Smith v. Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 16 September 1969
• Citation: 276 Cal.App.2d 156,81 Cal.Rptr. 120
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Christopher SMITH et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a political body, and Aaron F. McCrary, Defendants and Respondents. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a political subdivision of the State of California, and Aaron F. McCrary, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 32935.

Page 120

81 Cal.Rptr. 120

276 Cal.App.2d 156

Christopher SMITH et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a political body, and Aaron F. McCrary, Defendants and Respondents.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a political subdivision of the State of California, and Aaron F. McCrary, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 32935.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

Sept. 16, 1969.

Modified on Denial of Rehearing Oct. 10, 1969.

Hearing Denied Nov. 26, 1969.

Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Bourke Jones and John A. Daly, Asst. City Attys., Arthur Y. Honda and Felix E. Smith, Deputy City Attys., for plaintiff and appellant City of Los Angeles.

Belcher, Henzie & Biegenzahn and Robert D. Walker, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents County of Los Angeles and Aaron F. McCrary.

No appearance for plaintiffs and respondents Christopher Smith, Kimberly Smith, Matthew Smith, Jennifer Smith, Minors, each by Carol Smith, acting as their Guardian Ad Litem, and Carol Smith.

STEPHENS, Acting Presiding Justice.

This action arose out of an automobile accident which occurred on March 2, 1966. On that date John Charles Smith was on duty as a Los Angeles City police officer. While Officer Smith was operating a City vehicle at the Marengo on-ramp to the westbound San Bernardino freeway, a Los Angeles County owned vehicle driven in the course of employment by Fire Department Captain Aaron F. McCrary collided with the City vehicle. Officer Smith lost his life in the collision.

An action for wrongful death (No. 886728) against the County of Los Angeles and Aaron F. McCrary was commenced by the heirs of Officer Smith. These heirs consisted of his surviving spouse and his four children. An action for wrongful death (No. 889555) was also commenced by the City of Los Angeles against the same defendants in the earlier numbered action. For convenience, the plaintiffs in action No. 886728 will hereinafter be termed 'the Smith Heirs,' and the plaintiff in action No. 889555 will be termed 'the City.' The prime defendant in each of these actions, Los Angeles County, will hereinafter be termed 'the County,' and the term 'employee' hereinafter will include the employee's successors, wherever applicable.

After the two actions were at issue, they were consolidated by court order for the purpose of determining liability, leaving consolidation for the purpose of damage adjudication open to the discretion of the trial judge. At time of trial, the motion by the County to consolidate the cases for all purposes was argued and granted. During the trial, the City established damages of $26,160.23, consisting of payments of death benefits and burial allowances in the sum of $21,100, the amount of pension benefits actually paid to the Smith heirs, and other damage. In addition to the above amount of damages, the City sought to introduce evidence of the present value of all future or contingent pension payments to the Smith heirs which might thereafter be incurred. ¹ After an objection to such evidence was sustained, the City made an offer of proof to the effect that a specified sum would be the actuarial amount which the City was obligated to pay by virtue of the future pension payments required of it, and that this sum was recoverable as damages. The jury returned two verdicts: one in favor of the Smith heirs for $400,000, and one in favor of the City for $26,160.23. Immediately following the return of the verdicts and their having been ordered filed, the clerk's minutes disclose: 'In chambers, the Court orders the verdict in case #886728 * * * reduced to $373,839.77.' The 'Judgment on Verdict in Open Court' recites the two judgments, plus respective costs, in accordance with the court's 'in-chambers' reduction. The City appealed. Subsequently, upon payment of the specified judgments to each of the respective plaintiffs, satisfaction of judgment as to each was filed. ²

In its reply brief filed herein, the County succinctly states the basic issue presented to us: 'The sole issue raised on this appeal is the validity of appellant's (the City's) claim that the Labor Code authorizes it to recover not only all amounts paid or incurred by date of judgment, but also the present value of all future or contingent payments which may thereafter be incurred.'

