Anderson v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs.

• Decision Date: 15 November 2016
• Docket Number: No. 47660–6–II,47660–6–II
• Citation: 196 Wash.App. 674,384 P.3d 651
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: Kevin Anderson, Appellant, v. Department of Social and Health Services, Division of Child Support, Respondent.

196 Wash.App. 674

384 P.3d 651

Kevin Anderson, Appellant,

v.Department of Social and Health Services, Division of Child Support, Respondent.

No. 47660–6–II

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

November 15, 2016

Kevin Anderson (Appearing Pro Se), # 727189 Airway Heights Correction Ctr., P.O. Box 2049, Airway Heights, WA, 99001, for Appellant.

Anne Cecilia Miller, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 40124, Olympia, WA, 98504–0124, for Respondent.

Sutton, J.¶1 Kevin Anderson, a noncustodial parent, appeals the superior court's summary judgment order dismissing his claim that the Department of Social and Health Services, Division of Child Support (DCS) violated the Public Records Act (PRA)¹ when it withheld and redacted child support records and withheld an attorney-client email string. Anderson argues that the superior court erred in ruling that child support records were categorically exempt from disclosure under RCW 26.23.120(1) and that the attorney-client privilege precluded disclosure of certain emails. Anderson requests attorney fees and costs on appeal under RAP 18.1 and RCW 42.56.550(4).

¶2 We hold that RCW 26.23.120, which governs child support records, falls within the “other statutes” exemption under RCW 42.56.070(1) of the PRA and is consistent with the PRA. We further hold that the email string is protected under attorney-client privilege and is exempt from disclosure under RCW 5.60.060(2)(a).² Because DCS's responses were proper and DCS did not violate the PRA, there is no basis for a PRA penalty and the superior court properly granted summary judgment dismissing Anderson's PRA claim against DCS. We affirm.

FACTS

I. ANDERSON'S PRA REQUEST FOR CHILD SUPPORT CASE RECORDS

¶3 On July 1, 2013, Anderson submitted a public records request to DCS. Anderson requested several child support records, including (1) his “complete case comment history printout”³ and (2) “[a] copy of the e-mail sent from Judy Rupo^{[4 ]}[sic] to King County Prosecutor's Office on 3/10/10 regarding my case.” Clerk's Papers (CP) at 171.

¶4 DCS responded to Anderson's request on July 12, 2013, advising him that DCS records are “private and confidential” under RCW 26.23.120 and that it would take approximately 45 days to research, prepare, and provide responsive documents. CP at 166. On September 11, DCS further responded to Anderson's request, producing his case comment records, an exemption log, and a key explaining the exemptions DCS relied upon for each redaction. DCS explained that, because the information was exempt from disclosure under RCW 26.23.120 and Anderson did not have a court order or the custodial parent's consent, it had redacted the custodial parent's confidential information from the case comments. DCS also explained that it had redacted other private or confidential information related to the custodial parent's address and contact information.⁵ DCS further explained that the email string between Roppo and the King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office was a protected attorney-client communication under RCW 5.60.060. DCS again informed Anderson that DCS records were private and confidential under RCW 26.23.120 and that he could file an administrative appeal of any denial of disclosure with the Economic Services Administration (ESA) within the Department of Social and Health Services.

¶5 Anderson filed an administrative appeal with the ESA challenging DCS's responses to his PRA request. He asked DCS to clarify the specific exemption claimed for the email sent from Roppo. DCS responded that “the email is being withheld under RCW 5.60.060(2)(a),” the attorney-client privilege, and affirmed its initial withholding. CP at 195.

II. ANDERSON'S PRA COMPLAINT

¶6 While Anderson's administrative appeal was pending, he filed a PRA complaint in Pierce County Superior Court alleging that DCS's responses to his July 1, 2013 records request violated the PRA. His complaint did not mention the case comment redactions DCS provided to him in September 2013.⁶ It appears that Anderson first raised concerns regarding the redactions in discovery requests filed in January 2015.

A. DISCOVERY

¶7 After receiving Anderson's January 2015 discovery requests, DCS reviewed the case comment history provided to Anderson in September 2013 and produced a revised case comment history in February 2015. In its cover letter, DCS again informed Anderson that “all DCS records, including the case comments history that you requested are exempt from production under the PRA and may be disclosed only under RCW 26.23.120 and related rules.” CP at 236. DCS also stated that “records and information in the case comment history have been redacted where you are not the subject of or did not provide the information.” CP at 236.

