Anderson v. Gilliland, 20698

• Decision Date: 28 August 1981
• Docket Number: No. 20698,20698
• Citation: 624 S.W.2d 243
• Parties: Terri L. ANDERSON, Appellant, v. Cleo GILLILAND, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 243

624 S.W.2d 243

Terri L. ANDERSON, Appellant, v. Cleo GILLILAND, Appellee.

No. 20698.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

Aug. 28, 1981.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 24, 1981.

Tom S. McCorkle, Dallas, for appellant.

Carl Luna, Garland, for appellee.

Before AKIN, CARVER and STEPHENS, JJ.

AKIN, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the Probate Court refusing to order an independent executrix of the estate of her deceased husband to include as an asset of his estate the enhanced value of her separate property due to the expenditure of community funds. The sole question presented by this appeal is whether a quitclaim deed executed by the grantor to his wife was effective to convey his future equitable right of reimbursement for his one-half of community funds expended on his wife's separate property. We hold that the quitclaim deed could only transfer whatever interest the grantor had in the property at the time the deed was executed and delivered. Because an equitable right of reimbursement is not a right, title, or interest in real estate, the quitclaim deed conveyed nothing. Accordingly, the order of the Probate Court is reversed and this matter remanded to the Probate Court with instructions to include as an asset of the estate the husband's equitable right of reimbursement for community funds expended in enhancing the wife's separate property.

This dispute between Terri L. Anderson, the decedent's daughter, and Cleo Gilliland, his widow, arose when the widow refused to include as an asset of her deceased husband's estate his right of reimbursement for community funds expended on the widow's separate property. His daughter was the residual beneficiary under his will and was entitled to have the funds representing his right to reimbursement included as an asset of his estate unless the earlier quitclaim deed transferred this right. The daughter argues that the quitclaim deed did not transfer the decedent's equitable right to reimbursement for the enhancement of the wife's separate property from community funds. Consequently, she contends that she is entitled to her deceased father's right to reimbursement for the enhancement of the widow's separate property. We agree.

In Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561, 564-65 (Tex.1964), the supreme court specifically stated:

The charge of equity which one estate has against the opposite estate for reimbursement of all funds spent in enhancing the value of such opposite estate is only a claim for money and return of funds and not a right, title or interest in the land. Curtis v. Poland, 66 Tex. 511, 2 S.W. 39 (1886); Furrh v. Winston, 66 Tex. 521, 1 S.W. 527 (1886); Schmidt v. Huppman, 73 Tex. 112, 11 S.W. 175 (1889); Hayworth v. Williams, 102 Tex. 308, 116 S.W. 43 (1909); Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620, 624 (1935). (Emphasis added.)

The supreme court reasoned that community funds spent upon separate property gave the community no right, title, or interest in the land. That court also noted that no matured right of equitable reimbursement for community expenditures on separate property arose until dissolution of the community. It follows, therefore, that the quitclaim deed at the time of execution and delivery conveyed nothing to the wife because the husband-grantor had neither a matured right of equitable reimbursement nor a right, title or interest to the land at that time. See Lott v. Lott, 370 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex.1963). (A quitclaim deed transfers whatever present interest grantor had in land.) See also Harrison v. Boring & Kennard, 44 Tex. 255, 261-62 (1875) (quitclaim deed conveys no more than present interest of grantor, and "does not operate to pass an interest such as may afterwards vest.").

Gilliland contends, and the dissent agrees, that we should look to extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed, such as testimony of the widow and the contents of the grantor's will, to determine the intention of the grantor in executing the unambiguous quitclaim deed. This we cannot do. It is without question that the intent of an unambiguous deed must be determined from the language used.

Where the terms of a deed are clear and unambiguous, parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or contravene its terms or to show the construction placed thereon by the parties at the time or subsequent to its execution. Henry v. Phillips, 105 Tex. 459, 151 S.W. 533, 538 (1912); Soell v. Haddon, 85 Tex. 182, 19 S.W. 1087 (1892). Thus, we hold that the testimony of the widow, the contents of the grantor's will, and the closeness of the execution of the deed and the will, are all inadmissible on the question of the grantor's intent in executing the quitclaim deed.

