Angelich v. Medtrust, LLC

• Decision Date: 19 December 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 12–1508(JEB).
• Citation: 910 F.Supp.2d 128
• Parties: George David ANGELICH, Plaintiff, v. MEDTRUST, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

910 F.Supp.2d 128

George David ANGELICH, Plaintiff,

v.MEDTRUST, LLC, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 12–1508(JEB).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Dec. 19, 2012.

C. Sukari Hardnett, Silver Spring, MD, for Plaintiff.

Paul Warren Mengel, III, Pilieromazza PLLC, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JAMES E. BOASBERG, District Judge.

Plaintiff George Angelich was a clinical psychologist with Defendant MedTrust, LLC, from 2009 until his dismissal in September 2011. Although his Complaint is somewhat unclear, Plaintiff's employment appears to have been terminated following an official investigation of some kind, though he was never informed of its nature or results. He thus brought this suit against MedTrust, alleging wrongful discharge, breach of contract, tortious interference with a business expectancy, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant now moves to dismiss, asserting defects in personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, service of process, and venue. Although a number of Defendant's procedural arguments are correct, because the interests of justice favor transfer rather than dismissal and because both parties appear to concede that venue and personal jurisdiction would be proper in the Eastern District of Virginia, the Court will transfer the case there.

I. Background

According to the Complaint, which must be presumed true for purposes of this Motion, Angelich worked for MedTrust on a contract with the Department of Defense from October 2009 to September 2011. See Compl., ¶¶ 1, 7. MedTrust is a medical staffing company that provides contract employees to commercial and governmental entities. Id., ¶ 8. Plaintiff was employed as a clinical psychologist, serving at Fort Belvoir and Fort Myer, both of which are located in Northern Virginia. Id., ¶¶ 7–8. While employed by MedTrust, he successfully applied for a permanent position with the Department of Defense. Id., ¶¶ 9–10. The offer was later withdrawn pending an official investigation, the nature and results of which Plaintiff was never made aware. Id., ¶¶ 9–13. MedTrust subsequently informed Plaintiff by e-mail that his employment would be terminated on September 30, 2011. Id., ¶ 16.

Plaintiff's description of the investigation's background is difficult to follow, but he appears to believe that it concerned allegations that he had sexually harassed a coworker. Id., ¶¶ 17–27. On September 13, 2012, Plaintiff brought this action against MedTrust, alleging five common-law causes of action. Id. at 1. Defendant then filed the instant Motion to Dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), which the Court now considers.

II. Analysis

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's suit should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction (Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2)), subject-matter jurisdiction (12(b)(1)), appropriate service of process (12(b)(5)), and venue (12(b)(3)). In considering each argument, the Court must “treat the complaint's factual allegations as true ... and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’ ” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C.Cir.2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C.Cir.1979)) (internal citation omitted); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C.Cir.2005). The Court need not accept as true, however, “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the Complaint. Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C.Cir.2006) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

While analysis of the threshold jurisdictional issues Defendant presents “necessarily precedes a ruling on the merits, the same principle does not dictate a sequencing of jurisdictional issues,” which is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999). The Court, accordingly, will address Defendant's arguments in the order in which they appear in its Motion, beginning with service of process and then proceeding to discuss subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue.

A. Service of Process

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed for insufficient service of process under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5). See Mot. at 2. Adequate service of process requires “more than notice to the defendant,” Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 108, 108 S.Ct. 404, 98 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987), and Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that Defendant was properly served. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(1); Light v. Wolf, 816 F.2d 746, 751 (D.C.Cir.1987).

Rule 4(h)(1) allows a corporation to be served “in a manner authorized in the state where the district court is located” or “in a manner authorized in the state where service [was] made.” Id. Defendant asserts that “Plaintiff simply mailed the Summons and Complaint via certified mail to ‘MedTrust,’ ” a method of service it alleges was improper under the laws of both the District of Columbia, where this Court is located, and Texas, where Defendant was served. See Mot. at 3–4.