B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS

¶8 Prior to receiving the revised case comment history, Anderson filed a motion asking the superior court to rule that DCS's response to his July 1, 2013 request violated the PRA. In response to Anderson's motion, DCS filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment, citing to RCW 26.23.120 as the governing statute not the PRA. The superior court denied both motions, stating that DCS's motion was untimely but that it could move for summary judgment at a later date.

C. WITHHOLDING OF THE ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGED EMAIL COMMUNICATIONS

¶9 In an attempt to resolve the outstanding issues, DCS sent a letter to Anderson in March 2015 explaining the reasons for the redactions in Anderson's case comments and identifying RCW 26.23.120 as the statutory authority for the redactions. DCS also provided a redacted copy of the email string between Roppo and the prosecutor⁷ and explained that the email string was exempt from disclosure under the PRA because it was a privileged attorney-client communication under RCW 5.60.060(2).

D. DCS'S SECOND SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION

¶10 On April 8, 2015, DCS filed a second motion for summary judgment, requesting dismissal of Anderson's PRA claims as a matter of law because RCW 26.23.120, not the PRA, governed disclosure of child support records. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of DCS, dismissing Anderson's PRA claims. In its written order, the superior court ruled that Anderson's request for his case comment history was not disclosable under the PRA and that it was “being exempt[ed] from disclosure by RCW 26.23.120(1).”⁸ CP at 58. The superior court also ruled that the requested email string between Roppo and the King County prosecutor was “protected from disclosure by attorney/client privilege, RCW 5.60.060(2).” CP at 58.

¶11 Anderson appeals the superior court's ruling on the case comment history and on the Roppo/King County prosecutor email string.

ANALYSIS

¶12 Anderson argues that the superior court erred in granting summary judgment and dismissing his PRA claim. We hold that RCW 26.23.120, which governs the disclosure of child support records, falls within the “other statutes” exemption under RCW 42.56.070(1) of the PRA; that RCW 26.23.120 supplements and is consistent with the PRA; that, because DCS's responses to the records request were proper, it did not violate the PRA; and that the email string is a protected attorney-client communication exempt from disclosure under RCW 5.60.060(2)(a). Thus, the superior court did not err in granting summary judgment and dismissing Anderson's PRA claim.

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶13 We review agency actions under the PRA de novo, taking into account the PRA's policy that “free and open examination of public records is in the public's interest, even [though] examination may cause inconvenience or embarrassment.” Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County v. County of Spokane , 172 Wash.2d 702, 715, 261 P.3d 119 (2011) ; RCW 42.56.550(3). Summary judgment orders are also subject to de novo review, and we construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sanders v. State , 169 Wash.2d 827, 844–45, 240 P.3d 120 (2010). Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact⁹ and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sanders , 169 Wash.2d at 844, 240 P.3d 120.

II. CHILD SUPPORT RECORDS , RCW 26.23.120

A. THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT—LEGAL PRINCIPLES

¶14 We first address whether RCW 26.23.120 falls within the “other statutes” exemption under RCW 42.56.070(1) of the PRA. This is an issue of statutory interpretation. We review questions of law and statutory construction de novo. Wright v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. , 176 Wash.App. 585, 594, 309 P.3d 662 (2013). When a statute is unambiguous, we look to a statute's plain language alone to determine the legislature's intent. Wright , 176 Wash.App. at 594, 309 P.3d 662.

¶15 “The PRA is a strongly worded mandate for broad disclosure of public records.” Neighborhood Alliance , 172 Wash.2d at 714, 261 P.3d 119. “ ‘The general purpose of the exemptions to the [PRA's] broad mandate of disclosure is to exempt from public inspection those categories of public records most capable of causing substantial damage to the privacy rights of citizens.’ ” Deer v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. , 122 Wash.App. 84, 90, 93 P.3d 195 (2004) (quoting Limstrom v. Ladenburg , 136 Wash.2d 595, 607, 963 P.2d 869 (1998) ). Because the PRA mandates broad public disclosure, we liberally construe the PRA in favor of disclosure and narrowly construe its exemptions. White v. Clark County , 188 Wash.App. 622, 631, 354 P.3d 38 (2015), review denied , 185 Wash.2d 1009, 366 P.3d 1245 (2016). There are three sources of PRA exemptions, (1) the PRA itself, (2) the “other statutes” exemption, and (3) the Washington Constitution. White , 188 Wash.App. at 630–31, 354 P.3d 38.

¶16 The PRA generally does not allow withholding of public records in their entirety. Instead an agency subject to the PRA must segregate individual records and must withhold only those portions of the records that fall under a specific exemption. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. Univ. of Wash. , 125 Wash.2d 243, 261, ...