Anderson v. Luitjens

• Decision Date: 03 December 1976
• Docket Number: Nos. 46369,46370 and 46371,s. 46369
• Citation: 311 Minn. 203,247 N.W.2d 913
• Parties: Ross A. ANDERSON, et al., Appellants, v. Howard LUITJENS, et al., Appellants, Thomas Edward Pettit, Appellant, Charles J. Denker, Individually, and d.b.a. Chuck's Tavern, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 913

247 N.W.2d 913

311 Minn. 203

Ross A. ANDERSON, et al., Appellants, v. Howard LUITJENS, et al., Appellants Thomas Edward Pettit, Appellant Charles J. Denker, Individually, and d.b.a. Chuck's Tavern Respondent.

Nos. 46369, 46370 and 46371.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 3, 1976.

Syllabus by the Court

On the facts presented, Iowa bordertown tavern had sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Minnesota to justify the exercise of in personam state court long-arm jurisdiction over tavern owner pursuant to Minn.St. 543.19.

James R. Schwebel and Gregory P. Joseph, Minneapolis, for Anderson, et al.

Winter, Lundquist, Sherwood & Athens and Marvin E. Lundquist, Mankato, for Luitjens, et al.

Murnane, Murnane, Conlin & White and Lance B. Nyberg, St. Paul, for Pettit.

Erickson, Zierke, Kuderer, Utermarck & McKenna, Elton A. Kuderer and Gregory P. Huwe, Fairmont, for respondent.

Considered and decided by the court en banc.

SHERAN, Chief Justice.

Plaintiffs, Ross A. Anderson and Gordon B. Anderson, and defendants Howard Luitjens and Wendy Jean Johnson and Thomas Edward Pettit appeal from an order of the District Court of Nobles County granting defendant Charles J. Denker's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint against Denker for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse.

About 11:30 p.m. on September 30, 1972, plaintiff Ross Anderson was injured in a two-car automobile accident which occurred in Nobles County, Minnesota, about 3 miles north of the Iowa line. Anderson was a passenger in a car owned by defendant Luitjens and driven by defendant Johnson. The other car was driven by defendant Pettit.

Prior to the accident, defendant Johnson, who was 17 at the time, had been served alcoholic beverages at defendant Denker's tavern in Lake Park, Iowa, which is 3 miles south of the Iowa-Minnesota line and about 10 miles distant from the site of the accident. As a result of the accident, plaintiffs commenced a civil action against all four named defendants. As part of their response to the action, defendants Luitjens and Johnson cross-claimed for contribution or indemnity against Pettit and Denker, who does business as Chuck's Tavern. Pettit cross-claimed for contribution or indemnity against the other defendants. Denker, in turn, moved to dismiss the action against him on the grounds, as held by the district court, that personal jurisdiction over him had not been obtained.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that Ms. Johnson became intoxicated at the tavern, that she was served additional liquor while intoxicated, and that the accident resulted, at least in part, from her intoxication. Iowa law prohibits the sale of liquor to a minor (Iowa Code §§ 123.47, 123.49(2h) (1975)) and to intoxicated persons (Iowa Code § 123.49(1) (1975)). The issue on appeal is whether Denker, the Iowa tavern keeper, ought to be subject to the in personam long-arm jurisdiction of a Minnesota court.

Minn.St. 543.19 provides in pertinent part:

'Subdivision 1. As to a cause of action arising from any acts enumerated in this subdivision, a court of this state with jurisdiction of the subject matter may exercise personal jurisdiction over any * * * non-resident individual * * * in the same manner as if * * * he were a resident of this state. This section applies if, in person * * *, the * * * non-resident individual:

'(c) Commits any tort in Minnesota causing injury or property damage * * *.'

Appellants argue that a tort was committed, in Minnesota, and that there are sufficient 'minimum contacts' between defendant Denker and the state to justify the assertion of jurisdiction.

We believe that a tort was committed. Denker's alleged conduct, if proved, would be wrong and tortious because Iowa law makes it so. See, Iowa Code §§ 123.47, 123.49 (1975). As we stated in State ex rel. Nelson v. Nelson, 298 Minn. 438, 441, 216 N.W.2d 140, 143 (1974), construing the meaning of the word 'tort' as contained in § 543.19, subd. 1(c):

'* * * The doing of an act prohibited by law or the neglect to perform a duty imposed by law, resulting in damages to another, creates a legal liability * * * and may be denominated a tort within the scope of the long-arm statute.'

