Androkites v. White
| Decision Date | 21 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. Was-10-82. |
| Citation | 2010 ME 133,10 A.3d 677 |
| Parties | Alice C. ANDROKITES v. Nancy Blake WHITE et al. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
David J. Fletcher, Esq. (orally), Teresa E. Stepan, Esq., Fletcher & Mahar, P.A.,Calais, ME, for Nancy Blake White and Malcolm White.
John P. Foster, Esq. (orally), Kathleen A. Mishkin, Esq., Eastport, ME, for Alice Androkites.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
[¶ 1] Nancy Blake White (White) and Malcolm White (collectively, the Whites) appeal from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (Washington County, Cuddy, J.) following a nonjury trial, (1) finding in favor of an abutting landowner, Alice C. Androkites, in her trespass claim against the Whites, and (2) granting Androkites's request for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief prohibiting the Whites from using a footpath that crosses Androkites's property. The Whites argue that the court erred in applying recent law on adverse possession, see Hamlin v. Niedner, 2008 ME 130, 955 A.2d 251, to conclude that they did not meet their burden of proving that they have a prescriptive easement over Androkites's property.1 We affirm the judgment.2
[¶ 2] Nancy Blake White owns waterfront property located on Harrington Bay (the White Property) on which she has a cottage. White's husband, Malcolm White, does not jointly own the White Property, but is a named defendant in this case. Alice C. Androkites owns waterfront property on which she has a cottage (the Androkites Property) that is immediately south of the White Property. This case involves the Whites' right to use an established footpath, known as the Shore Path, that crosses the Androkites Property. The Shore Path runs north-south along the water, crossing part of the White Property, all of the Androkites Property, and proceeding through the property to the south of Androkites's lot to the property beyond.
[¶ 3] The White and Androkites Properties were originally a single lot owned by White's grandmother. White's mother and maternal uncle jointly acquired that single lot in or around 1945. In 1962, White's mother and uncle divided their single lot into seven smaller lots. Through an exchange of conveyances, White's mother acquired three of the seven lots, including what is now the White Property, and White's uncle acquired four of the lots, including what is now the Androkites Property. In 1977, White's mother conveyed her lots to White. In 1994, White's cousin acquired the current Androkites Property. White's cousin sold that lot to Androkites in September 2000. The 2000 transfer to Androkites was the first transfer of that piece of property outside thefamily since it was acquired by White's grandmother well before 1945.
[¶ 4] White spent almost every summer, or parts thereof, of her life at the family lots on Harrington Bay. Her grandparents, parents, and uncle's family also vacationed there each summer. Since the 1962 division of the jointly-owned lot, White and other family members used the Shore Path to cross what is now the Androkites Property to visit each other and other adjoining lots, go to the beach, and get to a boat mooring area. White never asked for or received permission from any family members to cross their property using the Shore Path and is not aware of anyone else asking permission. White testified that it was apparent to the family members who owned the current Androkites Property that she and others used the Shore Path across their lot because they often would exchange greetings, and no one interrupted her use of the path.
[¶ 5] In 2000, White's cousin prepared to sell what is now the Androkites Property to Androkites. As a prerequisite to selling her lot to Androkites, White's cousin acquired a release deed from the Whites providing that the Whites would abandon any right they had to use a parking area next to the cottage on the Androkites Property. The release deed expressly excepted from the release "any mutual right that any of the parties may have to walk the so-called [S]hore [P]ath." 3 The Whites did not, however, acquire or claim any easement "for parking or passage other than those created or reserved in recorded deeds" under the release deed. The parties generally stipulated, and the evidence in the record shows, that no recorded deed grants an easement to owners of the White Property over the Shore Path on the current Androkites Property or otherwise reserve such use or right.
[¶ 6] The Whites frequently walked on the Shore Path during several summers after Androkites purchased the property. The Whites do not need access to the Shore Path to travel to points south of the White Property; they have a deeded right to use the private road from White's property through the Androkites Property to points south.
[¶ 7] In 2006, Androkites filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Whites seeking to enjoin them from using the Shore Path and otherwise trespassing on the Androkites Property.4 The Whites filed an amended answer and counterclaim asserting an affirmative defense of prescriptive easement and seeking a declaration of the rights and responsibilities of the parties to the Shore Path.
[¶ 8] Androkites filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied, and filed a motion to reconsider based on our then recent decision in Hamlin v. Niedner, which was also denied. At trial, the Whites presented evidence in opposition to Androkites's claim and argued that the use made by White and her family of the Shore Path since 1962 established a prescriptive easement over the Androkites Property. The court entered a judgmentfor Androkites on her declaratory judgment claim and on her claim for trespass, awarding Androkites one dollar without interest or costs on the trespass claim. The court found in Androkites's favor as to the Whites' counterclaim for declaratory judgment.