District of Columbia Rule 4(c)(3) allows a corporation to be served by “certified mail, return receipt requested.” Id. Process, however, must be served upon an “officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.” D.C. Rule 4(h)(1). Likewise, Tex.R. Civ. P. 106 allows a corporation to be served by registered mail, but requires that service be addressed to a person authorized to accept service, including the “president[,] ... vice presidents [,] ... and the registered agent of the corporation.” SeeTex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.11(A). Texas law further requires that service be made by someone who is not “a party to or interested in the outcome of the suit.” SeeTex.R. Civ. P. 103. Under Texas law, the plaintiff's attorney is considered an interested party. See, e.g., Coleman v. Sentinel Transp., LLC, No. 09–1510, 2009 WL 3834438, at *3 (S.D.Tex.2009) (holding plaintiff's attorney was “a person ‘interested in the outcome’ of [the] suit, which makes service ineffective under Texas law”); Jackson v. United States, 138 F.R.D. 83, 88 (S.D.Tex.1991) (“Plaintiff's attorney is an agent of [Plaintiff and] ... does possess an economic interest in the outcome of the dispute,” rendering him unable to serve process under Texas law).

Plaintiff does not contest that service here was improper under Texas law, but maintains that it satisfied D.C. law. See Opp., ¶¶ 9–11. Plaintiff argues that because the “green card” (the card attached to certified mail that is returned to the sender upon delivery) specified that delivery was to be made to the “President of MedTrust,” and because he paid for “restricted delivery” (which ordinarily goes only to a specific addressee or authorized agent), he properly served Defendant under D.C. law. Id., ¶¶ 9–10. Defendant disagrees, pointing out that the green card merely serves as proof of delivery for the sender, and that the address on the envelope controls. See Rep. at 2–3. Defendant further notes that the Summons and Complaint were actually delivered to a receptionist, who could not have been a person authorized to accept service under D.C. Rule 4(h)(1). Id. MedTrust is correct. Whether or not Plaintiff paid for proper service, it is clear he did not obtain it. The Court finds, accordingly, that Plaintiff has not properly served Defendant by mail here because his mailing failed to address a specific party authorized to receive service under either D.C. or Texas law and was sent by his attorney, who was ineligible to serve process under Texas law.

While a court has the authority to dismiss an action outright on the basis of insufficient service of process, “the court can, in its sound discretion, ‘direct that service be effected within a specified time,’ ” quashing the defective service without dismissing the case. Wilson v. Prudential Financial, 332 F.Supp.2d 83, 89 (D.D.C.2004). “While the court does not look lightly on failure to comply with the notice requirements of Rule 4,” id., choosing to quash service in lieu of dismissing the case is appropriate where “dismissing the plaintiff's case ... would potentially subvert justice and unfairly prejudice the plaintiff, ... [and the defendant would] not be prejudiced by affording the plaintiff the opportunity to comply with Rule 4.” Candido v. District of Columbia, 242 F.R.D. 151, 164 (D.D.C.2007); see also S.J. v. Issaquah School Dist. No. 411, 470 F.3d 1288, 1293 (9th Cir.2006) (“the district court has discretion to dismiss an action or quash service” where service is insufficient); Marshall v. Warwick, 155 F.3d 1027, 1030 (8th Cir.1998) (appellate court “review[s] for abuse of discretion the decision to dismiss the complaint” for insufficient service); Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 645 (5th Cir.1994) (same); Umbenhauer v. Woog, 969 F.2d 25, 30 (3d Cir.1992) (“Upon determining that process has not been properly served on a defendant, district courts possess broad discretion to either dismiss plaintiff's complaint ... or to simply quash service of process.”). Dismissal is generally “inappropriate when there exists a reasonable prospect that service may yet be obtained.” Umbenhauer, 969 F.2d at 30.

Here, where Defendant has actual notice of Plaintiff's claim, where there is a “reasonable prospect that service may yet be obtained,” and where no prejudice would inure to Defendant from quashing service, the Court sees no reason to dismiss the case. While Plaintiff has failed to properly serve Defendant, his errors were minor in nature, and “[i]t is too late in the day and entirely contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the...