State v. Newman

• Decision Date: 04 March 2022
• Docket Number: 19-1228
• Citation: 970 N.W.2d 866
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Dantreon Levon NEWMAN, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

970 N.W.2d 866

STATE of Iowa, Appellee,

v.Dantreon Levon NEWMAN, Appellant.

No. 19-1228

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Submitted January 19, 2022

Filed March 4, 2022

Eric W. Manning of Manning Law Office, P.L.L.C., Urbandale, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen, C.J., and Appel, Waterman, Mansfield, and Oxley, JJ., joined. McDermott, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

McDONALD, Justice.

Dantreon Newman pleaded guilty to lascivious acts with a child, a class "D" felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.8(1)(d ) (2017), and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed five years. In this appeal, Newman contends his plea counsel provided ineffective assistance in allowing Newman to plead guilty without first requesting a competency hearing. He also contends the district court should have, sua sponte, ordered a competency hearing. The court of appeals affirmed Newman's conviction, concluding it was without authority to resolve Newman's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal and concluding there was nothing in the record that should have alerted the district to the need for a competency hearing. We granted Newman's application for further review.

The primary questions presented in this appeal are jurisdictional. The first jurisdictional question is whether Newman timely filed his notice of appeal. After the entry of judgment, Newman filed a pro se notice of appeal. At the time, he was still represented by plea counsel. Plea counsel did not timely file a notice of appeal on Newman's behalf. Iowa Code section 814.6A(1) (2019) prohibits a defendant represented by counsel from filing "any pro se document, including a brief, reply brief, or motion, in any Iowa court." The Code further provides that the "court shall not consider ... such pro se filings." Id. The application of this Code provision to Newman's notice of appeal raised a question of whether Newman timely invoked this court's appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g. , State v. Stark , No. 20-1503, 2021 WL 4592246, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2021) (stating pro se notice of appeal was a nullity but granting delayed appeal); Boring v. State , No. 20-0129, 2021 WL 2453045, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 16, 2021) ("However, the notice of appeal was again filed pro se while Boring was still represented by counsel. Accordingly, it was a document that could not be considered. It was a nullity, as the State claims. For that reason, the appeal is dismissed."). While this matter was pending on appeal, however, appellate counsel filed an additional notice of appeal in the district court and filed a motion in this court requesting Newman be granted a delayed appeal. Under the circumstances, we conclude the grant of delayed appeal is appropriate here. See State v. Davis , 969 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Iowa 2022) (granting delayed appeal where represented defendant timely filed pro se notice of appeal and where counsel subsequently filed a notice of appeal).

The second jurisdictional issue is whether Newman even has an appeal as a matter of right following his guilty plea. A defendant has a statutory right of appeal from "[a] final judgment of sentence, except in the following cases: (1) A simple misdemeanor conviction. (2) An ordinance violation. (3) A conviction where the defendant has pled guilty." Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a ). A defendant who has pleaded guilty may still appeal as a matter of right, however, where the defendant pleaded guilty to a class "A" felony or "where the defendant establishes good cause" to appeal. Id. § 814.6(1)(a )(3). Newman pleaded guilty to a class "D" felony and thus has a statutory right of appeal only upon establishing "good cause."

Section 814.6 does not define "good cause," but we have defined it broadly. In State v. Boldon and State v. Damme , we stated that "good cause" in section 814.6 means a "legally sufficient reason." State v. Boldon , 954 N.W.2d 62, 69 (Iowa 2021) (quoting State v. Damme , 944 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 2020) ). "What constitutes a legally sufficient reason is context specific." State v. Treptow , 960 N.W.2d 98, 109 (Iowa 2021). Generally speaking, a defendant asserts a legally sufficient reason and establishes good cause to appeal as a matter of right by asserting a claim on appeal for which an appellate court potentially could provide relief. See id. at 108–09.

