Angell v. Angell, No. A09-349.

• Decision Date: 09 December 2010
• Docket Number: No. A09-349.
• Citation: 791 N.W.2d 530
• Parties: In re the Marriage of Loretta Marie ANGELL, Respondent, v. Gordon William ANGELL, Jr., Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

791 N.W.2d 530

In re the Marriage of Loretta Marie ANGELL, Respondent,

v.Gordon William ANGELL, Jr., Appellant.

No. A09-349.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 9, 2010.

Syllabus by the Court

Federal anti-attachment provisions preempt a district court's order apportioning $150,000 in federal death benefits to a non-beneficiary spouse under Minn.Stat. § 518.58, subd. 2 (2008) in a marriage dissolution.

Peter L. Radosevich, Esko, MN, for appellant.

Arthur M. Albertson, Duluth, MN, for respondent.

Mary Catherine Lauhead, Law Offices of Mary Catherine Lauhead, St. Paul, MN, Michael D. Dittberner, Linder, Dittberner & Bryant, Ltd., Edina, MN, for amicus curiae Family Law Section, Minnesota State Bar Association.

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

The question in this case is whether federal law preempts the district court's award of death benefits to a non-beneficiary spouse. The court of appeals held that the award of federal death benefits to the non-beneficiary spouse conflicted with federal law. Because we hold that the anti-attachment provisions in 38 U.S.C. § 1970(g) (2006) and 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1) (2006) preempt the court's award made under state law, we affirm.

This action arises from the dissolution of the marriage between appellant Gordon William Angell, Jr. (appellant), and respondent Loretta Marie Angell (respondent). Appellant and respondent married in 1981. They had five children together. During the marriage, respondent worked part-time as a substitute rural postal carrier, earning approximately $1,100 a month. Respondent generally handled the finances and paid the bills.

One of the parties' children, Levi Angell, enlisted in the Marines in 2002 when he turned 18. Levi Angell died in active combat in Iraq in 2004. He was insured under the federal Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance program (SGLI), which is authorized by 38 U.S.C. §§ 1965-80A (2006) and regulated under 38 C.F.R. Pt. 9 (2010). Levi listed only his mother, the respondent,as a beneficiary on the SGLI policy election form. Levi also designated only respondent as the sole beneficiary of his death gratuity benefits, which are authorized by 10 U.S.C. § 1475 (2000), and allow payments from the federal government to designated survivors of servicemembers killed in combat.

Immediately following her son's death in April 2004, respondent received death gratuity payments totaling $100,000. Respondent also received a payment of $250,352.66 in May 2004 because of her status as the sole beneficiary under her son's SGLI plan. Respondent received an additional $150,000 from the federal government in 2005 under a program that provided additional payouts to prior SGLI beneficiaries. In total, respondent received $500,352.66 in federal death benefits because of her son's death.¹

All of the federal death benefit checks were made out solely to respondent or deposited directly into an account on her behalf. Appellant did not ask respondent for a share of the federal death benefits, other than $500 to buy clothes for his son's funeral. Respondent spent approximately $133,000 on gifts to her surviving adult children and on a family trip. At some point before the marriage dissolution proceedings were commenced, respondent moved most of the remaining federal death benefits into a bank account in another state. An adult daughter of respondent and appellant was designated the primary owner of that account.

Appellant moved out of the family home and moved in with his elderly mother in July 2006. Appellant had no bank or checking account, additional real property other than the homestead, retirement savings, or assets other than one car. He had a seventh-grade education, no job or vocational training, and has not held a full-time job since 2002. He has a disability that requires him to speak with a device and his primary source of income was a $424 monthly social security disability payment. Appellant's living expenses were about $600 a month.

Respondent filed for marriage dissolution on January 29, 2007. Sometime before the proceedings were commenced, respondent went on disability leave from her job. At the time of the marriage dissolution, she received $203 a month in General Assistance and additional supplemental social security disability benefits. Her monthly living expenses at the time were approximately $2,172.

