Anglin v. State, 1152
Decision Date | 09 September 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 1152,1152 |
Citation | 28 Md.App. 150,344 A.2d 130 |
Parties | Morris Edwin ANGLIN, Jr. v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Reginald W. Bours, III, Assigned Public Defender, Rockville, for appellant.
Alexander L. Cummings, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Arthur A. Marshall, Jr., State's Atty., for Prince George's County, and Thomas A. Blair, Asst. State's Atty., for Prince George's County, on the brief, for appellee.
Argued before ORTH, C. J., and MENCHINE and MOORE, JJ.
Morris Edwin Anglin, Jr. was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County for daytime housebreaking, 1 and for grand larceny 2 under one indictment (hereafter sometimes called Lyle case). In the same trial he was convicted also by the jury for receiving stolen goods of a value of over $100.00 3 under a second indictment (hereafter sometimes called Pearson case). He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for daytime housebreaking; to fifteen years imprisonment for grand larceny to run consecutively; and to ten years imprisonment for receiving stolen goods to run concurrently.
The following contentions are made on appeal:
1. That appellant's motion for severance or mistrial in the Pearson case was improperly denied.
2. That there was a fatal variance in the Lyle grand larceny case.
3. That the evidence was legally insufficient to convict in the Pearson case.
4. That the prosecutor's closing argument requires reversal.
5. That the trial court erroneously restricted cross-examination of the State's witnesses.
6. That the trial court erroneously restricted direct examination of defense witnesses.
7. That the trial court erroneously allowed an attorney witness to invoke privilege.
8. That the sentences imposed were illegal because:
(a) the sentencing judge gave consideration to disputed convictions or convictions when appellant was without counsel, or
(b) they were so unfair as to constitute denial of due process and equal protection of the laws.
By virtue of the State's motion to consolidate, the Lyle indictment was joined with the Pearson indictment. A motion by appellant opposing the joinder of three indictments had been denied as to the two subject indictments but granted as to a third. Thereafter, the jury was empanelled in the consolidated cases. On the second day of trial appellant made an oral motion for a severance of the two indictments upon which trial had commenced. That motion was made upon the ground that the prosecution had stated that it would use less evidence in the Pearson case than discovery procedures had indicated to appellant would be presented by the State.
In the course of argument upon the motion for severance the following colloquy among appellant, State's attorney and court occurred:
So, I would deny the motion to sever.'
Thus it is clear that the basis for the motion for severance was as heretofore recited. Assuming, without deciding, that the motion for severance was timely under Rule 735, we see no abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Hicks v. State, 9 Md.App. 25, 262 A.2d 66; DiNatale v. State, 8 Md.App. 455, 260 A.2d 669.
The record does not support the statement in appellant's brief that there was a 'motion for severance and/or mistrial.' The sole reference to a mistrial upon this issue was made by the trial judge in bench discussions with appellant concerning his motion for severance, namely, The appellant did not move for a mistrial below. That issue is not before us. Rule 1085.
We perceive no error.
The evidence shows that the items allegedly stolen by the appellant were owned by Nelson Lyle and his wife. The indictment had alleged that the stolen items were the property of Nelson Lyle.
The State contends that the issue was not raised below and that, under Rule 1085, it is not before us. Assuming, without deciding, that the issue was raised by appellant's motion for a judgment of acquittal as to all counts, we find no fatal variance.
Appellant cites our decision in Sizemore v. State, 5 Md.App. 507, 248 A.2d 417, our statement at 512-13 (420-21):
His reliance is misplaced. Sizemore turned upon the provisions of Article 27, § 605, 4 introduced into the statutory law of Maryland by Ch. 63 § 1 of the Acts of 1852. The statute has remained without amendment since that time.
At the time of the passage of the statute, the property rights of a wife were limited in the extreme, as is demonstrated by the decision in Herzberg v. Sachse, 60 Md. 426, wherein it was said at 432:
The statute was intended to simplify, not to make more complex, the requisite allegations of criminal charging documents. The statute was not intended to require more complex procedural allegations as to offenses involving the property of married women. Legislative action was not necessary to simplify allegations of ownership as to such property and manifestly was not intended to require more complex allegations as to such property.
Early and late it has been said that Hooper v. Baltimore, 12 Md. 464, 475; Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 355-56. See also: Baltimore v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 232 Md. 123, 192 A.2d 87.
The subsequent passaege of a married woman's property act 5 would not enlarge the effect of that prior statute. Annotation 2 A.L.R. 352, et seq.
In State v. Martin, 357 Mo. 368, 208 S.W.2d 203 (1948), where the information charged the larceny of ladies' rings and alleged that they were the property of the husband, the Court said at 208:
'If the rings actually belonged to both husband and wife it was still sufficient to plead ownership in him.'
To the same effect is Haley v. State, 191 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Ct. of Crim.App. of Texas, 1946).
We hold, accordingly, that the allegation of ownership in Nelson Lyle, followed by proof of ownership by himself and his wife, was sufficient under the common law. The variance between allegation and proof was not fatal.
This issue is limited to the Pearson case. A jeweler in Laurel, Maryland testified that appellant and another came into his store in January, 1974 and 'showed me the ring, told me that it had come from England by a merchant seaman, and wanted to sell it.' The jeweler at first declined to purchase the ring but did so about a half hour later after the appellant had...
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