Anderson v. First Nat. Bank of Hot Springs, 90-272

• Decision Date: 17 December 1990
• Docket Number: No. 90-272,90-272
• Citation: 304 Ark. 164,801 S.W.2d 273
• Parties: Ruth Brandenburg ANDERSON, Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF HOT SPRINGS, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 273

801 S.W.2d 273

304 Ark. 164

Ruth Brandenburg ANDERSON, Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF HOT SPRINGS, Appellee.

No. 90-272.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Dec. 17, 1990.

John Wesley Hall, Little Rock, for appellant.

Ronald G. Naramore, Hot Springs, for appellee.

PRICE, Justice.

The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting the appellee's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

The appellant, Ruth Brandenburg Anderson, married William M. Anderson, Jr., in October, 1981. They executed an antenuptial agreement in which the appellant agreed to receive nothing from Mr Anderson's estate upon his death. A new will was subsequently executed by Mr. Anderson, leaving the appellant approximately one-third of his real and personal property. The will was prepared by Henry Britt and nominated the appellee, First National Bank of Hot Springs (First National), as executor.

Mr. Anderson died on January 15, 1984, and the will was presented to probate court. The children of the appellant's deceased husband filed a will contest. First National was appointed administrator of the estate until the will contest was settled. Robert Hargraves was hired by First National as attorney for the estate. On August 6, 1984, the appellant and her deceased husband's children entered into a family settlement agreement which resolved the issues raised by the will contest and gave the appellant property from the estate.

The appellant alleged in her complaint against First National that (1) First National breached its fiduciary duty by hiring an attorney other than Henry Britt contrary to an agreement between William Anderson, Jr., and First National; (2) First National breached its fiduciary duty by refusing to defend the will in the will contest action and by coercing the appellant into signing the family settlement agreement; and (3) First National's conduct constituted the tort of interference with an inheritance.

First National filed its motion for summary judgment contending that there was no contractual agreement between First National and William Anderson, Jr., and the appellant had sustained no damages; no consideration was given for First National's alleged promise to hire Britt; the appellant was not coerced into signing the family settlement agreement; and the appellant was barred by principles of estoppel from denying the validity of the family settlement agreement.

The trial court entered summary judgment against the appellant stating there were no genuine issues of material fact to be decided. The appellant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment since disputed issues of material fact existed.

It is well settled that summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ARCP Rule 56. Once the movant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement, the respondent must meet proof with proof by showing a genuine issue as to a material fact. Pruitt v. Cargill, Inc., 284 Ark. 474, 683 S.W.2d 906 (1985). Because this appeal is from the trial court's granting of summary judgment, our review is limited and focuses on the pleadings, deposition testimony and other documents filed by the parties in support of their respective arguments.

The appellant first contends there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether First National breached its fiduciary duty by refusing to hire Henry Britt as attorney for the estate. Mr. Britt had prepared the last will of Mr. Anderson, and it was alleged by the appellant in her complaint that Mr. Anderson had agreed to...