Los Angeles City High School District of Los Angeles County v. Rodriguez
| Decision Date | 29 September 1955 |
| Citation | 135 Cal.App.2d 760,50 A.L.R.2d 1369,287 P.2d 871 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | LOS ANGELES CITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Carla M. RODRIGUEZ, a/k/a Marie C. Tweedy, also known as Carla M. Tweedy et al., Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 20999. |
Peter T. Rice, Los Angeles, for appellant.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, John B. Anson, Deputy County Counsel and Milnor E. Gleves, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondent.
The Los Angeles City High School District of Los Angeles County brought suit to condemn two parcels of property, one of which was owned by Carla M. Rodriguez, then known as Carla M. Tweedy. Mrs. Rodriguez answered the complaint, alleging her property to be of the value of $47,285. The testimony as to values offered by Mrs. Rodriguez was that of herself and her son-in-law, Ted, W. Bernhardt, together with a photograph, a chart, a map, a diagram and certain memoranda. The case was tried to a jury with respect to the value of the property and at the conclusion of the receipt of evidence the court on plaintiff's motion struck out all the testimony introduced on behalf of the defendant and instructed the jury to render a verdict in the amount of $20,850 which was the valuation placed upon the property by plaintiff's expert witness. Verdict was rendered accordingly and judgment of condemnation was entered. Defendant's motion for new trial was denied and she has appealed from the judgment. The sole question on the appeal is whether the court committed error in striking out the testimony of Mrs. Rodriguez and that of Mr. Bernhardt. The grounds of plaintiff's motions were that Mrs. Rodriguez did not state an opinion as to market value and Mr. Bernhardt was incompetent to express an opinion as to the market value of the property. It is clear to us that the rulings were erroneous.
The property consisted of some 2 1/2 acres with residential improvements, namely, a house, garage, laundry and other improvements consisting of a variety of fruit trees, Concord grape vines, shrubs, etc. Mrs. Rodriguez was a school teacher. She had lived on the property for about 27 years except for the past four years she and her family have farmed the property, raising vegetable crops, domestic animals for their use and maintaining a small apiary. The case had been tried before and a new trial had been granted when Mrs. Rodriguez refused to accept an amount considerably below the amount awarded her by the jury. She had testified in the former trial. Her examination and cross-examination as a witness in the second trial disclosed that she was a woman of high intelligence, thoroughly acquainted with real estate conditions in the San Fernando Valley, where the property was located, and especially the progress of development that had taken place and was taking place which would affect the value of her property. She expressed the opinion that the market value of her property at the time of condemnation was $40,990, and that it was valuable for two special purposes, namely, for its agricultural use and also its potential value for subdivision purposes. Throughout a long and highly technical cross-examination it was developed that Mrs. Rodriguez thought the property had some speculative value as prospective oil land, it previously having been leased for that purpose. She made it clear nevertheless that in stating her opinion of $40,990 as the market value of the property, she attributed no part of it to the oil potential. When pressed further on corss-examination she expressed the opinion that with oil prospects included the property would be worth $50,000. In corss-examination she was led into saying that $40,990 was what she considered the property to be worth to her and upon the assumption that that was the sole basis for her estimate of value plaintiff made a motion to strike out her testimony upon the ground that her opinion was based upon a false basis of value. Thereafter followed extended further questioning of the witness. Upon more than one occasion Mrs. Rodriguez answered questions as to her understanding of market value. She said: Even after that the court ruled that while the definition of market value which she gave was close, that 'it was not close enough' and that her testimony was worthless. Upon further interrogation Mrs. Rodriguez testified that there was a difference between the value of the property to her 'personally' and what the market value would be; that the worth of the property to her could not be estimated in dollars and cents but that the figure she gave of $40,990 was the market value. And she testified that she based her valuation in part upon 'asking price on other properties, known sales that have taken place in the last few years.' Again in reply to a question of the court she defined market value as follows: The court thereupon reversed its ruling and held that the testimony of Mrs. Rodriguez should stand. Then counsel for plaintiff, undaunted by the ruling of the court, argued the matter further, whereupon the court said 'She comes about as close as an average layman to market value, and I think there is some fallacy in these cases as to letting an owner testify as to what the value is, but the law is that they may, and I think I am stretching it a little, being a little technical with it.' In answer to a question by the court whether she would be willing to sell she stated she would not want to sell at any price. Upon the insistence of plaintiff's counsel the court finally reversed its latest ruling, struck out the testimony of Mrs. Rodriguez on the ground that it was of no value whatever and instructed the jury to disregard it. Counsel for the county are hard put to justify this ruling. They say that Mrs. Rodriguez stated that $40,990 was the price she would put on her property as what it was worth to her if some one came to her door offering to buy it; but she also testified that $40,990 which she would ask, were she willing to sell, would also be the market value of the property; that if she was anxious to sell she might ask less and if she was unwilling to sell she might ask more. She also testified that there was a difference between market value and the value which she considered the property would have to her for the use of herself and family.
After the court's ruling as above outlined, defense counsel asked numerous questions for the purpose of clarifying the testimony of the witness and removing any uncertainty as to the basis of the valuation which she had placed upon the property. All these questions were objected to and the objections were sustained. Thereafter defendant's counsel made an offer to prove by the witness that she had not given $40,990 as the value which she considered the property would have to herself and family but that it was the price which she would ask and would expect to receive as the market value. An objection to the offer was sustained.
Plaintiff attempts to sustain the ruling striking out the testimony of Mrs. Rodriguez by selecting isolated statements which it is claimed show that she based her estimate of value entirely upon what she considered the property would be worth to her and disregarding all the remainder of her testimony. All that can be claimed in support of the ruling is that in reply to suggestive questions she stated that the price of $40,990 which she would ask was what she considered the property to be worth to her, but those statements were inseparable from her repeated statements that she would consider that price to be the market value or a fair price to be paid for the property provided she was willing to sell but did not have to sell. If she was anxious to sell she might ask less; if she was unwilling to sell she might ask more. The questioning of Mrs. Rodriguez on cross-examination was captious; the objections to her testimony were hypercritical. One cannot read her entire testimony without becoming convinced that she was well informed as to market values, that her opinion had a sound legal basis and that it should have gone to the jury for their consideration.
The right of an owner to testify as to the value of his property is so well established as to call for but a token citation of authority. Mr. Jahr in his...
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