Anderson v. Lauderdale Cnty.

• Decision Date: 21 February 2023
• Docket Number: W2022-00332-COA-R3-CV
• Parties: BRANDON K. ANDERSON v. LAUDERDALE COUNTY, TENNESSEE
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

BRANDON K. ANDERSON v. LAUDERDALE COUNTY, TENNESSEE

No. W2022-00332-COA-R3-CV

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Jackson

February 21, 2023

Assigned on Briefs October 3, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lauderdale County No. 7208 A Blake Neill, Judge

Plaintiff filed an action against Lauderdale County under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-301 to -303, more than one year after his cause of action accrued. The trial court examined the gravamen of the complaint and determined a one-year statute of limitations applied rather than the two or six-year limitations periods advocated for by the plaintiff. Discerning no error in the court's analysis of the issues, we affirm.

Tenn R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed.

Stephen Rutland Leffler, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Brandon K. Anderson.

Haynes Tyler Russell and Nathan Daniel Tilly, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Lauderdale County, Tennessee.

Andy D. Bennett, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which John W. McClarty and Kenny W. Armstrong, JJ., joined.

OPINION

ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE

Factual and Procedural History

This appeal requires us to examine Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 8-8-301 to -303 and the applicable statute of limitations associated with causes of action arising thereunder. This lawsuit was first initiated on August 9, 2021, when Brandon K. Anderson ("Plaintiff") filed a "Complaint on Sheriff Bond Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-8-301, et[] seq." against Lauderdale County, Tennessee and Lauderdale County Deputy Sherriff Robert Wenzler ("Deputy Wenzler"). In his Complaint,^[1] Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that on February 18, 2020, Deputy Wenzler approached his vehicle while he was parked on a gravel road at night, pointed a gun at him, and when Plaintiff moved his car forward requesting to meet the deputy at a more public location, Deputy Wenzler fired his gun. Plaintiff asserted that he sped away from the scene toward his home and that Deputy Wenzler "radioed for other officers to assist in stopping [him] claiming that [Plaintiff] had tried to run over [Deputy Wenzler]." Plaintiff further averred that he "tried to get home but officers shot [him] with a taser incapacitating him when [he] got out of his car." On February 19, 2020, Deputy Wenzler charged Plaintiff with "attempted vehicular homicide, felony evading arrest, nine counts of disobeying traffic controls and simple possession of schedule VI drugs." Plaintiff averred that Deputy Wenzler made false representations in the "narrative of the factual basis for the charges." Plaintiff further averred that, "[w]hen it was determined by law enforcement that [Deputy] Wenzler swore under oath to the false representations against [Plaintiff], the District Attorney General voluntarily dismissed all charges against [Plaintiff]." Plaintiff alleged that a grand jury returned an indictment against Deputy Wenzler and asserted that Lauderdale County is liable for Deputy Wenzler's actions under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302 and -303 for "intentional tortious assault," "false imprisonment," "malicious prosecution," "abuse of process," and "invasion of privacy." Lauderdale County and Deputy Wenzler filed motions to dismiss the Complaint.

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on November 30, 2021, articulating the same factual basis for his lawsuit. However, in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff removed any reference to intentional torts and continued to assert that his cause of action arose under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 8-8-302 and -303. Plaintiff asserted broadly that "[a]s a proximate result of the conduct of [Deputy] Wenzler as alleged herein, [Plaintiff] suffered damages." Lauderdale County filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint on December 9, 2021, arguing that a one-year statute of limitations applied barring Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims against Deputy Wenzler. Plaintiff filed a response to the motion to dismiss asserting that either a six-year or two-year statute of limitations applied pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-109 or Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(2), respectively.

The trial court held a hearing on February 7, 2022 and entered an Order Granting Defendant Lauderdale County's Motion to Dismiss on February 24, 2022. The court held that a one-year statute of limitations governed Plaintiff's cause of action and bars his claim. Plaintiff timely appealed to this Court.

