Anderson v. Short, 24493
| Citation | 476 S.E.2d 475,323 S.C. 522 |
| Decision Date | 19 June 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 24493,24493 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
| Parties | Sandra ANDERSON and Paul Anderson, Appellants, v. Marvin J. SHORT, Respondent. . Heard |
Charles L. Henshaw, Jr., of Furr and Henshaw, Columbia, for appellants.
E. Brown Parkinson, Jr. and Hamilton E. Russell, of Haynsworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, L.L.P., Greenville, for respondent.
On appeal is an order dismissing Appellants' complaints as barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm.
Sandra Anderson began seeing Dr. Marvin Short, a psychiatrist, in August 1983 for pain management. She was under his continuous care for this and other ailments until March 1991, when she was admitted into a hospital for treatment of substance abuse and drug addiction. She filed suit against Dr. Short on January 13, 1994 alleging her addiction was caused by Dr. Short's negligence in prescribing drugs during the time period in which she was his patient. Paul Anderson, Sandra's husband, brought an action for loss of consortium.
The trial judge found both actions were barred by the statute of limitations.
I. Is the medical malpractice claim barred by the statute of limitations?
II. Is the loss of consortium claim barred by the statute of limitations?
An action for medical malpractice "shall be commenced within three years from the date of treatment, omission or operation giving rise to the cause of action or three years from date of discovery or when it reasonably ought to have been discovered, not to exceed six years from date of occurrence." S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-545 (Supp.1995). The trial judge found Sandra's action was time-barred because she had at least constructive notice of a potential claim against Dr. Short for three to four years before her treatment with him ended in March 1991. Thus, the statute of limitations began to run at the time of her discovery and ended three years later, long before she brought this action in 1994.
Sandra concedes that under application of the "discovery rule," her complaint is untimely. Rather, she argues this court should adopt the continuous treatment rule. According to this rule, "if the treatment by the doctor is a continuing course and the patient's illness, injury or condition is of such a nature as to impose on the doctor a duty of continuing treatment and care, the statute does not commence running until treatment by the doctor for the particular disease or condition involved has terminated." David W. Louisell & Harold Williams, Medical Malpractice, p 13.02 (1995). Under this rule, Sandra argues the statute of limitations would be tolled until March of 1991, when her treatment with Dr. Short ended.
Many states have adopted some version of the continuous treatment rule. However, most courts will not apply the rule to toll the running of a statute of limitations if before treatment ends the patient discovers or should have discovered the injury giving rise to the cause of action. See, e.g., Ballenger v. Crowell, 38 N.C.App. 50, 247 S.E.2d 287 (1978). See also Louisell & Williams, supra, at p 13.02; 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 174 (1987); 61 Am.Jur.2d Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 316 (1981). Were we to adopt the continuous treatment rule in this state, we would be inclined to conform with the majority of jurisdictions in limiting its application in the manner described above. See Preer v. Mims, 323 S.C. 516, 476 S.E.2d 472 (1996) (Davis Adv. Sh. No. 25 at 3).
Sandra has conceded she discovered her addiction more than three years prior to the time she brought her action. Thus the action would still be untimely notwithstanding our adoption of the continuous treatment rule, which, under these facts, we expressly decline to decide.
In his order, the trial judge ruled against Paul on two grounds. First, the judge ruled Paul was barred by the discovery rule because he was on constructive notice of a potential claim against Dr. Short for more than three years before the action was commenced. Second, the judge ruled a claim for loss of consortium was derivative and thus bound by...
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