Anderson v. State
Decision Date | 08 September 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 42789,42789 |
Citation | 267 So.2d 8 |
Parties | Earnest Eugene ANDERSON et al., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Wallace E. Allbritton, Raymond L. Marky, W. E. Whitlock, III, Richard W. Prospect, Donald K. Rudser, Michael M. Corin, A. S. Johnston and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.
We have for consideration a motion filed by the Attorney General asking this Court to temporarily relinquish jurisdiction and remand 40 cases in which the death penalty was imposed to the respective circuit courts for the imposition of life sentences and thereafter, upon certification and return to this Court, transfer the appeals to the appropriate District Court of Appeal, pursuant to Rule 2.1(5)(d), Florida Appellate Rules, 32 F.S.A. Counsel for the defendants, of course, joined in this motion.
The position of the Attorney General is, that under the authority of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, the death sentence imposed in these cases is illegal. Although a petition for rehearing was filed in the Furman case, a stay order was not issued and the judgment became final 25 days after the date of the decision, subject however, to recall on a rehearing.
Although this Court has never declared the death penalty to be unconstitutional, we nevertheless recognized and followed the concensus determination of the several opinions rendered by the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, Supra. See Donaldson v. Sack, Fla., 265 So.2d 499.
The United States District Court in United States ex rel. Young v. Wainwright (No. 64--16--Civ.--J--S) (Fla.M.D.) entered a judgment vacating and setting aside death sentences imposed upon all persons incarcerated in 'Death Row' of the State prison whose cases had terminated. The Federal District Court retained jurisdiction of other defendants whose cases are now in the appellate process in this Court pending 'a decision of the Supreme Court of Florida vacating and setting aside the sentences of death' against such persons. We will, of course, follow the decision of the United States Supreme Court.
The Attorney General relies upon Rule 3.800, F.R.Cr.P., 33 F.S.A., which authorizes the Court at any time to correct an illegal sentence imposed by it.
The elimination of the death penalty from the statute prescribing the penalty for murder in the first degree does not destroy the entire statute. The only sentence which could now be imposed upon conviction of the crime of murder in the first degree is life imprisonment. This is an automatic sentence and a reduction from the sentence previously imposed. The Court has no discretion.
The defendants request that they be resentenced at an early time because of the existence of Chapter 72--118 which becomes effective October 1, 1972. This statute requires imposition of a life sentence without parole.
We are aware of the many problems involved, when it is necessary to transport a large number of convicted murderers from the State prison to the trial court for the purpose of sentence. The safety of the law-abiding citizen is a matter of paramount concern to the Court. Also, many hours of manpower would be consumed by law enforcement officers in transporting the prisoners. Some local jail facilities are crowded and inadequate. Since the death sentence has been outlawed, there is a greater possibility of murder for the sake of escape, particularly when the penalty to be imposed for the taking of an additional human life can be no greater than that previously imposed by the Court. The above factors are sufficient to create an exception to Rule 3.180, F.R.Cr.P., requiring the presence of the defendants at sentencing. Their absence deprives them of no rights.
Every court has inherent powers to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, subject to, or not in conflict with valid existing laws and constitutional provisions. See 5 F.L.P., Courts, § 14, and cases cited.
Under the circumstances of these particular cases, it is our opinion that we should correct the illegal sentences previously imposed without returning the prisoners to the trial court.
The sentences of death imposed on the defendants, Anderson, Earnest Eugene; Barlow, David Edward; Bauldree, John Phillip; Bishop, Sylvan Dale; Boatwright, Kenneth L.; Cobb, Charles Elwood; Coon, Douglas Dwight; Demps, Bennie Eddie; Evans, Lawrence Dean; Forward, James E.; Fowler, Jerry Dwayne; Fussell, James; Guice, Marvin Louis; Hall, Roger...
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