 52 S.E.2d 364], supra. See also Annotation, 79 L.Ed. 474, 487.

'In short, while the Legislature may delegate the power to find facts or determine the existence or nonexistence of a factual situation or condition on which the operation of a law is made to depend, or another agency of the government is to come into existence, it cannot vest in a subordinate agency the power to apply or withhold the application of the law in its absolute or unguided discretion, 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, Sec. 234.' 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 160, page 489.

In South Carolina State Highway Department v. Harbin, 226 S.C. 585, 86 S.E.2d 466, 471, the Department had set up a point system without specific legislative authority and had adopted the practice that when the total of violation points charged against a driver reached a minimum of ten, the driver was interviewed by a member of the highway patrol for the purpose of determining whether the offender's license to drive should be suspended or whether it appeared from the circumstances he should be given another chance. If permitted to retain his license after the interview, any additional violation committed by him was deemed sufficient for an immediate suspension of his license. The statute involved was Section 46-172 of the 1952 Code of South Carolina, which read in pertinent part as follows: 'For cause satisfactory to the Department it may suspend, cancel or revoke the driver's license of any person for a period of not more than one year.'

The Supreme Court of South Carolina held the above statute was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The Court said: '* * * in the grant of this authority, there is no standard except the personal judgment of the administrative officers of the Department.' The Court further held that the Department was without authority to adopt a Point System.

In the case of Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579, 581, 71 A.L.R. 604, the Supreme Court of Appeals held invalid an ordinance of the City of Lynchburg which, after providing for mandatory suspension of licenses for certain causes, authorized the Chief of Police 'to revoke the permit of any driver who, in his opinion, becomes unfit to drive an automobile on the streets of the city, * * *.' The Court said: 'That portion of the ordinance here in question which authorizes the chief of police 'to revoke the permit of any driver who, in his opinion, becomes unfit to drive an automobile on the streets of the...