Ansley Walk Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Atlanta Dev. Auth.

• Citation: 867 S.E.2d 600,362 Ga.App. 191
• Decision Date: 30 December 2021
• Docket Number: A21A1623
• Parties: ANSLEY WALK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. et al. v. The ATLANTA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY d/b/a Invest Atlanta et al.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

362 Ga.App. 191

867 S.E.2d 600

ANSLEY WALK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. et al.

v.The ATLANTA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY d/b/a Invest Atlanta et al.

A21A1623

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

December 30, 2021

Scott Everett Morris, Atlanta, Joseph Scott Jacobson, Steven Wald, Michael Smith, for Appellant.

Robert Philip Alpert, Jeffrey Keith Douglass, Atlanta, Jeffrey Allen Zachman, Douglas Michael Hance, Atlanta, Nathan Lewis Garroway, Atlanta, Jeffrey Allen Zachman, for Appellee.

Brown, Judge.

Ansley Walk Condominium Association, Inc., Wayne A. Christian, Robert R. Smith, and Foah Properties, LLC (collectively "Plaintiffs"), filed a putative class action for inverse condemnation and trespass against The Atlanta Development Authority d/b/a Invest Atlanta ("ADA"), Atlanta BeltLine, Inc. ("ABI"), and the City of Atlanta (collectively "the City"), alleging that the City has failed to compensate property owners for the unauthorized use and taking of their property to develop a portion of the Atlanta BeltLine. Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court's denial of class certification. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Background

The record shows that the 3.46-mile stretch of property at issue ("the Property") originally was a railroad corridor. The former railroad purpose easements on the Property originally were established in the nineteenth century by the Georgia Airline Railway Company, the Atlanta and Richmond Air Line Railway Company, The Atlanta and Charlotte Air Line Railway Company, and Southern Railway Company through a combination of deeds and agreements with landowners at the time. Norfolk Southern Railroad ("Norfolk") eventually became the owner of the railroad easements as successor to these companies. In 2004, Norfolk transferred its interest in the Property to entities unrelated to this matter, but reserved to itself an easement for railroad purposes. In 2008, The Atlanta Development Authority acquired the Property in order to develop the Atlanta BeltLine, "a transportation and economic development initiative involving, among other things, multi-use trails for pedestrian/bicycle traffic and fixed rail routes and modern streetcars within the City of Atlanta." Atlanta BeltLine, Inc. ("ABI") is the implementation agent for the BeltLine.

Following acquisition of the property by ADA and in connection with developing and operating the BeltLine, ADA and ABI entered into at least 60 different agreements with adjacent property owners to resolve any potential issues relating to property rights. The agreements include boundary line agreements, license agreements, access agreements, limited warranty deeds, and a variety of easement agreements, including easements granted by certain of the putative class members to ADA and ABI and vice versa. Putative class members who did not enter into property-rights agreements with the City Defendants were notified by letter and/or email of ABI and/or ADA's planned use of the Property beginning in 2008.

The Property includes part of the BeltLine's Eastside Trail and part of the Beltline's Northeast Trail. Construction on the 2.25-mile section of the Eastside Trail began in 2010 and was opened to the public in October 2012. As of 2020, the Northeast Trail was partially open to the public with limited points of access, but lacked lighting and pavement. ABI considers the Northeast Trail an "Interim Trail" with plans for additional construction over the next few years. On March 7, 2017, Norfolk terminated its railroad purpose easement over the Property.

The Class Action

In 2017, Ansley Walk Condominium Association, Inc. ("Ansley") filed the underlying class action complaint for inverse condemnation, trespass, and attorney fees, costs, and expenses.¹ According to the complaint, putative class members are "landowners who own fee title in land adjoining and within [the Property]," and are the successors in interest through the landowners who granted the original railroad easements. According to the complaint, when Norfolk "abandoned" its railroad purpose easement in 2017, the Property "became unburdened by all railroad easements, and Plaintiffs were entitled to reclaim their ‘reversionary’ right to use, possess, and control their land that they owned in fee simple to the centerline of [the Property]." However, these rights were "blocked" by the City's development of the Property into the BeltLine, constituting a trespass and effecting a taking of their property, entitling them to just compensation. Plaintiffs proposed that the prospective class members be identified by a search of the records of the Fulton County Tax Assessor and Recorder of Deeds.

Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on November 3, 2020, defining the proposed class as follows:

The people and entities who, on March 7, 2017, owned interests in lands constituting part of the railroad corridor or right-of-way on which a rail line formerly was operated by [Norfolk] from milepost 633.10 to milepost 636.56 in Fulton County, Georgia, and who seek to recover just and adequate compensation for a taking by Defendants of their interests and rights to use, possess, control, and enjoy the railroad corridor lands having been abandoned by [Norfolk] on March 7, 2017, and who contend that Defendants are liable for the taking of and trespass upon their lands and interests.

After a hearing, the trial court denied class certification, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy any of the class certification requirements under OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) and (b). This appeal followed.²

Discussion

"Because class actions represent an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only, such actions are permitted only in the limited circumstances described in OCGA § 9-11-23." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bowden v. Med. Center, Inc. , 309 Ga. 188, 194 (II) (1) (a), 845 S.E.2d 555 (2020). See also Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, LP v. Ratner , 295 Ga. 524, 525 (1), 762 S.E.2d 419 (2014). In order to certify a class, the trial court must find that the plaintiff satisfied all of the threshold factors of OCGA § 9-11-23 (a), which provides:

(1) [t]he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;

(2) [t]here are questions of law or fact common to the class;

(3) [t]he claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and

(4) [t]he representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Bowden , 309 Ga. at 193 (II) (1) (b), 845 S.E.2d 555. "If the plaintiff can satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation factors of OCGA § 9-11-23 (a), she must then satisfy at least one of the three requirements of OCGA § 9-11-23 (b) in order to show that class certification is appropriate."³ Id. at 193-194 (II) (1) (b), 845 S.E.2d 555. See also City of Roswell v. Bible , 351 Ga. App. 828, 831 (1), 833 S.E.2d 537 (2019). "Certification is improper if a plaintiff fails to establish even one of the required factors listed in OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) and (b)." (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

Doctors Hosp. Surgery Center, L.P. v. Webb , 307 Ga. App. 44, 46, 704 S.E.2d 185 (2010). "To satisfy these requirements, it [is] not enough for the plaintiffs simply to [allege] that they were satisfied. Rather, the plaintiffs [have] to come forward with evidence to prove their satisfaction of the statutory requirements." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Ratner , 295 Ga. at 526 (1), 762 S.E.2d 419. See also Bible , 351 Ga. App. at 831 (1), 833 S.E.2d 537 (class proponents bear the burden of proving that class certification is appropriate).

"Trial courts are vested with broad discretion to decide whether to certify a class, and absent an abuse of that discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's decision." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bible , 351 Ga. App. at 830 (1), 833 S.E.2d 537. "Implicit in this deferential standard of review is a recognition of the fact-intensive basis of the certification inquiry and of the trial court's inherent power to manage and control pending litigation." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Endochoice Holdings, Inc. v. Raczewski , 351 Ga. App. 212, 214, 830 S.E.2d 597 (2019). We will affirm the trial court's factual findings if supported by any evidence. Id. Finally, "[b]ecause OCGA § 9-11-23 is based on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is appropriate that we look to federal cases interpreting that rule for guidance." Id. at 214-215, 830 S.E.2d 597. Accord Bickerstaff v. Suntrust Bank , 299 Ga. 459, 462 (1), 788 S.E.2d 787 (2016).

On appeal, Plaintiffs contend the trial court abused its discretion in denying class certification under OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) and OCGA § 9-11-23 (b) (3). Because we agree with the trial court that Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the predominance requirement of OCGA § 9-11-23 (b) (3), we find no abuse of discretion.

As previously stated, in addition to the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-23 (a), putative class representatives must satisfy at least one of the requirements set forth in OCGA § 9-11-23 (b). Bible , 351 Ga. App. at 830 (1), 833 S.E.2d 537. Here, Plaintiffs rely on OCGA § 9-11-23 (b) (3), which provides that a class action may be maintained if the trial court "finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."⁴

To determine whether the requirement of predominance is satisfied, a ... court must first identify the parties’ claims and defenses and their elements. The ... court should then classify these issues as common questions or individual questions by predicting how the parties will prove them at trial. Common questions are ones where the same evidence will suffice for each member, and

...