ANR Production Co. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Com'n

Decision Date31 October 1990
Docket Number89-277,Nos. 89-276,s. 89-276
Citation800 P.2d 492
PartiesANR PRODUCTION COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Petitioner (Petitioner/Appellant), v. The WYOMING OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION, Respondent (Respondent/Appellee), and Woods Petroleum Corporation, Intervenor (Intervenor/Appellee). ANR PRODUCTION COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Appellant (Petitioner/Appellant), v. The WYOMING OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION, Appellee (Respondent/Appellee), and Woods Petroleum Corporation, Appellee (Intervenor/Appellee/Respondent).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

William T. Schwartz and J. Scott Burnworth of Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & Walker, Casper and Don C. Nelson, ANR Production Co., Houston, Tex., for ANR Production Co.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Joe Scott, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Casper, for Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Com'n.

Craig Newman and Morris R. Massey of Brown & Drew, Casper, for Woods Petroleum Corp.

Before CARDINE, C.J., * and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice.

ANR Production Company (ANR) appeals a district court order that certified to this court a petition by ANR for the district court to review a determination made by the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (Commission). ANR petitioned the district court to review the Commission's determination to shut in an ANR well to prevent waste and protect correlative rights. This court consolidated the appeal and petition for review.

We affirm.

ISSUES

The issues raised by ANR with respect to the appeal from the district court are:

1. Did the district court err in certifying the Petition for Review prior to and without hearing on the Motion of ANR Production Company ("ANR") for leave to present additional evidence under W.R.A.P. 12.08?

2. Did the district court err in certifying the Petition for Review directly to the Supreme Court under W.R.A.P. 12.09 over the objection of ANR?

The issues raised by ANR with respect to the Commission's determination are:

1. Is the decision of the Commission arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law for failure to set forth the basis by which one set of experts' views [were] chosen over an opposing set of experts' views, and that the acceptance of Woods' evidence and the rejection of ANR's evidence, was made on a reasonable and proper basis?

2. Is the decision of the Commission arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law for failure to contain adequate findings of basic facts on material issues to support the ultimate facts and conclusions contained within the decision?

3. Is the decision of the Commission contrary to law and invalid since it does not constitute the actions of a disinterested quorum of the Commission?

FACTS

In 1983, the Commission approved formation of the Powell Pressure Maintenance Unit (PPMU). PPMU produces oil and associated hydrocarbons from a subterranean level called the First Bench which underlies a portion of Converse County, Wyoming. Woods Petroleum (Woods) is the operator of the PPMU with a working interest in the unit. The PPMU is expected ultimately to produce sixteen million barrels of oil, 6.4 million barrels of natural gas liquids, forty-five billion cubic feet of natural gas and 23.5 billion cubic feet of make-up gas. Fifty feet below the PPMU is another subterranean level called the Second Bench which produces gas and hydrocarbons.

In August 1988, Woods applied for an emergency hearing by the Commission regarding problems which Woods alleged were caused by an ANR well. ANR owns the South Powell Federal No. 2-1 well (South Powell well) located beneath the PPMU at the Second Bench level. Woods claimed ANR had caused the Benches to exchange their fluids (communicate).

After hearing evidence from experts employed both by Woods and ANR, the Commission found ANR's fracture treatment of the South Powell well was causing communication On May 19, 1989, ANR petitioned the district court for review of the Commission's determination. On June 5, Woods moved for permission to intervene, which was given on July 14. Four days later, Woods requested the district court certify ANR's petition for review to this court under W.R.A.P. 12.09. 1 The memorandum in support of that request advanced the rationale of appellate expediency and judicial efficiency pursuant to Safety Medical Services, Inc. v. Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming, 724 P.2d 468, 470 (Wyo.1986).

because the fractures united the two Benches. On April 24, 1989, the Commission ordered the South Powell well shut in to protect the correlative rights of the First Bench producers and to prevent waste by protecting the secondary recovery operations. The Commission's report was signed by a Commissioner who had disqualified himself for a conflict of interest but who never voted on the determinations that affected ANR.

