Anderson v. McDonald
| Decision Date | 26 March 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. CC929,CC929 |
| Citation | 170 W.Va. 56,289 S.E.2d 729 |
| Parties | Edith Bell ANDERSON v. Eugene F. McDONALD and Omaha Indemnity Company, a Corporation. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. When a release of liability is obtained by the representative of an insurance company and in a negligence action against the insured, the insured pleads the release as an affirmative defense pursuant to W.Va.R.Civ.P. 8(c), and the plaintiff has moved to join the insurance company as a party to the action, the trial judge may join the insurance company as a party to the action pursuant to W.Va.R.Civ.P. 20.
2. In a negligence action, the granting of a separate trial upon the issue of the validity of a release of liability rests within the discretion of the trial judge. W.Va.R.Civ.P. 42(c).
Madden, Hughes & Whorton and G. Charles Hughes, Moundsville, for plaintiff.
Bachmann, Hess, Bachmann & Garden and George E. McLaughlin, Wheeling, for defendants.
This action is before this Court upon two certified questions from the Circuit Court of Marshall County, West Virginia. The certified questions were docketed by this Court by order entered on November 3, 1981. 1 The questions involve the joinder of an insurance company as a party in a negligence action. This Court has before it all matters of record and the briefs filed by counsel.
In August, 1980, the plaintiff, Edith Bell Anderson, filed an action in the Circuit Court of Marshall County, West Virginia, against the defendant, Eugene F. McDonald. In that action, the plaintiff sought recovery in the amount of $100,000 plus costs as the result of an automobile accident which occurred on October 9, 1979, in the City of Moundsville. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant negligently drove through a stop sign.
In his answer to the complaint, McDonald asserted a counterclaim against the plaintiff upon the theory of negligence. Furthermore, in count two of his counterclaim, McDonald asserted that on March 28, 1980, the plaintiff executed a written release with respect to the October 9, 1979, accident and agreed to the sum of $6,000 as settlement of her claim. In that counterclaim, McDonald asserted that the plaintiff repudiated the release and that the plaintiff refused to accept the settlement amount of $6,000. Accordingly, McDonald sought specific performance of the release agreement. 2
It should be noted that subsequent to the accident, the plaintiff negotiated her claim with Phyllis J. MacVicar, an employee of an adjusting firm. That firm was employed by defendant McDonald's insurance company, The Omaha Indemnity Company (a Mutual of Omaha Company). Ms. MacVicar obtained the March 28, 1980, release from the plaintiff and subsequently mailed to the plaintiff a $6,000 check. Although the Omaha Indemnity Company (hereinafter "Omaha") was not mentioned in the release, Omaha executed the $6,000 check. The plaintiff refused that check and returned it to Ms. MacVicar.
In September, 1980, the plaintiff moved that Omaha be made a party to the action. In October, 1980, McDonald, pursuant to W.Va.R.Civ.P. 42(c), moved that the release issue be tried separately from the original action. By order entered September 24, 1981, the circuit court granted the motion of the plaintiff to join Omaha as a party and denied McDonald's motion for separate trials. 3 Pursuant to that order, the following questions were certified to this Court:
1. Whether Omaha Indemnity Company, under these factual circumstances, may be joined by plaintiff as a necessary or real, proper or indispensable party, to which question, this [Circuit] Court has ruled in the affirmative.
2. Whether the defendants, so joined, are entitled, under the circumstances, to a separate trial, to which questions, this [Circuit] Court has ruled in the negative.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm the rulings of the circuit court. It should be noted in passing that the merits of the negligence and validity of release issues are not before this Court. Those issues are to be resolved in the circuit court upon remand of this action.
The plaintiff contends that the circuit court was correct in joining Omaha as a party defendant. As the plaintiff's petition indicates, the plaintiff contends that, absent Omaha as a party to the action, a verdict for the plaintiff against McDonald would not prevent Omaha from asserting the validity of the March 28, 1980, release in a separate proceeding. The plaintiff contends, therefore, that the absence of Omaha in this action may subject the plaintiff to "a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations" within the meaning of W.Va.R.Civ.P. 19(a). W.Va.R.Civ.P. 19(a) and (b) provide as follows:
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible.--A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible.--If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
The defendants contend, however, with respect to W.Va.R.Civ.P. 19, that Omaha has no interest in the action, other than to provide insurance coverage to McDonald in the event that the March 28, 1980, release of liability is held to be invalid. Therefore, Omaha concludes that it should not have been joined as a party. Omaha asserts that it was not a party to the release, and that, absent Omaha in this action, the plaintiff is not prevented from litigating the validity of the release and, if successful, obtaining a judgment against McDonald.
The plaintiff further contends, however, that inasmuch as the issues in this action surrounding McDonald and Omaha arose from the same transaction or occurrence and involve common questions of law or fact, the joinder of Omaha as a party was proper under W.Va.R.Civ.P. 20(a). W.Va.R.Civ.P. 20(a) provides as follows:
(a) Permissive joinder.--All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action. All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities.
Nevertheless, the defendants contend that, inasmuch as no claim was asserted in circuit court between the plaintiff and Omaha, joinder of Omaha as a party under W.Va.R.Civ.P. 20 is not permitted. 4
It should be noted that W.Va.R.Civ.P. 19 and W.Va.R.Civ.P. 20(a) were amended by order of this Court entered on June 1, 1978. Those rules as amended follow substantially the language of the present federal rules. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 19 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 20. 5 No cases have been decided by this Court concerning Rule 19 and Rule 20 subsequent to the 1978 amendments. 6
Three types of parties are generally recognized with respect to the issue of joinder under Rule 19 and Rule 20: indispensable parties, necessary parties and proper parties. Indispensable and necessary parties are associated with Rule 19. Proper parties are associated with Rule 20. As the note to W.Va.R.Civ.P. 19 states in part: Furthermore, as the note to W.Va.R.Civ.P. 20 states in part: Of course, this Court is not unmindful that a mechanical designation of parties as indispensable, necessary or proper, should not be substituted for a comprehensive analysis...
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