Angleton v. Angleton

• Decision Date: 23 March 1962
• Docket Number: No. 8899,8899
• Citation: 370 P.2d 788,84 Idaho 184
• Parties: Hugh R. ANGLETON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ludmilla Waskowsky ANGLETON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 788

370 P.2d 788

84 Idaho 184

Hugh R. ANGLETON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ludmilla Waskowsky ANGLETON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 8899.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

March 23, 1962.

Rehearing Denied May 3, 1962.

Richards, Haga & Eberle, Boise, for appellant.

Langroise, Clark & Sullivan, Boise, for respondent.

KNUDSON, Justice.

The appellant, Ludmilla Waskowsky Angleton, and respondent, Hugh R. Angleton, intermarried on September 11, 1948. One male child, Peter John, was born November 13, 1955, the sole issue of said marriage.

The controversy between these parties was initially brought to the attention of the trial court in a habeas corpus action, being Case No. 8900, Idaho, 370 P.2d 798, commenced by appellant to secure custody of the child. Pending the hearing in the habeas corpus proceedings respondent filed an action seeking a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty, and custody of the minor child. Appellant countered with a cross-claim for separate maintenance and also sought custody of the child. Upon application of appellant the habeas corpus and divorce actions were consolidated for trial and decision.

After the introduction of much evidence on behalf of the respective parties the trial before the Honorable M. Oliver Koelsch, District Judge, sitting without a jury, was concluded on June 25, 1959. On September 24, 1959, Judge Koelsch caused to be filed his memorandum decision in the case. On the succeeding day, September 25, 1959, Judge Koelsch resigned his office. Promptly thereafter, the Honorable J. Ray Durtschi was regularly appointed to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of Judge Koelsch, and he has since continued as successor of Judge Koelsch in the office of District Judge of the Third Judicial District.

On October 13, 1959, appellant moved for a new trial which was denied by order filed March 25, 1960.

After having considered the sufficiency of Judge Koelsch's memorandum decision as constituting adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law, Judge Durtschi, on October 30, 1959, caused to be made and filed an order directing entry of judgment consistent with the findings of fact and conclusions of law made and contained in the memorandum decision. On the same day a judgment and decree was entered and filed granting respondent's request for a divorce and awarding him custody of the minor child, also dismissing appellant's cross-claim.

Appeal is taken from the judgment and order denying appellant's motion for a new trial.

One of the important assignments of error is lodged against the action of the court below in entering its order directing that judgment and decree be entered on the basis of the memorandum decision of Judge Koelsch in that appellant contends that the decision is not sufficient in form or contents to constitute findings of fact and conclusions of law to support a judgment.

The findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Rule 52(a) I.R.C.P. constitute the trial court's decision as to what are the ultimate facts established by the evidence and the conclusions of law resulting therefrom upon which a judgment may be entered accordingly. The action for divorce and the cross-claim were filed after the effective date of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and are governed thereby. (I.C. § 1-215; Rule 86 I. R.C.P.)

Rule 52(a) provides that:

' * * * the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment; * * * If an opinion or memorandum decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein.'

No special form is required.

Rule 63 I. R.C.P. is also applicable to the problem here presented and provides as follows:

'If by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, a judge before whom an action has been tried is unable to perform the duties to be performed by the court under these rules after a verdict is returned or findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, then any other judge regularly sitting in or assigned to the court in which the action was tried may perform those duties; but if such other judge is satisfied that he cannot perform those duties because he did not preside at the trial or for any other reason, he may in his discretion grant a new trial.'

Among the other disabilities referred to in the rule includes 'resignation from office'. (7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2nd Edition, 1453, Par. 63.03). It is clear that if the trial judge has rendered a decision in the form of findings and conclusions, his successor has the power to render judgment thereon without a trial de novo. Rule 63 I. R.C.P.; State ex rel. Bloom v. Superior Court, King County, 171 Wash. 536, 18 P.2d 510; Case v. Fox, 138 Ore. 453, 7 P.2d 267.

Whatever may have been the tendency under the practice prior to the adoption of Rule 52(a), it is clear that under said rule there is no necessity for over-elaboration of detail or particularization of facts.

