Los Angeles County v. City of Los Angeles
| Decision Date | 06 September 1963 |
| Citation | 33 Cal.Rptr. 503,219 Cal.App.2d 838 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. The CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 27083. |
Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Bourke Jones and Weldon L. Weber, Asst. City Attys., and Spencer L. Halverson, Deputy City Atty., for defendant and appellant.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Robert C. Lynch, Deputy County Counsel, for plaintiff and respondent.
Is the County or the City obligated to pay the cost of detention of prisoners committed to the Los Angeles County Jail by the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District for violations of Los Angeles City ordinances? This is the question presented in this proceeding.
The superior court rendered judgment for the County and against the City in the sum of $476,194.68 for reimbursement of the costs incurred by the County in the detention of prisoners so committed during the period from July 1, 1955 to March 31, 1962.
In 1950, under the reorganization of the inferior court system by state constitutional amendment (article VI, sections 1 and 11), municipal courts were molded into the state judicial system and ceased to be a part of the municipal governments with which they had been affiliated. Following this reorganization, the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District followed the policy of committing prisoners convicted of violations of city ordinances to the county jail. Such policy has been based upon the theory that the state law set forth in section 19 of the Penal Code is applicable, that section providing: 'Except in cases where a different punishment is prescribed by any law of this State, every offense declared to be a misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by both.'
The enforcement of this policy has been resisted consistently by the City of Los Angeles, which contended that its city jail is the proper place for such detention by reason of the specific provisions of section 11.00(m) of the Los Angeles Municipal Code, City Ordinance No. 77,000, which provides that violations of its provisions constitute a misdemeanor which '* * * unless provision is otherwise herein made, shall be punishable by a fine of not more than $500.00 or by imprisonment in the City jail for a period of not more than six months or by both such fine and imprisonment.' (Emphasis added.)
The County contends that the general law of the state is controlling and that it is mandatory that the municipal court commit such city ordinance violators to the county jail. The City takes the contrary view. Prior to and during the period embraced in this action the City lodged formal written objections with the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District and with the Sheriff of the County of Los Angeles to commitment of such violators to the county jail. The sheriff, as custodian of such prisoners upon commitment to his custody, has considered himself bound to follow the Penal Code provisions and the orders of commitment of the court. As a result, the City has been unable to make use of its own available jail facilities for detention of city ordinance offenders after conviction and sentence. The City has refused to reimburse the County for the costs entailed in the detention of such prisoners in the county jail and this action resulted.
The trial court found the facts to be essentially as above stated and, in its conclusions of law, held, in part, as follows:
'1. The commitment of prisoners to the Los Angeles County Jail by the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District for violation of Penal Ordinances of the City of Los Angeles are valid commitments.
'2. The Sheriff of Los Angeles County was required by law to receive and to maintain and care for in the Los Angeles County Jail at the expense of the plaintiff all persons committed to '3. The plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement from the defendant for its actual cost of care and maintenance of prisoners committed to the Los Angeles County Jail by the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District for violation of the Penal Ordinances of the City of Los Angeles from July 1, 1955, through March 31, 1962.
the Los Angeles County Jail by the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District for violation of Penal Ordinances of the City of Los Angeles.
Judgment was ordered and entered accordingly, and the City has appealed.
The trial court, in pronouncing judgment, relied principally upon the authority of County of Sonoma v. City of Santa Rosa, 102 Cal. 426, 36 P. 810, and upon the application of section 36903 of the Government Code.
In the Sonoma Case the County of Sonoma brought action against the City of Santa Rosa to recover the cost of maintaining prisoners committed to the county jail for violations of the ordinances of the city. Judgment was granted in favor of the county for the costs of maintaining such prisoners. The court stated (pages 430-431 of 102 Cal., page 812 of 36 P.):
'It is contended that if the charter does not authorize the commitment to the county jail of persons found guilty of the violation of city ordinances, such commitments are in excess of [the court's] jurisdiction, and void, and are not made by competent authority; that the plain duty of the sheriff, under such circumstances, is to refuse to receive the prisoner. But counsel are wrong in this construction. The commitments were illegal, but were nevertheless made by 'competent authority.' By competency is meant the legal power or capacity to take cognizance of a cause; as, for example, the competency of a judge or court to examine and decide.
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Relying upon the Sonoma case, supra, the County contends that the commitments to the county jail by the municipal court of violators of penal ordinances of the City of Los Angeles were valid commitments made by competent authority and accordingly the County is entitled to reimbursement.
It is clear from a reading of the Sonoma case that the court felt constrained to render judgment in favor of the county because of an implied contract found to exist between city and county justifying reimbursement.
Unusual as it may seem, the City of Los Angeles also relies upon the Sonoma case, pointing to language at page 429, of 102 Cal., at page 811 of 36 P., which reads as follows: 'We think the provision in question requires persons found guilty of violating city ordinances to be committed to the city prison, and those found guilty of the violation of the criminal laws of the state, where imprisonment is ordered, to be committed to the county jail.' The Sonoma case arose in 1894, long before the reorganization in California of the inferior courts and at a time when the recorder or city judge was a city official responsible to the taxpayers of the city. The court was a city court and the general laws governing the city provided that imprisonment for a violation of city ordinances shall be in the city prison or the county jail. The court reasoned that the judge, being a city official, in committing prisoners to the county jail implledly requested maintenance of the county for such prisoners and accordingly an implied contract resulted for reimbursement for their care.
Contrary to the trial court's views, the Sonoma case is not controlling in the instant case because its rulings are based upon facts diametrically opposed to those in the instant case. Schematically, this is shown in the following manner:
SONOMA
1. City Charter () provided for commitment to city jail or county jail.
2. The committing magistrate was a city judge, an official of the city.
3. The decision was rendered on the basis of implied contract, the judge as a city official impliedly 'requesting' the county's assistance.
1. City Ordinance (adopted pursuant to a freeholders charter) did not provide for commitment to county...
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