Anderson v. Minter

• Decision Date: 15 December 1972
• Docket Number: No. 72-236,72-236
• Citation: 32 Ohio St.2d 207,291 N.E.2d 457,61 O.O.2d 447
• Parties: , 61 O.O.2d 447 ANDERSON, Appellee, v. MINTER et al., Appellants.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 207

32 Ohio St.2d 207

291 N.E.2d 457, 61 O.O.2d 447

ANDERSON, Appellee, v. MINTER et al., Appellants.

No. 72-236.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 15, 1972.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A complaint filed in the Common Pleas Court by a civil service employee seeking to test the legality, under the provisions of R.C. § 143.27, of an order of the appointing authority suspending such employee for five days or less does not state a cause of action.

2. A complaint alleging that a supervisory employee maliciously induced the appointing authority of a civil service employee to suspend such employee for a period of five days or less and seeking compensatory and punitive damages as the result thereof does not state a cause of action against such supervisory employee.

Plaintiff-appellee, Karen Anderson, formerly held the position of Social Worker I in the employ of the Cuyahoga County Welfare Department. She resigned this position effective August 15, 1969.

On January 12, 1970, plaintiff filed suit in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County against appellant Steven Minter, then director of the Cuyahoga County Welfare Department, and against appellant Elizabeth Tuttle, who was Anderson's supervisor, alleging that plaintiff had been suspended from employment for a period of five days from August 11, 1969, to August 15, 1969, by Minter and that he was induced to do so by Tuttle. Upon the basis of allegations that such suspension was in violation of the protection accorded her by the civil service provisions of the Ohio Revised Code, and that both Minter and Tuttle acted maliciously, Anderson (1) in her first cause of action sought a finding that Minter 'was not entitled to suspend' her, and that he be 'directed and required to remove all indications of said unlawful suspension from plaintiff's permanent employment record,' that he 'be ordered, directed and required to compensate plaintiff's loss of wages' in the amount of $132, toghther with interest from August 15, 1969, and be 'directed and required to pay' $3,000 as 'punitive damages,' and (2) in her second cause of action prayed for 'judgment against defendant Elizabeth Tuttle' for $132, plus interest from August 15, 1969, 'as compensatory damages' and $3,000 'as punitive damages.'

A demurrer to the first and second causes of action (filed prior to the effective date of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure) was treated by the trial court as a motion to dismiss and, as such, sustained on November 18, 1970.

A third cause of action against Tuttle for defamation, based upon statements made by Tuttle in her memorandum to Minter recommending suspension of Anderson, was voluntarily dismissed on December 22, 1970.

The judgment of the trial court, dismissing the first and second causes of action, was reversed by the Court of Appeals. The cause is before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Edward R. Stege, Jr., Cleveland, for appellee.

John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., and Richard A. Goulder, Cleveland, for appellants.

LEACH, Justice.

At the outset, we must distinguish between the nature of the two causes of action involved herein. While monetary 'judgment' is sought against Tuttle much of the relief sought against Minter would necessarily require official action on the part of the director of the county Welfare Department. The Court of Appeals considered the cause of action against Minter as being one 'for illegal suspension of the plaintiff from her position as Social Worker I,' and the cause of action against Tuttle as one 'in tort * * * for interference with her employment.' We shall consider them in the same light.

I

The question presented by the first cause of action is whether the provisions of R.C. § 143.27 authorize a civil service employee to contest the legality of a suspension of five days or less by an action brought directly in the Common Pleas Court.

R.C. § 143.27 reads, in pertinent part:

'The tenure of every officer or employee in the classified service of the state and the counties, cities, city health districts, general health districts, and city school districts thereof, holding a position under sections 143.01 to 143.48, inclusive, of the Revised Code, shall be during good behavior and efficient service and no such officer or employee shall be reduced in pay or position, suspended, or removed, except for incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, drunkenness, immoral conduct, insubordination, discourteous treatment of the public, neglect of duty, violation of such sections or the rules of the director of state personnel or the commission, or any other failure of good behavior, or any other acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office.

'In any case of reduction, suspension of more than five working days, or removal, the appointing authority shall furnish such employee with a copy of the order of reduction, suspension, or removal, which order shall state the reasons therefor. Such order shall be filed with the director of state personnel and state personnel board of review, or the commission, as may be appropriate.

'Within ten days following the filing of such order, the employee may file an appeal, in writing, with the state personnel board of review or the commission. In the event such an appeal is filed, the board or commission shall forthwith notify the appointing authority and shall hear, or appoint a trial board to hear, such appeal within thirty days from and after its filing with the board or commission, and it may affirm, disaffirm, or modify the judgment of the appointing authority.

'In cases of removal or reduction in pay for disciplinary reasons, either the appointing authority or the officer or employee may appeal from the decision of the state personnel board of review or the commission to the court of common pleas of the county in which the employee resides in accordance with the procedure provided by section 119.12 of the Revised Code.' (Emphasis added.)

Under the terms of the statute a suspension for more than five days can only be made after furnishing the employee with a copy of the order of suspension and the reasons therefor. There is no such requirement as to suspensions for five days or less.

An Appeal is provided to the State Personnel Board of Review or commission for suspensions of more than five days. None is provided for suspensions of five days or less.

No appeal is provided to the Common Pleas Court from any order of suspension, such appeals (except as to members of the police or fire department of a city) ¹ being limited to those involving removal, or reduction in rank for disciplinary reasons.

Upon the basis that the language of the first paragraph of R.C. § 143.27 prohibited all suspensions except for the causes set forth therein, the Court of Appeals concluded that the question of whether cause existed for a suspension of five days or less could be determined in 'an independent action in the Common Pleas Court.' We do not agree.

Although the General Assembly has provided, in effect, that even suspensions for five days or less should be made only for cause, its intention to vest final discretion as to the necessity of such short-term suspensions in the appointing authority, subject only to the provisions of R.C. § 143.40 ² as to abuse of such power, is apparent from the legislative 'design' or 'scheme.' See 50 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d, 233 et seq., Sections 249 et seq.

Examining the statute in the light of its historical background, we find that, effective October 27, 1961, the General Assembly, by repealing R.C. § 143.26 and amending R.C. § 143.27 (129 Ohio Laws 1330) combined into a single statute some of the provisions previously...