Standard of Review

A statute of limitations defense is appropriately addressed in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. See Martin v. Rolling Hills Hosp., LLC, 600 S.W.3d 322, 330 (Tenn. 2020). A motion filed under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) "tests only the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint, not the strength of the plaintiff's proof." Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 455 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Highwoods Props., Inc. v. City of Memphis, 297 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tenn. 2009)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, "courts 'must construe the complaint liberally,' presume all alleged facts are true, and 'giv[e] the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences.'" Cooper v. Mandy, 639 S.W.3d 29, 33 (Tenn. 2022) (quoting Ellithorpe v. Weismark, 479 S.W.3d 818, 824 (Tenn. 2015)). A trial court's determination of "the applicable statute of limitations is an issue of law that we review de novo." Bates v. Greene, 544 S.W.3d 345, 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Gunter v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 121 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tenn. 2003)); see also Benz-Elliott v. Barrett Enters., LP, 456 S.W.3d 140, 147 (Tenn. 2015).

Analysis

Plaintiff brought his claim pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302^[2] and -303, neither of which contains a statute of limitations period.^[3] See Cross v. Shelby Cty., No. W2005-01231-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 1005168, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2006) (noting the absence of a limitations period in Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302 and inviting the General Assembly to consider the applicable limitations period). When a specific statute of limitations is not clearly set forth in a statute, courts must determine the applicable statute of limitations period by "considering the '"gravamen of the complaint."' Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 457 (quoting Whaley v. Perkins, 197 S.W.3d 665, 670 (Tenn. 2006)); see also Pera v. Kroger Co., 674 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tenn. 1984) ("It is well settled in this state that the gravamen of an action, rather than its designation . . . determines the applicable statute of limitations."); Blalock v. Preston Law Grp., P.C., No.M2011-00351-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 4503187, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2012) ("When determining which of several possible statutes of limitations applies to a particular claim, the court must look to the gravamen of the complaint."). Where a complaint has multiple claims, courts look to the gravamen of each claim. Benz-Elliott, 456 S.W.3d at 148-49, 151. To determine the gravamen of a claim, "a court must first consider the legal basis of the claim and then consider the type of injuries for which damages are sought." Id. at 151.

The trial court found that the gravamen of the complaint was for personal injuries and that the claims were governed by a one-year statute of limitations found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104.^[4] Because Plaintiff filed his claim over one year from the date of his alleged injuries, the court concluded the claims were time barred. Plaintiff argues that either the six-year statute of limitations period in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-109 or the two-year statute of limitations period in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(2) applies allowing his claim to proceed. We will address each contention in turn.

First, we look to the allegations in the complaint to determine the gravamen of the claims including the legal basis of the claims and the types of injuries alleged. The Amended Complaint is not a model of clarity in outlining the specific claims asserted or the injuries alleged; however, Plaintiff avers that he was "surprised and fearful" when he saw Deputy Wenzler pointing a gun at him, and he "feared for his safety." Plaintiff states that Deputy Wenzler made "false representations" against him and quotes extensively from excerpts from a grand jury indictment against Deputy Wenzler:

(a) "...did unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly by use of a deadly weapon cause [Plaintiff] to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by pointing his gun at [Plaintiff] and threatening to shoot him if [Plaintiff] did not exit his vehicle . . ." (b) "...did unlawfully feloniously and knowingly by the use of a deadly weapon cause [Plaintiff] to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury by firing his weapon at [Plaintiff's] vehicle as it was driving away from [Deputy] Wenzler . . ."

(c)". . . did unlawfully feloniously and knowingly, while a public servant, acting under color of office or employment commit an offense intentionally subjecting [Plaintiff] to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, stop, frisk, halt, search, seizure when the said [Deputy] Wenzler knew the conduct was unlawful . . ."

(d)". . . did unlawfully feloniously and knowingly, while a public servant, with intent to harm [Plaintiff], commit an act relating to the servant's office or employment that constitutes an unauthorized exercise of official power . . ."

(e)". . . did unlawfully feloniously and knowingly, while a public servant, with intent to harm [Plaintiff], commit an act relating to the servant's office or employment that exceeds he said [Deputy] Wenzler's official power . . ."

(f)". . . did unlawfully feloniously and knowingly, while a public servant, with intent to harm [Plaintiff], violate a law relating to the said [Deputy] Wenzler's office or employment . .

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