Anderson v. Wiggins

Citation331 So.3d 1
Decision Date20 February 2020
Docket Number2017-CT-00607-SCT
Parties Chasity ANDERSON v. Darnice WIGGINS
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Mississippi

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JAMES N. SCARFF, II

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: THOMAS J. LOWE, JR., BRANDON, JAMES B. GRENFELL

EN BANC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

COLEMAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. The Rankin County Chancery Court granted summary judgment in favor of Darnice Wiggins in a conversion case she brought against Chasity Anderson, the fiancée of Wiggins's deceased son Jhonte Sanders. As the basis for granting summary judgment, the chancellor determined that Anderson failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson appealed, and the Court of Appeals deadlocked in a 5-5 decision. Once the Court of Appeals denied her motion for rehearing, Anderson filed a petition for writ of certiorari , and we granted it. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment, and we remand the case for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Sanders and Anderson met each other while serving in the military in 2009. The two lost touch with one another. In 2011, Sanders was diagnosed with leukemia

while living in Chicago, Illinois. In May 2013, Sanders reconnected with Anderson online. Sanders then moved to Rankin County and continued his chemotherapy treatment at University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC). After suffering multiple seizures in 2014, Sanders required hospitalization. Following his hospitalization, Wiggins, Sanders's mother, moved to Jackson, Mississippi, and became his primary caregiver. On November 14, 2014, UMMC transferred Sanders to Methodist Rehabilitation Center (Methodist) in Jackson, Mississippi, for two weeks of rehabilitative treatment. Dr. Clea Evans is a neuropsychologist at Methodist in Jackson, Mississippi, and was a part of a team that treated Sanders the fourteen days he was there. Methodist released Sanders on November 28, 2014. However, Sanders continued outpatient rehabilitative-speech-therapy treatments from December 1, 2014, through January 2015. On December 19, 2014, Sanders settled a personal-injury claim and received a monetary settlement in excess of $350,000. Sanders made multiple transfers of those settlement funds to Anderson.

¶3. Sanders died soon after the transfer of his funds. Following Sanders's death, the Rankin County Chancery Court appointed Wiggins, Sanders's mother, administratrix of his estate. Wiggins filed a "Complaint for Conversion" against Anderson. Though other transactions occurred, the crux of Wiggins's conversion complaint revolved around transfers Sanders made after his personal-injury settlement. In support of her conversion claim, Wiggins alleged that Anderson was aware of Sanders's pending settlement, that Sanders qualified as a vulnerable adult, and that Anderson either unduly influenced him to transfer the funds or utilized her position of trust to take advantage of him while he was a vulnerable adult. Wiggins also alleged that "at all times complained of herein, ... Sanders was in a constant state of confusion ... and did not have the mental capacity to manage his money nor make cognizant decisions which were in his best interest." After filing the complaint, Wiggins sent Anderson requests for admissions. Anderson failed to respond to the requests, and the chancery court deemed them admitted. Wiggins then filed a motion for summary judgment.

¶4. During the summary judgment hearing, Wiggins offered multiple exhibits into evidence, including an affidavit from neuropsychologist, Dr. Evans. Wiggins argued that the court should grant her motion because Anderson's admissions, the established facts, and Dr. Evans's affidavit proved that no genuine issue of material fact existed. The chancellor agreed and granted summary judgment, reasoning that the pleadings, answers to discovery and requests for admission, together with the affidavit of Dr. Evans showed no genuine issue of material fact.

¶5. Anderson appealed, and we assigned the case to the Court of Appeals. Looking to the admissions, the established facts, and Dr. Evans's affidavit, the prevailing opinion of the court reasoned that Wiggins had supported her conversion claim by arguing that Sanders was a vulnerable adult. Anderson v. Wiggins , No. 2017-CA-00607-COA, ––– So.3d ––––, –––– (¶ 21), 2019 WL 2098392, at *5 (¶ 21) (Miss. Ct. App. May 14, 2019). De facto affirming the chancery court's decision by a 5-5 vote, the prevailing opinion wrote that Anderson's failure to respond to the motion for summary judgment meant she rested upon her allegations, and those were insufficient to show there was a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. at –––– (¶ 24), 2019 WL 2098392 at *6 (¶ 24).