On August 4, ANR objected to the request for certification. ANR argued it intended to ask the district court to order the Commission to take additional evidence pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.08. On that same day, Woods requested a hearing date be set on its request for certification. That hearing was set for September 1. On August 22, that hearing was rescheduled for October 25. On September 1, 1989, ANR retained new counsel.

On October 25, the day of the scheduled hearing, ANR filed the motion to present additional evidence. Without granting ANR's motion to present additional evidence, the district court certified ANR's petition to this court for review, to which ANR objected and timely appealed.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND APPLICATION

[T]he applicable standard of review depends upon whether the determination called into question in the appellate courts falls within one of three categories: "review of the sufficiency of the evidence to meet the required burden of persuasion at the trial [fact-finding] level; review of the exercise of discretion; and plenary review of the choice, interpretation, [construction 2], and application of the controlling legal precepts."

Byer, Judge Aldisert's Contribution to Appellate Methodology: Emphasizing and Defining Standards of Review, 48 U.Pitt.L.Rev. xvi, xx (preceding p. 963) (1987) (quoting Aldisert, The Appellate Bar: Professional Responsibility and Professional Competence--A View from the Jaundiced Eye of One Appellate Judge, 11 Cap.U.L.Rev. 445, 467 (1982)).

A. Appeal from Certification with no W.R.A.P. 12.08 Hearing

The first issue advanced by ANR claims the district court erred in certifying the petition for review without an actual hearing on ANR's motion to present additional evidence under W.R.A.P. 12.08. ANR claims correctly that the appropriate standard of review for this issue requires an interpretation and construction of W.R.A.P. 12.08.

Although this court, and not the legislature, generates procedural rules to govern judicial review of agency determinations in Wyoming, 3 the principles generally used to interpret and construe constitutional and statutory provisions are applied to interpret and construe procedural rules created by this court. "We follow the rule W.R.A.P. 12.08 provides in pertinent part:

that, if the language of the [rule] is clear and unambiguous, we must accept and apply the plain meaning of that language." State v. Denhardt, 760 P.2d 988, 990 (Wyo.1988).

If, before the date set for hearing, application is made to the court for leave to present additional evidence, and it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the additional evidence is material, and there was good reason for failure to present it in the proceeding before the agency, the court in contested cases shall order that the additional evidence be taken before the agency upon conditions determined by the court.

(Emphasis added.)

The "plain meaning" principle of interpretation requires us to interpret the phrase "before the date set for hearing" in W.R.A.P. 12.08 to mean a motion for additional evidence must be presented before the hearing date.

By applying what appears to be the plain meaning of W.R.A.P. 12.08 to the record, this court is led to one conclusion. On August 22, a hearing was set for October 25. ANR could have moved to present additional evidence at any time from the 22nd of August until the end of the day on October 24th. But when ANR moved for leave to present additional evidence on the date of the hearing, it did not move "before the date set for hearing" as required by W.R.A.P. 12.08.

The untimely motion under W.R.A.P. 12.08 precludes ANR from relying on that rule on appeal. The contrary claim of ANR fails.

B. Certification of Petition for Review

The second issue advanced by ANR claims the district court erred by certifying the petition for review directly to the Supreme Court under W.R.A.P. 12.09 over the objection of ANR. This issue asks that we review a determination which resulted from an exercise of discretion by the district court because the standard of review for certification under W.R.A.P. 12.09 is "abuse of discretion." See Wyoming State Engineer v. Willadsen, 792 P.2d 1376 (Wyo.1990).

In Willadsen, 792 P.2d at 1378, we indicated "the district court's decision to certify a case [pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09] to this Court is discretional." A discretional decision by a district court will only be reversed upon a showing of abuse of discretion. "[A]buse of discretion has as its anchor point the query of 'whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.' " Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544, 549 (Wyo.1990) (quoting Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579, 583 (Wyo.1986)). See Seaton v. State of Wyo. Highway Com'n, Dist. No. 1, 784 P.2d 197, 202 (Wyo.1989) and Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 814 (Wyo.1980).

Because we indicated in Safety Medical Services, Inc., 724 P.2d at 471 that "appellate expediency and judicial efficiency" are factors for the decision by a district court to certify and because the district court based the rationale for certification on judicial efficiency, we hold the district court could reasonably...

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