Anonymous, In re

• Decision Date: 12 March 1970
• Citation: 309 N.Y.S.2d 13,62 Misc.2d 578
• Parties: In re ANONYMOUS.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 13

309 N.Y.S.2d 13

62 Misc.2d 578

In re ANONYMOUS.

Supreme Court, Trial Term, Bronx County, Part VI.

March 12, 1970.

Charles H. Speigel, for respondent.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., Anna Withey, New York City, of counsel, for petitioner.

NATHAN T. HELMAN, Justice.

In this narcotic addiction proceeding, it appears that the alleged addict displayed symptoms of mental disability which prompted the trial court to direct an inquiry before another Judge concerning the ability of the alleged addict to understand the nature of the proceedings, and his competency to participate in the trial. Such remand in conformity with the court's practice under Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 204 N.E.2d 179 was approved procedurally, in People v. Hudson, 19 N.Y.2d 137, 278 N.Y.S.2d 593, 225 N.E.2d 193. Questions are now raised as to the power of the court, in a pretrial proceeding, to determine issues of incompetency in an addiction case.

Ample authority exists in a Criminal case to suspend further hearing until the issue of competence to stand trial is determined. Sections 658 to 662--a of the Code of Criminal Procedure establish methods and procedures to be employed after indictment; Sections 870--873 apply similarly to proceedings before indictment or in case of mere offense. The Mental Hygiene Law, however, particularly the more recent sections of Article 9 relating to narcotic addicts, offers no method of determining as to an alleged addict, 'whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' (Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824).

It is well established that commitment pursuant to Section 206 of the Mental Hygiene Law is a 'civil' commitment; evidentiary rules concerned with burdens of proof and the introduction of evidence are governed by 'civil' procedures. Where a plenary inquiry is conducted into respondent's competency to stand trial, the view has often been expressed that even in a criminal trial, that issue is ancillary to the trial of the criminal charge, and is merely a Civil proceeding (Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507; In re Bresee, 82 Iowa 573, 48 N.W. 991). Thus, it would appear that inquiries of this type, whether under the Criminal Code or the Mental Hygiene Law, partake of a similar character, and should be identical, notwithstanding statutory provisions that the Mental Hygiene Law is not applicable to persons confined under criminal charges.

It may be noted that since the 1966 amendments, several decisions have emphasized the broad areas of due process which are afforded the respondent in an addiction case; the right to counsel at every stage, and the opportunity to litigate fully the issue of addiction (Narcotic Addiction Control Commission v. James, 22 N.Y.2d 545, 293 N.Y.S.2d 531, 240 N.E.2d 29; People ex rel. Gordon v. Murphy, 55 Misc.2d 275, 285 N.Y.S.2d 198). In the James case, the court held that a three-day detention of appellant:

'* * * without Notice of the nature of the proceeding and an opportunity to contest the finding upon which the determination to restrain his liberty was predicated, is contrary to our most fundamental notions of fairness and constitutes a deprivation of liberty without due process.' at 552, 293 N.Y.S.2d 531, at 537, 240 N.E.2d 29, at 33 (emphasis added).

Certainly, the type of safeguards established by that case would be meaningless if a person mentally deranged were required to participate in a proceeding where restraints on his liberty might be imposed.

Distinctions between 'criminal' and 'civil' have fallen in several recent cases where similar questions were involved. The landmark case of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, held that juvenile delinquency proceedings, nominally 'civil', were sufficiently similar to criminal proceedings to require that accused delinquents be afforded counsel, right of confrontation, and all other constitutional rights available to those criminally charged. (See, also, Thompson v. Morrow, 57 Misc.2d 932, 293 N.Y.S.2d 974.) In Matter of Gregory W., 19 N.Y.2d 55, 62, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675, 680, 224 N.E.2d 102, 106, the court was concerned with the rights of an infant under the Family Court Act. Recognizing that the proceedings were not criminal in nature, the court nevertheless sustained them, 'resulting as they do in a loss of personal freedom, are at the very least, quasi-criminal in nature'. The Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization of January 30, 1962, page 8, contains the following: 'Any commitment--whether 'civil' or 'criminal', whether assertedly for 'punitive' or 'rehabilitative' purposes--involves a grave interference with personal liberty'.

Subdivision 2 of Section 208 of the Mental Hygiene Law specifically provides that notwithstanding the 'civil' nature of the proceeding, a right of confrontation exists as at a Criminal trial. Section 208, subdivision 4a, fixes the maximum confinement period for treatment and rehabilitation at 60 months for felonies and 36 months for misdemeanors. And in its declaration of the purpose of the new law the statute makes frequent reference to the danger to the safety of New York citizens from narcotic addiction and the need of the law to protect society from extended crime. Thus, from every...