Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis

• Decision Date: 27 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. W2009–00986–SC–R11–CV.,W2009–00986–SC–R11–CV.
• Citation: 363 S.W.3d 436
• Parties: Norman REDWING v. CATHOLIC BISHOP FOR THE DIOCESE OF MEMPHIS.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

363 S.W.3d 436

Norman REDWING

v.CATHOLIC BISHOP FOR THE DIOCESE OF MEMPHIS.

No. W2009–00986–SC–R11–CV.

Supreme Court of Tennessee,Middle Section, at Jackson.

April 7, 2011 Session.Feb. 27, 2012.

Gary K. Smith and Karen M. Campbell, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Norman Redwing.

John H. Dotson and Casey Shannon, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis.

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CORNELIA A. CLARK, C.J., JANICE M. HOLDER, GARY R. WADE, and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined.

OPINION

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J.

This appeal involves a dispute regarding the civil liability of the Catholic Diocese of Memphis for acts of child sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by one of its priests in the 1970s. A victim of this alleged abuse filed suit against the Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Memphis in the Circuit Court for Shelby County seeking monetary damages. The Diocese moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprived state courts of subject matter jurisdiction and that the victim's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the Diocese's motion. The Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations had run on the victim's claims and that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred state courts from considering the victim's negligent hiring and retention claims but not the negligent supervision claims. Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, No. W2009–00986–COA–R10–CV, 2010 WL 2106222 (Tenn.Ct.App. May 27, 2010). We granted the victim's Tenn. R.App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal. We have concluded that the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the victim's claims and that the victim's claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

I.

The facts in this opinion are drawn from the allegations in the complaint. No trial has occurred. Neither party has presented evidence, and no facts have been found by a fact-finder. Because this case comes to us as an appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss, the applicable standard of review requires us to presume that the allegations in the complaint are true. Our decision to include in this opinion any particular factual allegation found in the complaint should not be construed as a conclusive finding-of-fact that prevents the parties from presenting evidence regarding the fact or that prevents the trial court or the jury from making contradictory findings-of-fact based on the evidence actually presented by the parties.

Norman Redwing¹ was born in August 1960 and was raised in a Roman Catholic home. His childhood was turbulent. He was raped by an adult male when he was seven years old. The trauma remained long after the event, and by the time he was twelve, Mr. Redwing began to run away from home on a regular basis.

Between 1972 and 1974, Mr. Redwing attended mass regularly at Holy Names Catholic Church in Memphis. There he came to know Father Milton Guthrie. On the occasions when Mr. Redwing ran away from home, Fr. Guthrie allowed him to stay at the church. These acts of kindness caused Mr. Redwing to admire and respect priests in general and Fr. Guthrie in particular. Mr. Redwing respected Fr. Guthrie not only for his acts of kindness but also for his involvement in the civil rights movement.

Eventually, Mr. Redwing confided to Fr. Guthrie that he had been raped when he was seven years old. At first, Fr. Guthrie responded with kindness and understanding. He made breakfast for Mr. Redwing when he spent the night at the church and gave him pocket money from time to time. However, after a time, Mr. Redwing alleges that Fr. Guthrie began to take advantage of him. He states that Fr. Guthrie began to touch him in inappropriate ways and eventually inveigled him into a physical relationship that included oral sex.

In August 2008, over thirty years after the alleged acts of sexual abuse occurred, Mr. Redwing filed suit in the Circuit Court for Shelby County against the “Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis.” ² He did not name Fr. Guthrie as a defendant based on his understanding that Fr. Guthrie had died.

Mr. Redwing alleged that the Diocese breached its fiduciary duties and acted negligently with regard to the hiring, retention, and supervision of Fr. Guthrie. Mr. Redwing also alleged that the Diocese was aware or should have been aware that Fr. Guthrie was “a dangerous sexual predator with a depraved sexual interest in young boys” and that the Diocese misled him and his family regarding its “knowledge of Father Guthrie's history and propensity for committing sexual abuse upon minors.” According to Mr. Redwing's complaint, “[a]fter finding out about Father Guthrie's abuse of minors, the Diocese actively took steps to protect Father Guthrie, conceal the Diocese's own wrongdoing in supervising Father Guthrie, and prevent Norman Redwing and other victims of Father Guthrie from filing civil lawsuits.”