Since Denker's alleged action in serving liquor to Ms. Johnson involved the apparent violation of two different Iowa statutes, the test of Nelson was met, and we are satisfied that a tort was committed. ¹

We also believe that the tort was committed in Minnesota. The district court felt otherwise, and based its conclusion on the fact that Minn.St. 303.13, subd. 1(3), the corporate long-arm statute, contains language referring to a tort committed 'in whole or in part in Minnesota,' whereas § 543.19, subd. 1(c), refers only to a foreign corporation or nonresident individual who 'commits any tort in Minnesota.' In the district court's view, § 543.19, subd. 1(c), could not apply here because § 543.19 requires an Act, not just an injury, that occurs in Minnesota, and defendant Denker committed no act in this state.

This view of the matter is persuasive, but not conclusive. In Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 172 N.W.2d 292 (1969), certiorari denied sub nom. Burke v. Hunt, 397 U.S. 1010, 90 S.Ct. 1239, 25 L.Ed.2d 423 (1970), we stated that § 543.19 was enacted 'to afford maximum protection to this state's residents injured by acts of nonresidents' and that the legislature's basic interest was 'to extend the extraterritorial jurisdiction of our courts to the maximum limits consistent with constitutional limitations.' 285 Minn. 96, 172 N.W.2d 304. The district court's view of the differences between § 303.13 and § 543.19 controverts the above-quoted passages from Hunt.

Our view of the matter is supported by prior Minnesota decisions and by the Restatement, Conflict of Laws 2d. The test for whether or not a tort has occurred 'in Minnesota' for purposes of long-arm jurisdiction is whether damage from the alleged tortious conduct resulted in Minnesota. If the injury or the damage occurred here, jurisdiction has followed in cases where minimum contacts have been shown despite the fact that the tortious activity occurred elsewhere. Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960); Adamek v. Michigan Door Co., 260 Minn. 54, 108 N.W.2d 607 (1961); Casperson v. Board of Regents of University of Minn., 272 Minn. 210, 137 N.W.2d 194 (1965); Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, supra. As we noted in Mid-Continent Freight Lines, Inc. v. Highway Trailer Industries, Inc., 291 Minn. 251, 190 N.W.2d 670 (1971), §§ 303.13 and 543.19--

'* * * were enacted primarily for the protection of residents of this state, and the legislature, to that end, intended to extend jurisdiction of this state's courts over foreign corporations And other nonresident defendants to the maximum limits consistent with due process safeguards.' (Italics supplied.) 291 Minn. 254, 190 N.W.2d 673.

Furthermore, Restatement, Conflict of Laws 2d, § 37, refers to jurisdiction over a nonresident individual who 'causes effects in the state by an act done elsewhere' and indicates that jurisdiction over such an individual is proper 'unless the nature of the effects and of the individual's relationship to the state make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.' See, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Restatement, Conflict of Laws 2d, § 50, refers to foreign corporations whose acts done outside the state cause effects within the state, and the comment to this section indicates that the rule for foreign corporations is the same as the rule for nonresident individuals. The Restatement approach coincides with our view that Minn.St. 303.13 and 543.19 ought to be similarly interpreted and construed to the extent that it is reasonably possible to do so.

The major remaining question is whether there are sufficient 'minimum contacts' to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by Minnesota courts over defendant Denker. Five main factors guide our resolution of this question. They are: (1) Quantity of defendant Denker's contacts with Minnesota; (2) nature and quality of those contacts; (3) source and connection of cause of action with the contacts; (4) interest of the state in providing a forum; and (5) convenience of the parties. ²

The main tangible contact of defendant Denker with Minnesota results from the estimation by Denker in his affidavit in support of his motion to dismiss that only 8 percent of this business consists of sales to Minnesota residents. This contact is not as insignificant as it might initially appear. In Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, supra, four nonresident individual defendants were among those sued by the plaintiff for fraudulent conversion of an insurance company's assets. Jurisdiction over the nonresident individuals was obtained pursuant to § 543.19, subd. 1(c). The court in Hunt found the assertion of jurisdiction inoffensive because the defendants, through actions performed both in and outside the state, had intentionally set in motion events whose inescapable effect was to injure Minnesotans. 285 Minn. 112, 172 N.W.2d 312. Similarly here, defendant Denker or his employees can be viewed as having set in motion a chain of events which led directly to plaintiffs' injuries. It is alleged that Ms. Johnson was a minor, that she was served alcoholic beverages at Denker's tavern, that she became intoxicated, that she was served liquor in that state, and that her intoxication was a proximate cause of the accident. ³ If exercise of jurisdiction was inoffensive in Hunt, it would seem acceptable here.

As for the source and connection of the cause of action with the contacts, it is important to bear in mind that at the time of this accident the legal age in Iowa was 19, but the legal age in Minnesota was still 21. ⁴ This difference was bound to attract young Minnesotans to Iowa's nearby establishments. From this it appears that a sufficiently...