State ex rel. Bloom v. Superior Court In and For King County
| Decision Date | 31 January 1933 |
| Docket Number | 24351. |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. BLOOM v. SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR KING COUNTY et al. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2.
Petition for a writ of mandate by the State, on the relation of P. M Bloom, against the Superior Court in and for King County, and Chester A. Batchelor, judge of department three thereof, to compel the respondent judge to enter a judgment in an action brought by the relator against Takiguchi & Co.
Writ issued.
Edwin H. Flick and Herald A. O'Neill, both of Seattle, for relator.
Grinstead Laube, Laughlin & Meakim, of Seattle, for respondents.
Relator as plaintiff, in November, 1929, commenced an action in the superior court for King county in which Takiguchi & Co., a corporation, was made defendant. A trial was had to a jury resulting in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the cause. The verdict was set aside and a new trial granted. A second trial was had to a jury again resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff and again the verdict was set aside and a new trial granted.
Thereafter, the plaintiff waived a jury trial and the case was tried to the court. After hearing the evidence, the trial judge, not being fully satisfied, ordered an audit to be made of certain books and records, the court announcing that, after the report of the auditor was received, counsel on either side would be permitted to examine it, would be heard if desired, and thereafter the court would announce his decision upon the issues in the case.
The auditor, on May 11, 1932, filed his final report in part in the form of suggested findings of fact and conclusions of law separately stated and numbered. On oral notice to opposing counsel the plaintiff caused a hearing to be had on this report on May 28, 1932, at which counsel for the defendant did not choose to appear and at the conclusion of that hearing and on that day the trial court made and entered its written order as follows:
On the same day and after the entry of the order quoted, the trial judge resigned his office and ceased to be a judge of the superior court.
Thereafter, and in November, 1932, the plaintiff in that action made a motion for judgment in accordance with the findings of fact and conclusions of law so arrived at and caused the motion to be brought on for hearing Before the respondent judge who declined and refused to enter the judgment proposed or any judgment in the cause but did enter a written order to some extent embodying his reasons for his refusal to enter final judgment.
Whereupon an alternative writ was sued out of this court to which respondent has made a return which raises no issue of fact.
Our first inquiry is, Were the findings and conclusions of the auditor which the trial court adopted as his own sufficient in law when so adopted to entitle the prevailing party to a judgment thereon. Some contention is made to the contrary, but apparently respondent does not greatly rely on that defense.
As already indicated, the findings and conclusions were separately stated and numbered as the statute requires. They set up as judicially established certain facts which theretofore were in dispute and the conclusions drawn from the facts found call for a judgment against the defendant, the terms and nature of which are clearly and definitely indicated. Our examination of the record indicates that had the trial court made such findings and conclusions without the intervention of an auditor, or an auditor's report, no one would have questioned his right to enter a judgment thereon.
Surely the fact that these findings and conclusions were definitely framed and set out in the auditor's report and that they were recommended by him cannot make them less capable of adoption than proposed findings and conclusions so framed and submitted by counsel for the prevailing party in the case and it would seem equally certain that such a written instrument as the auditor's report may be adopted by a signed written order specifically referring to the writing to be adopted just as effectively as though...
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Staples v. Callahan, 10649.
...control over Judge Kent's orders as Judge Kent would have himself retained until the expiration of the term. State ex rel. Bloom v. Superior Court, 171 Wash. 536, 18 P.2d 510; State ex rel. Nelson v. Superior Court, 184 Wash. 97, 49 P.2d 903, 54 P.2d 1215; Columbia Mutual B. & L. Ass'n v. M......
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...his successor has the power to render judgment thereon without a trial de novo. Rule 63 I. R.C.P.; State ex rel. Bloom v. Superior Court, King County, 171 Wash. 536, 18 P.2d 510; Case v. Fox, 138 Ore. 453, 7 P.2d Whatever may have been the tendency under the practice prior to the adoption o......
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...jurisdictions, as well as the Federal Rules, find the argument advanced by the respondent unpersuasive. (State ex rel. Bloom v. Superior Court (1933), 171 Wash. 536, 18 P.2d 510; U. S. v. Sundstrom (1st Cir. 1973), 489 F.2d 859, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 934, 95 S.Ct. 205, 42 L.Ed.2d 163; Fed.......
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