Anderson v. Hunte Delivery Sys., Inc.
| Decision Date | 02 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:11-cv-355-TFM |
| Parties | DAVID DARIEL ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. HUNTE DELIVERY SYSTEM, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
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Now pending before this Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on September 27, 2011.
On November 10, 2009, Sarah Darelle Anderson ("Decedent") died in an automobile accident on Interstate Highway 85 between Mitylene and Waugh, Alabama. Plaintiff, David Dariel Anderson ("Anderson" or "Plaintiff"), as Administrator and Personal Representative of the Decedent, originally filed the instant action on November 23, 2011, in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama alleging the following claims: 1) Negligence against Aaron Lewis ("Lewis") and Hunt Delivery System, Inc., Hunte Kennel Systems and Animal Care, Inc., ("Hunte") (collectively "Defendants"); 2) Wantonness against Lewis and Hunte; 3) Negligent Entrustment against Hunte; 4) Wanton Entrustment against Hunte; 5) Negligent Hiring, Training, Supervising and Monitoring against Hunte; and 6) Wanton Hiring, Training, Supervising and Monitoring against Hunte. (Doc. 27, filed on October 5, 2011). Having removed the suit to this Court on May 9, 2011 (Doc. 1), Defendants now seeksummary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot establish negligence or wantonness because the duty to avoid is not applicable and/or because the Decedent was contributorily negligent. (Doc. 17, filed September 27, 2011). After careful consideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendants (Doc. 17) arguments presented by parties through filings (Doc. 17., and Doc. 31., and accompanying evidentiary submissions), along with oral arguments on January 13, 2012, and the record as a whole, the Court finds that a genuine dispute of material facts exist regarding all claims of negligence and that the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
The Court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 based upon the parties' diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and M.D. Ala. LR 73.1, the parties have consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all proceedings in this case and ordering the entry of final judgment. (Docs. 9-10, filed June 3, 2011).
A party in a lawsuit may move a court to enter summary judgment before trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) and (b). "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment asa matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority, 161 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 1998). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). At the summary judgment juncture, the court does not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter," but solely "determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 249. Only disputes about the material facts will preclude the granting of summary judgment and "disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248. A material fact is one "that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law," and a dispute about a material fact is "genuine" "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.; accord Greenberg v. Bell-South Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Slomcenski v. Citibank, N.A., 432 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2003)) ("In determining whether an issue of fact is 'genuine' for the purpose of defeating summary judgment, we ask whether the evidence is 'such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'").
Thus, the initial burden of proof rests on the movant. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; Gonzalez, 161 F.3d at 1294. This burden is satisfied when the movant shows that if the evidentiary record were reduced to admissible evidence at trial, it would beinsufficient to permit the non-movant from carrying its burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. The admissibility of evidence is subject to the same standards and rules that govern admissibility of evidence at trial. Clemons v. Dougherty County, Georgia, 684 F.2d 1365, 1369 n.5 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 556 (5th Cir. 1980)).
Once the movant meets its burden under Rule 56, the non-movant must designate specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Conclusory assertions, unsupported by specific facts, presented in affidavits opposing the motion for summary judgment are likewise insufficient to defeat a proper motion for summary judgment. Lejaun v. Nat'l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990); see also Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (). "Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact." Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). The party opposing summary judgment must respond by setting forth specific evidence in the record and articulating the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim, and may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Johnson v. Board of Regents of University of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001). If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative,summary judgment may be granted. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citations omitted). Thus, to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 586 106 S.Ct. at 1356 (citations omitted). A plaintiff must present evidence demonstrating that he can establish the basic elements of his claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
In determining whether a genuine dispute for trial exists, the court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003); Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1242-43. Further, "all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party's] favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; 106 S.Ct. at 2513; see also McCormick, 333 F.3d at 1243 (). If the non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. In other words, summary judgment is proper after adequate time for discovery and upon motion against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case. Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.
The undisputed facts are that on the evening of November 10, 2009 the Decedent was the driver and her friend, Sarah Elizabeth Clayton, was the only passenger in Decedent's Chevy Equinox SUV, which was southbound on Interstate 85. (See Doc. 27, filed October 5, 2011). Heavy rain and low visibility made the Decedent hydroplane and lose control of her Chevy Equinox, which flipped at least once but perhaps multiple times. ("first accident") Ultimately the Equinox landed on its roof, with the front half of the vehicle on the left shoulder of the road while the back half of the vehicle remained, in part, in the left hand lane of traffic. After the first accident, a commercial motor vehicle driven by Lewis and owned by Hunte, was traveling southbound on Interstate 85 and hit the back half of the decedent's vehicle ("second accident"). Id.
Plaintiff asserts that the Decedent survived the first accident only to be struck a fatal blow to her head, either directly or indirectly, by the Defendant in the second accident. Id. Defendants assert that the Decedent was already dead at the time of the second accident. Defendants theorize that the Decedent broke her neck when she was ejected from her vehicle in the first accident. (Doc. 17).
Clayton testified in her deposition that she and the decedent were Auburn University students at the time of the accidents and the two of them were close friends. ). Clayton and the Decedent first met in the Auburn Band andwere two members of the piccolo section. Id. at 10-12. Clayton and the Decedent were fast friends who were together most of their spare time. Id.
Shortly before the accident Clayton and Decedent left a Bible study at a friend's house when they decided to go to Krispy Kreme in Montgomery. Decedent was upset because she recently broke up with her boyfriend. Id. at 21-22. During the trip Clayton and Decedent discussed the breakup and were listening to music when the vehicle hit a puddle and began to hydroplane. Id. at 29, 41. Clayton remembers the car going up on two wheels, closing her eyes, hanging upside down, and...
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