Taylor v. Harrison

• Decision Date: 01 January 1877
• Citation: 47 Tex. 454
• Parties: NEWTON TAYLOR v. W. F. HARRISON.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

47 Tex. 454

NEWTON TAYLOR

v.W. F. HARRISON.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1877.

ERROR from Collin. Tried below before the Hon. W. H. Andrews.

This was an action of trespass to try title, brought by W. F. Harrison against Newton Taylor and Peter R. Wallis, for 500 acres of land, part of the H. R. survey of Thomas Jouett, in Collin county. The case was submitted on the following agreed statement of facts:

“It is agreed in this case that Thomas Jouett received a patent to the land in controversy, which was a part of his headright, on the 18th day of February, 1845, and that Thomas Jouett transferred the said land, on January 22, 1846, by deed of general warranty, for $738, as consideration paid, in which he was joined by his wife Mary Jouett, to V. B. Sims, and that said deed was filed on the same day for record, and (except the acknowledgment of the grantors) was recorded in book B of Fannin county records, and was duly indexed. At that time, Collin county was not organized, but was a part of Fannin. That indorsed on said deed is the following: Filed and recorded in Book B, p. 328, January 22, 1846. Attest, R. W. Lee, Clerk C. C., F. Co.

But the acknowledgment of Thomas Jouett and wife to said deed, which is in proper form, was not recorded, but the balance of the deed was.

That afterwards, Sims, by deed with general warranty, transferred said land to W. Matherson, and Matherson to plaintiff. Both of the last two deeds are recorded in the county recordsof Collin county.

The defendants claim the lands in controversy by a deed from Mary F. Beale, administratrix of the estate of Thomas Jouett, executed to E. Thomas Watson, June 30, 1856; said land was sold under and by virtue of an order of the County Court of Fannin county, on the petition of the administratrix, to pay the debts of the estate, for the sum of $230. The sale was duly confirmed by the court, and the title made to Watson by the administratrix. It is admitted that Watson paid the purchase-money above named; said Watson transferred the land by deed without warranty to the defendants. It was admitted that the orders of the court, in reference to the sale and confirmation of said land, were regular. The deed from the administratrix to Watson was recorded in Collin county records February 9, 1857; and from Watson to Taylor, March 13, 1857.

The court gave judgment for plaintiffs, and Taylor and Willis brought the case by writ of error to this court.Throckmorton, Brown & Bro., for plaintiffs in error.

Bledsoe & Head, for defendant in error.--The only question in this case is, can an administrator sell a greater interest in land than his intestate had? It will be remembered that the deed in the case at bar from Jouett, the intestate, was recorded in the proper county, except the acknowledgment; and if the court should determine that the fact that the neglect of the clerk to record the acknowledgment would defeat the record of the balance of it, notwithstanding such clerk had certified on the deed that it was “duly recorded,” we still think that the plaintiff in error who purchased from the administrator of Jouett acquired no title. (Rodgers v. Burchard, 34 Tex., 441.) A vendee at a judicial sale (as an executor's or administrator's) takes only such interests as the debtor or decedent actually had. (Dwight v. Newell, 3 Comst., 185;Love v. James, 4 Watts, 473;Osterman v. Baldwin, 6 Wall., 117.) Nor can such grantee be regarded as a “ bona fide” purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice. (Smith's Heirs v. Bank of Mobile, 21 Ala., 124; Farrer v. Patton, 20 Mo., 81.)

The deed of an administrator, being a quit-claim deed, and only conveying such interest as the decedent had, the purchaser is certainly taxed with notice of all outstanding claims, whether they be recorded or not. This case is stronger than those cited above; for the purchaser could, by consulting the records, have been put upon inquiry at least.

MOORE, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE.

It is the evident purpose of the registration laws to protect creditors and purchasers against fraud and imposition by vendors and their prior creditors, as well as to protect and secure the latter against fraudulent combinations and contrivances between the owners of real estate and third parties, after incumbering or parting with their title or interest in it. The first of these objects is intended to be effected by requiring that all bargains, sales, and other conveyances whatsoever, of any lands, tenements, and hereditaments, whether made for passing any estate of freehold or inheritance, or for a term of years; and all deeds of settlement upon marriage, whether land, money, or other personal things, shall be settled, or covenanted to be left or paid, at the death of the party, or otherwise; and all deeds of trust and mortgages, though valid and binding as between the parties and their heirs, and as to all subsequent purchasers with notice thereof, or without consideration, shall, nevertheless, be void as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, unless duly acknowledged or proved, and lodged with the clerk, to be recorded, as required by law. The record is accomplished by making such instruments, when duly proven and recorded as provided by the statute, operate as constructive notice to creditors and subsequent purchasers, of such facts as they would have learned from the record, if examined. But purchasers and creditors are only charged by construction with notice of the facts actually exhibited by the record, and not with such as might have been ascertained by such inquiries as an examination of the record might have induced a prudent man to make. Hence, it is a well-established rule, that the registration of deeds or instruments, required by law to be recorded, will not operate as constructive notice, unless they have been acknowledged or proved, as prescribed by law. (Work v. Harper, 24 Miss., 517;White v. Denman, 1 Ohio St., 110;Bishop v. Schneider, 46 Mo., 472.) And while it is a conclusion of law which cannot be disputed, that subsequent purchasers and creditors are charged with notice of all the facts shown or exhibited by the record, it has never been held that they were bound or affected by a record which does not give notice of a valid conveyance of the property in question, but merely gives information which, if in fact communicated to such creditor or purchaser, might have been reasonably sufficient to put him upon inquiry, though had such inquiry been made, the existence of a prior incumbrance, not properly recorded, might have been ascertained. It is therefore held, that a deed not properly acknowledged or proved for record, although in fact duly executed, will not operate as notice of such deed; and though it may have been duly proved or acknowledged for record, if, in some material respect, it has been improperly recorded, the same result follows from such omission, and the record will only give notice of the existence of such an instrument as that exhibited by it. (Terrell v. Andrew County, 44 Mo., 309; Beekman v. Frost, 18 John, 544; Sanger v. Craigue, 10 Vt., 555;Jennings v. Wood, 20 Ohio, 266; 2 Wash. On Real Prop., 139.)

And unless there is such a record as the statute prescribes, it certainly does not furnish notice...