¶6. Following the denial of Anderson's motion for rehearing, she filed a petition for certiorari review, and we granted it.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7. "We employ a de novo standard of review of a trial court's grant or denial of a summary judgment and examine all the evidentiary matters before it—admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc." Foster v. Williams (In re Estate of Laughter) , 23 So. 3d 1055, 1060 (¶ 17) (Miss. 2009) (quoting Bullock v. Life Ins. Co. , 872 So. 2d 658, 660 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2004) ). "The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made, and the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists." Moore v. Delta Reg'l Med. Ctr. , 23 So. 3d 541, 544 (¶ 7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Heigle v. Heigle , 771 So. 2d 341, 345 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2000) ). If there is no genuine issue of material fact, then "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ...." Heigle , 771 So. 2d at 345 (¶ 8) (quoting Miss. Dep't of Wildlife, Fisheries & Parks v. Miss. Wildlife Enf't Officers' Ass'n, Inc. , 740 So. 2d 925, 930 (¶ 11) (Miss. 1999) ). "On the other hand, [i]f there is doubt as to whether or not a fact issue exists, it should be resolved in favor of the non-moving party.’ " Neely v. N. Miss. Med. Ctr., Inc. , 996 So. 2d 726, 729 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2008) (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Berry , 669 So. 2d 56, 70 (Miss. 1996) overruled on other grounds by Owens v. Miss. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. , 910 So. 2d 1065 (Miss. 2005) ).

DISCUSSION

¶8. Anderson's petition for writ of certiorari raises two issues. First, Anderson argues that the chancery court erred by affirming the grant of summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals erred by failing to reverse. Anderson also argues that Wiggins lacked evidence to prove that Sanders was a vulnerable adult.

¶9. "[T]he threshold for summary judgment is high and requires that ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, ... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact ....’ " Stuckey v. The Provident Bank , 912 So. 2d 859, 864 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2005) (quoting Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ). A fact is material if it "tends to resolve any of the issues properly raised by the parties." Ladnier v. Hester , 98 So. 3d 1025, 1028 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Moss v. Batesville Casket Co., Inc. , 935 So. 2d 393, 398 (¶ 16) (Miss. 2006) ). "If any triable facts exist , the lower court's grant of a summary judgment will be reversed ; otherwise the decision will be affirmed." Stuckey , 912 So. 2d at 864 (¶ 8) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miller v. Meeks , 762 So. 2d 302, 304 (¶ 3) (Miss. 2000) ). Judge Tindell's dissent in Anderson v. Wiggins explained which party bears the burden of production and proof:

In a summary[-]judgment hearing, the burden of producing evidence in support of, or in opposition to, the motion is a function of Mississippi rules regarding the burden of proof at trial on the issues in question. The movant bears the burden of persuading the trial judge that: (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, and (2) on the basis of the facts established, [s]he is entitled to [a] judgment as a matter of law. The movant bears the burden of production if, at trial, [s]he would bear the burden of proof on the issue raised.

Anderson , ––– So.3d at –––– (¶ 34), 2019 WL 2098392, at *7 (¶ 34) (Tindell, J., dissenting) (quoting Palmer v. Biloxi Reg'l Med. Ctr. Inc. , 564 So. 2d 1346, 1355 (Miss. 1990) ). "[B]ecause [d]efendants do not carry any burden of production at trial, they also do not carry any burden of production at the summary-judgment stage." Karpinsky v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. , 109 So. 3d 84, 89 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2013).

¶10. In Stuckey , the court reviewed a sworn complaint to determine if it constituted evidence of triable issues of fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Stuckey , 912 So. 2d at 864-65 (¶ 7). Stuckey had responded to a motion for summary judgment with a sworn complaint, which contained a litany of allegations, after the moving party had met its burden of persuasion. Id. at 866 (¶ 13). Stuckey relied solely on the sworn complaint and argued it created a genuine issue of material fact. Id. Rejecting Stuckey's contention, the Court explained the provisions of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) in the context of whether a response to a motion for summary judgment is necessary. Id. at 867 (¶ 14). The Court reasoned,

The provisions of Rule 56(e) which caution practitioners that "they may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [their] pleadings," clearly do not mandate a grant of summary judgment if there is no response to the summary judgment motion ; however, Rule 56(e) does caution that if the non-moving party fails to respond, summary judgment, if appropriate , shall be entered against [the non-moving party].

Id. at (¶ 15) (emphasis added).

¶11. Here, Wiggins bore the initial burden of establishing the nonexistence of issues of material fact when she moved for summary judgment on her conversion claim. Wiggins argued that Anderson's failure...

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3 cases
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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi
    • September 6, 2022
    ... ... the defendant, some unlawful assumption of dominion over the ... personal property of the plaintiff.” Anderson v ... Wiggins, 331 So.3d 1, 5 (Miss 2020) (alterations omitted). A ... claim for conversion “cannot be maintained without ... ...
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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi
    • September 6, 2022
    ... ... the defendant, some unlawful assumption of dominion over the ... personal property of the plaintiff.” Anderson v ... Wiggins, 331 So.3d 1, 5 (Miss 2020) (alterations omitted). A ... claim for conversion “cannot be maintained without ... ...
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