In this respect, we note that the cases cited in the dissenting opinion are consistent with our holding in that those courts looked to the language of the deed to determine the intent of the grantor. E. g. Borroum v. Culmell, 90 Tex. 93, 37 S.W. 313, 314 (1896). Other cases cited by the dissent, such as Baldwin v. Drew, 180 S.W. 614 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1915, no writ), all concern situations where the deed was ambiguous and where the court had to determine whether the deed was a warranty deed or merely a quitclaim deed. In those situations, a court is justified in looking to surrounding circumstances and to other extrinsic evidence in construing a deed, the language of which is otherwise uncertain.

Because the right of community reimbursement is only an equitable claim for money upon dissolution of the community, and because the quitclaim deed contained no language which may be read as a waiver or a conveyance of this future unmatured right, the equitable right to reimbursement belonged to the husband until his death and passed to his residuary beneficiary under his will. Accordingly, the order of the probate court is reversed and remanded with instructions for the probate court to determine the amount of reimbursement due the estate and to include that sum in the assets of decedent's estate.

Reversed and remanded.

STEPHENS, Justice, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that a quitclaim deed executed by a decedent in favor of his wife, four months before his death, purporting to convey all of his right, title and interest in a certain tract of his wife's separate realty, was ineffective to convey to her his one-half interest in the community estate's equitable right to reimbursement for community funds expended to improve her separate property during the marriage. I disagree with this conclusion.

The majority strictly construes the form and language of the deed, in light of generally recognized principles of law, as an attempted conveyance of a present interest in the described tract of land, without giving consideration to the intention of the grantor. In construing the effect of a quitclaim deed, the intention of the parties, together with pertinent circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed, are admissible to determine whether the conveyance is a transfer of the land itself or mere chance for title. Baldwin v. Drew, 180 S.W. 614 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1915, no writ). A deed may be read and construed in the light of the surrounding circumstances under which it was executed, and no matter how imperfect title may be in the grantor, the question to be resolved in giving effect to the instrument is the intention of the parties. Carleton v. Lombardi, 81 Tex. 355, 16 S.W. 1081 (1891); Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454 (1877); Harrison v. Boring, 44 Tex. 255 (1875); Culmell v. Borroum, 13 Tex.Civ.App. 458, 35 S.W. 942 (Tex.Civ.App.1896 error refused), 90 Tex. 93, 37 S.W. 313 (1896).

A careful review of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed in this case is necessary to ascertain the grantor's intent and thus arrive at a logical and just construction. I do not believe this precise question has been decided in Texas. First, I would readily agree with the majority, that on November 20, 1978, Mr. Gilliland, grantor, owned no present legal right, title or interest in the separate realty of Mrs. Gilliland, yet the circumstances show that he believed he owned some kind of right, title or interest. It is undisputed that the property right at issue in this case is Mr. Gilliland's one-half interest in an equitable right of reimbursement in favor of the community estate, arising out of improvements placed upon Mrs. Gilliland's separate realty by the community estate during the marriage. This equitable right of reimbursement, although characterized by the majority as a future equitable right, is in actuality a presently accrued, but unmatured property right, which matures and becomes enforceable upon dissolution of the marriage, by either divorce or death of one of the parties.

The thrust of the majority opinion is in its strict application of the parol evidence rule to the execution of the unambiguous quitclaim deed. There is no question the general rule provides that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or contravene the terms of an unambiguous deed, but it is necessary to note that there are equitable as well as legal exceptions. In Bradshaw v. McDonald, 147 Tex. 455, 216 S.W.2d 972 (1949), a deed, absolute on its face, is shown by extrinsic evidence to be in fact a mortgage, with no requirement that fraud, accident or mistake be pled. In Griffin v. Robertson, 592 S.W.2d 31 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ) an unambiguous joint survivorship agreement is shown by extrinsic evidence to be a parol trust for the benefit of a child's education, with no requirement that fraud, accident or mistake be pled. I believe the unique facts of this case require an exception to...