The Diocese denied the allegations in Mr. Redwing's complaint. On October 22, 2008, the Diocese filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 motion seeking dismissal of the complaint on two grounds. First, in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1), the Diocese asserted that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the ecclesiastical abstention or church autonomy doctrine.³ Second, in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), the Diocese argued that the statute of limitations barred Mr. Redwing's complaint. The Diocese noted that three decades had passed since the alleged abuse occurred and that nearly three decades had passed since the expiration of the statute of limitations. The Diocese also asserted that neither the discovery rule, fraudulent concealment, nor equitable estoppel could be used to toll the running of the statute of limitations.

On April 15, 2009, Mr. Redwing filed a memorandum in opposition to the Diocese's motion to dismiss. He argued that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did not prevent the state courts from exercising jurisdiction over his complaint. He also asserted that appropriate grounds exist for tolling the statute of limitations, including fraudulent concealment, equitable estoppel, and the discovery rule.

The trial court conducted hearings on the Diocese's motion on April 17 and 20, 2009. On April 22, 2009, the trial court filed an order denying the motion. The court did not explain its reasoning with regard to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. With regard to the statute of limitations, the trial court stated that “the record does not establish as a matter of law that sufficient facts as to defendant's potential liability could have been known more than a year prior to the filing of the lawsuit.”

Two days after the entry of the trial court's order, the Diocese filed motions seeking permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R.App. P. 9 and to stay the proceedings pending the interlocutory appeal. Mr. Redwing opposed both motions. On May 13, 2009, the trial court filed an order declining to approve an interlocutory appeal or a stay.

Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10, the Diocese immediately filed an application for an extraordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals. On May 14, 2009, the Court of Appeals directed Mr. Redwing to file a response. Mr. Redwing did so. On July 1, 2009, the Court of Appeals granted the Diocese's Rule 10 application for permission to appeal and stayed the proceedings in the trial court pending the appeal.

On May 27, 2010, the Court of Appeals handed down Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, No. W2009–00986–COA–R10–CV, 2010 WL 2106222 (Tenn.Ct.App. May 27, 2010). With regard to the Diocese's defense predicated on the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, the court drew a distinction between Mr. Redwing's negligent supervision claim and his negligent hiring and retention claims and held unanimously that the latter claims were barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine but that the former claim was not. The Court of Appeals did not separately address Mr. Redwing's breach of fiduciary duty claim.

The Court of Appeals split, however, with regard to the Bishop's statute of limitations defense. The majority of the panel concluded that Mr. Redwing was on inquiry notice when he reached the age of majority because he knew he had been abused, he knew who his abuser was, and he knew that his abuser was employed by the Diocese. Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 2010 WL 2106222, at *7. The majority decided that Mr. Redwing's “conclusory allegation that he exercised reasonable care and diligence is not sufficient to prevent dismissal of the complaint as time-barred [because] the rest of the complaint belies the allegation.” Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 2010 WL 2106222, at *7. In the majority's view, if Mr. Redwing had filed suit when he reached eighteen years of age, “discovery in that case would have ‘provided a mechanism for [him] to learn that the Diocese had been negligent.’ ” Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 2010 WL 2106222, at *7 (quoting Doe v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 306 S.W.3d 712, 730 (Tenn.Ct.App.2008)).

In her dissenting opinion, Judge Kirby concluded that the majority's dismissal of Mr. Redwing's claims was premature in the context of an appeal of a motion to dismiss. Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 2010 WL 2106222, at *10. Judge Kirby noted that Mr. Redwing had alleged in his complaint that the Diocese had undertaken to conceal its wrongdoing and that the Diocese had misled Mr. Redwing. Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 2010 WL 2106222, at *8. Judge Kirby also concluded that Mr. Redwing was not on inquiry notice with regard to the Diocese's wrongdoing and that even if...