In considering the detail which the findings and conclusions should contain, it is helpful to review decisions of Federal Courts relative to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. which is almost identical to Rule 52(a) I.R.C.P. In the Committee Note of 1946 to Subdivision (a) (5 Moore's Federal Practice, 2nd Edition, 2606) it is stated that 'These findings should represent the judge's own determination and not the long, often argumentative statements of successful counsel; * * * the judge need only make brief, definite, pertinent findings and conclusions upon the contested matters; there is no necessity for over-elaboration of detail or particularization of facts.' See also United States v. Fornes (C.C.A.2d, 1942) 125 F.2d 928. Findings should not be discursive; they should not state the evidence or any of the reasoning upon the evidence, Petterson Lighterage & Towing Corp. v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co. (C.C.A.2d 1942) 126 F.2d 992. The following quotation is from 5 Moore's Federal Practice, 2nd Edition, 2643, Par. 52.05(1), a paragraph entitled 'General Analysis' in which said rule is discussed:

'A scientific distinction between fact and law is not workable. Nor would such a distinction serve the purpose behind Rule 52, which is to aid the trial court in making a correct appraisal of the evidence and the law to the end that a sound decision is made, to show what has been adjudicated for future purposes for res judicata and estoppel by judgment, and to aid the appellate court where an appeal is taken.'

In Merrill v. Merrill, 83 Idaho 306, 362 P.2d 887, this Court stated:

'The purpose of requiring findings of fact and conclusions of law is to aid the appellate court by affording it a clear understanding of the basis of the decision of the trial court * * * the absence of findings may be disregarded by the appellate court if the record is so clear that the court does not need their aid for a complete understanding of the issues.'

In Makah Indian Tribe v. Moore, D.C., 93 F.Supp. 105, the trial judge orally announced his decision which was transcribed by the reporter. The trial judge died before formal findings and conclusions were submitted. The power of any other judge to sign the formal judgment in accordance with the decision announced by the trial judge was challenged. The successor judge found that the opinion of the trial judge indicated the factual basis for the ultimate conclusion and provided a clear understanding of the basis of the decision and entered judgment accordingly. See also, Woodruff v. Heiser, 150 F.2d 873 (C.C.A.10th, 1945); Western Pac. R. R. Corp. v. Western Pacific R. Co., 197 F.2d 994 (C.C.A.9th, 1951); Carr v. Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., 200 F.2d 251 (C.C.A.9th, 1952).

In the instant case the memorandum decision of the trial court consisted of in excess of 820 words and Judge Durtschi, after carefully examining it, stated:

'I find that Judge Koelsch's memorandum decision indicates and provides a clear understanding of the factual basis and legal reasons for his decision that the plaintiff should prevail and that the defendant should not, and when considered together with permissible inferences and presumptions (Koser v. Bohemian Breweries, 69 Idaho 33, 202 P.2d 398) the findings and conclusions contained therein are adequate under the circumstances. I have therefore concluded that findings of fact and conclusion have been filed in the action within the intent and meaning of Rule 63, I. R.C.P., and that I have the power, under that rule, to perform the duty of signing the formal judgment and that in the exercise of the discretion conferred by Rule 63 it is appropriate and proper that I do so.

We find that the conclusion reached by Judge Durtschi was correct.

Our further inquiry is whether the trial court made a finding on the material issues raised by the pleadings involved. The issues created by the pleadings are few. Under respondent's complaint the principal allegations are that

(1) respondent and appellant were married September 11, 1948, which fact is admitted by appellant;

(2) respondent resided in Idaho for more than two months prior to the commencement of his action. This allegation is denied by appellant;

(3) one child was born the issue of the marriage, which appellant admits;

(4) there is no community property, which is also admitted by appellant;

(5) respondent is, and appellant is not, a fit and proper person to have custody of the child. This is denied by appellant;

(6) appellant has been guilty of such extreme cruelty as justifies the granting of a divorce to respondent, which allegation is denied by appellant.

Under the cross-claim appellant seeks separate maintenance and an award of $300.00 per month; custody of the child; and an additional award of $9000.00 for support allegedly due, together with transportation expenses. Respondent denies all allegations of the cross-claim except the fact of marriage and...