[¶ 9] The Whites filed a motion for reconsideration and for findings of fact. The court denied the motion for reconsideration, but granted the motion for additional findings of fact and made additional factual findings. The Whites then brought this timely appeal.
[¶ 10] On appeal, the Whites argue that the trial court adopted an inappropriate standard for determining when a prescriptive easement has been established over property owned within the family of the person claiming the easement. Specifically, the Whites argue that the court erroneously extended the holding concerning adverse possession in Hamlin v. Niedner, 2008 ME 130, 955 A.2d 251, to impose upon them the burden of proving adversity as between White and previous owners of the Androkites Property, because the owners involved were family members.
[¶ 11] The Whites argue that hostility or adversity, which they suggest implicates "the necessity of airing family laundry," has never been an element of a prescriptive easement claim and that there is no precedent for placing the burden of proof on them in this matter.
[¶ 12] We review questions of law and legal conclusions, including the construction of deeds, de novo. Mill Pond Condo. Ass'n v. Manalio, 2006 ME 135, ¶ 6, 910 A.2d 392, 395; Murch v. Nash, 2004 ME 139, ¶ 10, 861 A.2d 645, 649. We review the trial court's factual findings as to the elements of a prescriptive easement for clear error and will affirm those findings if supported by competent record evidence, even if evidence could support alternative factual findings. Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 33, 760 A.2d 232, 244. We will vacate the trial court's conclusion that the party with the burden of proof failed to prove a prescriptive easement only if the evidence compelled a contrary conclusion. Jordan v. Shea, 2002 ME 36, ¶ 22, 791 A.2d 116, 122.
[¶ 13] The statutory requirement for establishing a prescriptive easement is found at 14 M.R.S. § 812 (2009), which provides in relevant part that "[n]o person, class of persons or the public shall acquire a right-of-way or other easement through, in, upon or over the land of another by the adverse use and enjoyment thereof, unless it is continued uninterruptedly for 20 years." Sandmaier v. Tahoe Dev. Group, Inc., 2005 ME 126, ¶ 5, 887 A.2d 517, 518. This statutory provision, long part of Maine property law, see R.S. ch. 174, § 12 (1954), has been interpreted and applied through an extensive body of case law.
[¶ 14] The party claiming a prescriptive easement has the burden at trial of proving by a preponderance of the evidence each of the following elements: (1) continuous use for at least twenty years; (2) under a claim of right adverse to the owner; (3) with the owner's knowledge and acquiescence, or with a use so open, notorious, visible, and uninterrupted that knowledge and acquiescence will be presumed. Sandmaier, 2005 ME 126, ¶ 5, 887 A.2d at 518; accord Jordan, 2002 ME 36, ¶ 22, 791 A.2d at 122; Town of Kittery v. MacKenzie, 2001 ME 170, ¶ 15, 785 A.2d 1251, 1255-56; Dartnell v. Bidwell, 115 Me. 227, 230, 98 A. 743, 744 (1916).
[¶ 15] The first element, continuous use for at least twenty years, is not in dispute.5 For purposes of our analysis, we also assume that the third element of the prescriptive easement analysis was established.6 What remains in dispute is the second element: whether White's and other family members' use of the Shore Path over what is now the Androkites Property was "under a claim of right adverse to the owner."
[¶ 16] The party claiming a prescriptive easement must prove that she has used the property under a claim of right that is adverse to the owner. Jordan, 2002 ME 36, ¶ 22, 791 A.2d at 122. Using the property "under a claim of right" means that the claimant "must be in possession as the owner, intending to claim the land as [her] own, and may not be in recognition of or...
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...in possession as an owner intending to claim the land as their own and without recognition or subordination to the true owner. Androkites v. White, 2010 ME 133, 16, 10 A.3d 677. There is a presumption that use is under a claim of right when the claimant has proven continuous possession for ......
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Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport
...viability of a type of easement and the evidence required to establish that easement are matters of law we review de novo. See Androkites v. White, 2010 ME 133, ¶ 12, 10 A.3d 677. We review the facts supporting the court's conclusions for clear error, and will uphold the court's findings un......
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Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport
...in possession as an owner intending to claim the land as their own and without recognition or subordination to the true owner. Androkites v. White, 2010 ME 133, 16, 10 A.3d 677. There is a presumption that use is under a claim of right when the claimant has proven continuous possession for ......
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Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport
...in possession as an owner intending to claim the land as their own and without recognition or subordination to the true owner. Androkites v. White, 2010 ME 133, 16, 10 A.3d 677. There is a presumption that use is under a claim of right when the claimant has proven continuous possession for ......