In determining whether a defendant has asserted a claim on appeal for which an appellate court potentially could provide relief, we do not assess the merits of the claim. Instead, we assess whether the claim is of the type for which an appellate court could provide relief. On direct appeal from a guilty plea, Iowa's appellate courts could potentially provide relief where the defendant preserved error for appeal or where the defendant need not preserve error for appeal. For example, we have recognized a defendant establishes good cause to appeal by asserting a challenge to a sentencing hearing or sentence because a defendant need not preserve error to assert such claims on appeal. See State v. Jordan , 959 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Iowa 2021) ; State v. Fetner , 959 N.W.2d 129, 134 n.1 (Iowa 2021) ; Boldon , 954 N.W.2d at 69 ; Damme , 944 N.W.2d at 105. By way of counterexample, a defendant who asserts only a claim or claims of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot establish good cause to appeal as a matter of right because Iowa's appellate courts are without authority to provide relief on such claim or claims. See Iowa Code § 814.7 ; Treptow , 960 N.W.2d at 109–10 ("The defendant has no right to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, and this court has no authority to decide a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Under the circumstances, the appellate courts cannot provide the defendant with relief. The defendant has thus not established good cause to pursue his appeal as a matter of right under section 814.6."); State v. Tucker , 959 N.W.2d 140, 154 (Iowa 2021) (dismissing appeal where defendant claimed his counsel was ineffective in allowing him to plead guilty where the plea was not knowingly and intelligently made).

Newman's claims in this appeal relate to his competency to plead guilty. At the plea hearing, the district court engaged in a thorough colloquy with Newman to establish his plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by a factual basis. The presentence investigation report prepared for sentencing showed that Newman reported he had been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia and that he was taking medications while being held in pretrial detention. Because of the information in the presentence investigation report, Newman's plea counsel requested to make a record at sentencing regarding Newman's competency. Newman's counsel made clear that his conversations with Newman "raised absolutely no concerns for me whatsoever about [Newman's] competency." Counsel noted that Newman "was able to appropriately process the information" related to this "really complex" case. The district court engaged in a brief colloquy with Newman and stated there was "a lengthy discussion during the plea hearing, and it appeared to me during that hearing that you were processing everything well and understood everything well during the hearing." Newman agreed with that assessment.

On appeal, Newman contends the information contained in the presentence investigation report was sufficient to trigger a competency hearing under Iowa Code chapter 812. Iowa Code section 812.3(1) provides:

If at any stage of a criminal proceeding the defendant or the defendant's attorney, upon application to the court, alleges specific facts showing that the defendant is suffering from a mental disorder which prevents the defendant from appreciating the charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the defense, the court shall suspend further proceedings and determine if probable cause exists to sustain the allegations. The applicant has the burden of establishing probable cause. The court may on its own motion schedule a hearing to determine probable cause if the defendant or defendant's attorney has failed or refused to make an application under this section and the court finds that there are specific facts showing that a hearing should be held on that question.

Newman presents two claims in this direct appeal related to his competency to plead guilty. He first contends his counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to request a competency hearing pursuant to chapter 812. This court is without authority to resolve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Id. § 814.7; Treptow , 960 N.W.2d at 109–10 ; Tucker , 959 N.W.2d at 151–52. Accordingly, Newman's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not a legally sufficient reason that can serve as "good cause" to establish a statutory right to appeal. See Treptow , 960 N.W.2d at 109–10 ; Tucker , 959 N.W.2d at 154. And we do not consider this claim any further.

In his second claim, Newman contends the district court erred in failing to, sua sponte, order a competency hearing. Our cases hold that a defendant may, without preserving error, challenge on direct appeal the district court's failure to hold a competency hearing. See State v. Einfeldt , 914 N.W.2d 773, 779–80 (Iowa 2018) ; State v. Lucas , 323 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Iowa 1982) (en banc). The rationale for the rule is that an incompetent defendant is in no position to preserve error in the district court. See Lucas , 323 N.W.2d at 232. The State concedes that Iowa's courts "have excepted a claim that the district court failed to conduct a sua sponte competency hearing from the traditional rule of error preservation." Because we could potentially provide relief on this type of claim,...