Anderson v. State
| Decision Date | 18 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-2016,19-2016 |
| Citation | 962 N.W.2d 760 |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
| Parties | John Lewis Arthur ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee. |
Randall L. Jackson (argued) of Law Office of Randall L. Jackson, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Louis S. Sloven (argued), Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and James Hathaway, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
John Anderson appeals the postconviction court's summary judgment denial of his third application for postconviction relief. Anderson's appeal was untimely filed, and he requests a delayed appeal. For the foregoing reasons, we deny the delayed appeal and dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
On April 12, 2010, Anderson was convicted of first-degree burglary and first-degree robbery in the Iowa District Court for Polk County. During the jury trial, six witnesses testified about Anderson's involvement with the offense. Anderson was sentenced to two twenty-five-year sentences to be run concurrently.
Anderson appealed his conviction to the court of appeals, arguing that his counsel was ineffective for failure to object to a jury instruction that did not include as a matter of law that several people who testified against him were accomplices. State v. Anderson , No. 10-0802, 2011 WL 2419797 at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 15, 2011). The court of appeals determined that Anderson could not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel because he could not show with reasonable probability that if his counsel objected to the instruction that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id. at *4.
Anderson filed his first application for postconviction relief in the Iowa District Court for Polk County on February 20, 2012, raising several ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The postconviction court rejected Anderson's claims and denied his application. The court of appeals affirmed. Anderson v. State , No. 13-0057, 2013 WL 6662514, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2013).
Anderson filed a second postconviction-relief application on January 9, 2015, raising new arguments that his first postconviction-relief counsel was ineffective and alleging that evidence of material fact existed that had not been previously presented to the court that required vacating his sentence in the interest of justice. The postconviction court ruled that the application was time-barred by the statute of limitations. The court of appeals affirmed and said Anderson could not point to any specific facts or law that could not have been raised within the applicable statute of limitations to justify an exception. Anderson v. State , No. 15-1809, 2016 WL 7403738, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016).
In this case, we consider Anderson's third application for postconviction relief. Anderson filed the application with the postconviction court on June 22, 2018. The State filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that all of Anderson's claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that there was no exception for the delayed claims. In Anderson's resistance, he argued that the claims involved newly discovered evidence and therefore were not subject to summary judgment.
On May 16, 2019, the postconviction court granted the State's motion for summary judgment on Anderson's third application for postconviction relief. The postconviction court ruled that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
Anderson filed a handwritten "motion for belated appeal" on November 21, 2019. The motion claimed that "counsel was ineffective for failing to file notice of appeal when State was granted summary judgement." Anderson's motion also stated that he instructed his counsel "on numerous occasions" to fix the mistake but that counsel "failed to uphold the task."
Anderson's motion did not include specifically when he learned that counsel had made the mistake or why he waited six months to file a motion for belated appeal. At our direction, Anderson's attorney, Nicholas Einwalter, submitted a statement that said summary judgment was entered on May 16, 2019, that counsel did communicate with Anderson after the ruling on May 31 and inquired whether Anderson wanted to appeal, that Anderson did want to appeal, and that counsel
The State filed a resistance to Anderson's motion arguing that the deadline to file a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. We ruled that on appeal we would review both the jurisdictional issue and the issue of whether a delayed appeal should be granted.
Swanson , 406 N.W.2d at 792–93.
Our grant of delayed appeals has mostly been reserved to direct appeal of criminal cases. See, e.g. , State v. Anderson , 308 N.W.2d 42, 44 (Iowa 1981) ; Horstman v. State , 210 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Iowa 1973) ; State v. Wetzel , 192 N.W.2d 762, 764–65 (Iowa 1971). This term we determined delayed appeals may be appropriate in termination-of-parental-rights cases depending on the circumstances. In re A.B. , 957 N.W.2d 280, 291–93 (Iowa 2021). We have also stated that "[t]he same federal constitutional considerations which have forced us to recognize delayed appeals in criminal cases are potentially applicable in some civil settings." Swanson , 406 N.W.2d at 792 n.1. But we have not decided whether or under what circumstances a delayed appeal might be available in postconviction-relief actions.
In this case, however, it is not necessary to address the availability of delayed appeal in postconviction relief. For even if delayed appeal were available, it is not available here under the facts presented.
In analyzing Anderson's request for a delayed appeal, we are constrained by the evidence provided in the record. Anderson's attorney, Einwalter, indicated in an affidavit that Anderson intended to appeal and that Einwalter miscalculated the deadline and failed to appeal before the deadline.
Typically, however, a delayed appeal will not be granted for more than mere "negligible" delay. In re A.B. , 957 N.W.2d at 293. Anderson waited six months after learning of his attorney's failure to timely file a notice to appeal before filing his motion for delayed appeal. There is authority for the proposition, however, that a six-month delay is not a per se unreasonable length of time to be granted a delayed appeal, but for any extended delay, the appellant must justify the reason for the length of time it took to initiate the untimely appeal. See Brown v. State , 278 Kan. 481, 101 P.3d 1201, 1204 (...
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