By virtue of section 183 of its Charter (Stats.1947, pp. 3679--3687), the City was obligated to pay future pension benefits to the Smith heirs. That section, insofar as applicable here, provides:

'Whenever any member of the Fire of Police Department shall die as a result of any injury received during the performance of his duty, * * * then an annual pension shall be paid in equal monthly installments to his widow, or child or children, * * * in an amount equal to one-half (1/2) of the average monthly rate of salary assigned to the ranks or positions held by such member during the three years immediately preceding the time of his death * * *. Said pension shall be paid to the widow during her lifetime or until she remarries, and thereafter a pension shall be paid in equal monthly installments, in an amount equal to one-half of the average monthly rate of salary assigned to the ranks or positions held by such member during the three years immediately preceding the time of his death * * * to the legally appointed guardian of the child or children of such deceased member until such child or children shall have attained the age of eighteen years, * * *. Provided, however, that during the lifetime of such widow or until she shall remarry, and additional amount shall be paid to such widow for each child during the lifetime of such child, or until such child shall have married or reached the age of eighteen years, as follows: * * * for three or more children, fifty percent (50%) of such pension * * *.'

It is obvious that the obligation to pay said pension, so far as it is not inconsistent with state law, is determined by the Charter. The City was Officer Smith's employer. As was stated in County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, 219 Cal.App.2d 838, 33 Cal.Rptr. 503, 506:

'The City of Los Angeles is governed by its own freeholders' charter adopted pursuant to the State Constitution (art. XI, § 8). As such it enjoys freedom from state legislative control with respect to its municipal affairs. When in conflict with general laws, and relating to municipal affairs, the provisions of its charter and ordinances adopted pursuant thereto must prevail. (Cole v. City of Los Angeles, 180 Cal.App.2d 313, Fletcher v. Porter, 203 Cal.App.2d 313, 21 Cal.Rptr. 452.) It is only with respect to state affairs, as distinguished from municipal affairs, that the general laws of the state take precedence over local ordinances. (Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, 29 Cal.2d 661, 177 P.2d 558, 170 A.L.R. 225; City of Pasadena v. Charleville, 215 Cal. 384, 10 P.2d 745.)' ³

Where, however, there exists a conflict between the pension provisions of the City and the statewide system of workmen's compensation, the Labor Code prevails, for to that extent, the employee benefits are not Merely of municipal concern. (Healy v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 41 Cal.2d 118, 122, 258 P.2d 1.)

A pension system established for municipal employees is a municipal affair, and within the chartered powers. The obligation imposed on the City to pay such pension amounts becomes effective upon the death of its employee. (Tyra v. Board of Police etc. Com're, 32 Cal.2d 666, 671, 197 P.2d 710.) The right to pension benefits following the death of the employee is a derivative right, an element of the deceased's compensation earned by the employee by his performance of his duties. (Henry v. City of Los Angeles, 201 Cal.App.2d 299, 313, 20 Cal.Rptr. 440.) To this broad statement must be added the limitation that such pension benefits are not 'salary' in that ratio which the employee's contributions bear to the total of the pension payments (City plus employee contributions). (See City of Los Angeles v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (Fraide), 63 Cal.2d 242, 253, 46 Cal.Rptr. 97, 404 P.2d 801; City of Los Angeles v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (Morse) 63 Cal.2d 263, 264, 46 Cal.Rptr. 110, 404 P.2d 814.) It is the excess of such death and dependency payments over and above those required by the Workmen's Compensation Act which constitutes 'salary' payable to the dependents and heirs.

Since provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act as set forth in the Labor Code (section 3201 et seq.) have a bearing upon the contentions of the parties, it is necessary, at the outset, to note that the concepts of pension benefits and workmen's compensation benefits differ. ⁴ Larson v. Board of Police etc. Com'rs, 71 Cal.App.2d 60, 63--64, 162 P.2d 33, 34--35, states:

'The payment of workmen's compensation and the allowance of pension benefits are supported upon entirely different principles. The former is based upon section 21 of article XX of the State Constitution and the legislation pursuant thereto, which expresses the social public policy of the state to the effect that the unfortunate economic results caused by the injury or death of an employee shall, in a measure, be borne by society. A pension, however, generally represents 'an integral portion of the contemplated compensation' for the services rendered by the employee. Dryden v. Board of Pension Commrs., 1936, 6 Cal.2d 575, 59 P.2d 104; Snyder v. City of Alameda, 1943, 58 Cal.App.2d 517, 136 P.2d 857. 'A provision for a pension to his widow obviously benefits the member's economic status in a way similar to an increase of his wages * * *.' Sweesy v. Los Angeles etc. Ret. Bd., 1941, 17 Cal.2d 356, 361, 110 P.2d 37, 40. Where, as here, the employee has made contributions over a period of years so that either he or designated dependents of his upon his death might have a pension, the right thereto should not be denied unless such an...