Respondent and appellant came to several agreements during the proceedings. Specifically, the parties agreed that respondent would get sole physical and legal custody of their then-minor son. Appellant and respondent also agreed that respondent would keep a nonmarital parcel of unimproved land that respondent inherited during their marriage, that they would divide the household goods, furnishings, cars, and other personal property before trial, and that they would sell their home and split the proceeds equally. Appellant and respondent also stipulated that "no spousal maintenance should be awarded to either party."

The only issue for trial, according to the district court, was the proper characterization and division of the federal death benefits. After trial, the court found the parties' stipulations "to be reasonable" and incorporated them into its judgment and decree. As to the federal death benefits, the court determined that the death gratuity payments were marital property, and the court divided them evenly between theparties. The court further determined that the SGLI payouts were respondent's nonmarital property. The court then determined that appellant was entitled to $100,000 from respondent's nonmarital assets to prevent an unfair hardship, as authorized by Minn.Stat. § 518.58, subd. 2 (2008).² Appellant's total award therefore was $150,000.

Respondent filed a post-trial motion to amend the judgment and decree, asserting that because she was the sole named beneficiary of the death gratuity benefits, those benefits were solely her nonmarital property. Respondent also asserted that federal law barred the district court from distributing any portion of either the death gratuity benefits or the SGLI proceeds to appellant because the payments were "within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government." Respondent asked the court to amend the judgment and decree to remove the $150,000 award to appellant, or alternatively, to order a new trial.

The district court amended the judgment and decree to designate all of the federal death benefits as respondent's nonmarital property. The court then increased its award to appellant from respondent's nonmarital property under the section 518.58, subdivision 2, "unfair hardship" provision to $150,000, leaving appellant with the same $150,000 award that the court originally ordered. The court denied the remainder of respondent's motions.

Respondent appealed to the court of appeals. Respondent asserted on appeal that the district court erred by awarding appellant any share of her nonmarital property or, alternatively, that the court erred by increasing the share of the award of her nonmarital property from $100,000 to $150,000. Angell v. Angell, 777 N.W.2d 32, 35 (Minn.App.2009). Appellant in turn challenged the reclassification of the death gratuity benefits as nonmarital property. Id.

The court of appeals first determined that the district court did not err by designating all of the federal death benefits as nonmarital property. Id. at 37. The court determined that Levi's designation of respondent as the sole beneficiary of his federal death benefits provided enough evidence to overcome the state law presumption that because the federal death benefits were received during the marriage, they were marital property. Id. at 36.

The court of appeals then turned to the issue of whether the property division was proper. Id. at 37. The court determined that based on appellant's financial and medical circumstances, the award under the section 518.58, subdivision 2, unfair hardship provision "accord[ed] with the statute's hardship concerns." Angell, 777 N.W.2d at 38. But the court also found that the district court's order awarding appellant a share of the federal death benefits directly conflicted with the express prohibition under federal law barring the diversion of military death benefits from designated beneficiaries of those benefits. Id. at 40. The court reversed solely on the latter issue and remanded the case to the district court to make a property distribution consistent with its holding. Id. at 41. We granted appellant's petition for review.³

I.

It is well settled that "[a] trial court has broad discretion in evaluating and dividing property in a marital dissolution and will not be overturned except for abuse of discretion." Antone v. Antone, 645 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn.2002). But we review de novo the question of whether federal law preempts state law. In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 63 (Minn.2008).

Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a federal law prevails over a conflicting state law. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding"). Congressional purpose is " 'the ultimate touchstone' " of the inquiry into whether a federal statute preempts a state law. Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 63 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978)). And when considering issues arising under the Supremacy Clause, we "start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947). Divorce and other family law matters are traditionally within the historic police power of the states. See Langston v. Wilson McShane Corp., 776 N.W.2d 684, 689 (Minn.2009) (citing Ankenbrandt...