Andres G., In re
Decision Date | 02 June 1998 |
Docket Number | No. D029494,D029494 |
Citation | 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 285,64 Cal.App.4th 476 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | , 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5781 In re ANDRES G. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOAQUIN G., Defendant and Appellant. |
John J. Sansone, San Diego County Counsel, Susan Strom, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Gary C. Seiser, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Christopher Blake, San Diego, for Minors.
Andres G. and Joaquin G. were declared dependent children of the juvenile court. Father Joaquin G. (father) appeals, arguing the juvenile court erred in making a nonstatutory disposition by placing the children with respondent San Diego County Department of Social Services (Department) but detaining them with their parents and in ordering he submit to a psychological evaluation.
Andres was born on November 3, 1993, and Joaquin on February 9, 1997. On July 22, 1997, a hospital hold was placed on five-month-old Joaquin when he sustained second degree burns after coming in contact with an iron. Joaquin's mother reported she was ironing on the floor while Joaquin slept in a low lying bed nearby. She finished ironing, unplugged the iron and set it next to a wall near the bed. Feeling she was about to have an epileptic seizure, Joaquin's mother went to the bathroom to put water on her face. When she returned 15 minutes later Joaquin was on the floor and had been burned by the iron.
An examining physician concluded that at a minimum Joaquin's injuries were the result of neglect. While the distribution and number of burns suggested a non-accidental injury, the nature of the burns themselves did not resemble those associated with intentional harm.
On July 23, 1997, a WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE SECTION 3001, subdivision (b), petition was filed as to Joaquin and a section 300, subdivision (j), petition as to Andres. The petition as to Joaquin alleged physical harm as the result of unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions. The petition as to Andres alleged a substantial risk of harm citing the allegations related to Joaquin.
A detention hearing was held on July 24, 1997. Department requested psychological evaluations of both parents. Father objected, stating he was not in the home at the time of Joaquin's injuries. The court authorized payment for such evaluations but did not order they be undertaken. The court ordered Joaquin detained at the Polinsky Center with the provision Department could, with the concurrence of Joaquin's counsel, detain him at home. Andres was detained with the parents.
The jurisdictional hearing was held on August 19, 1997. A social study prepared for the hearing opined Joaquin's injuries did not appear to have been intentionally inflicted but rather were the result of neglect. The parents submitted on the reports. The court found the allegations in the petitions true.
At the dispositional hearing, both Andres and Joaquin were declared dependent children pursuant to section 360, subdivision (b). Finding, pursuant to section 361, subdivision (b)(1)[now subd. (c)(1) ], there would be a substantial danger to the health or safety of the children if returned home, the court removed physical custody from the parents and placed it with Department pursuant to section 361.2, subdivision (e). The court ordered Andres placed with a relative but detained him in his parents' home. As to Joaquin, the court made the same order with the proviso that the parents' psychological evaluations first be reviewed and that Joaquin not be returned home without the concurrence of his counsel.
Father, Andres and Joaquin argue the trial court made an unauthorized disposition when, while finding by clear and convincing evidence it would be dangerous to return the children to the parental home, it gave physical custody to Department, and ordered the children placed with relatives but immediately detained them with their parents. 2
All parties agree the orders were the result of a statutorily unauthorized, informal dispositional scheme employed by the San Diego County Juvenile Court. Department argues while the dispositions were unauthorized, all parties consented to them. Department contends the scheme provides a flexibility useful to Department, parents and the court and use of the scheme should be allowed in appropriate cases. We conclude the orders made by the juvenile court were in excess of its jurisdiction. We further conclude that given the societal interests involved and the specificity of the statutory dispositional outline, authority to employ the nonstatutory scheme cannot be conferred by consent.
The Welfare and Institutions Code provides a detailed plan for the disposition of a minor found to be a person described in section 300. When such a finding is made, and when the court judges the minor a dependent, it can make any order limiting the control exercised by the parents necessary for the protection of a child. (§ 361, subd. (a).) However, physical custody of the child can be taken from the parents, in the context of the present case, only if the juvenile court "finds clear and convincing evidence of ... [p] ... a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor or would be if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor's physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor's parents' ... physical custody." (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)
When the court orders the minor removed from the physical custody of a parent, and there is no non-custodial parent with whom the minor may be placed, the court must give custody and control of the minor to the probation officer who may place the minor, in the context of the present case, in (1) the home of a relative, (2) a foster home, (3) a licensed community care facility, (4) a foster family agency for placement, or (5) a group home. (§ 361.2, subds. (a)-(e).)
In In re Damonte A. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 894, 899-900, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 369, the court reviewed a dispositional scheme identical to the one employed in the present case and stated:
The court further commented: (In re Damonte A., supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 900, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 369.) 3
We agree. We are troubled by, what at least appears to be, the artifice of making a finding that it is necessary to remove a child from the physical custody of the parents, and, thus, place custody with Department, and then immediately place the child physically back in the home. Not only does such a procedure entail an unseemly inconsistency, its effect is to either remove children from the home under circumstances the Legislature did not authorize or to place children in a dangerous setting.
Department argues not only did father fail to object to the use of the court's nonstatutory dispositional scheme, the actions of his counsel indicated he consented and he cannot now raise the issue on appeal. We disagree.
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