Bowden v. Medical Center, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 June 2020
• Docket Number: S19G0494, S19G0496
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: BOWDEN et al. v. The MEDICAL CENTER, INC. The Medical Center, Inc. v. Bowden et al.

309 Ga. 188

845 S.E.2d 555

BOWDEN et al.

v.The MEDICAL CENTER, INC.

The Medical Center, Inc.

v.Bowden et al.

S19G0494, S19G0496

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: June 29, 2020

Frank Mitchell Lowrey, Michael Rosen Baumrind, Michael Brian Terry, Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, LLP, 1201 West Peachtree Street, N.W. Suite 3900, Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3417, Charles A. Gower, Charles Austin Gower, Charles A. Gower, P.C., P.O. Box 5509, Columbus, Georgia 31906, for Appellant in S19G0494.

William N. Withrow, Lindsey Bowen Mann, Troutman Sanders LLP, Bank of America Plaza, Suite 3000 600 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30308-2216, Miller Peterson Robinson, King & Spalding LLP, 1180 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 1600, Atlanta, Georgia 30309, Paul Douglas Ivey, Robert Calhoun Martin, Lauren King Dimitri, Hall Booth Smith, P.C., 233 12th Street, Suite 500 P.O. Box 2707, Columbus, Georgia 31902-2707, for Appellee in S19G0494.

Jason Edward Bring, Chesley Sellers McLeod, William Jerad Rissler, Arnall Golden Gregory LLP, 171 17th Street, N.W. Suite 2100, Atlanta, Georgia 30363-1031, for Other Party in S19G0494.

Curtis Allen Garrett, James Francis Bogan, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, 110 Peachtree Street Suite 2800, Atlanta, Georgia 30309-4528, Robert Perry Sentell, Joseph Hixon Huff, Kilpatrick Stockton, LLP, P.O. Box 2043, Augusta, Georgia 30903-2106, for Amicus Appellant in S19G0494.

William N. Withrow, Lindsey Bowen Mann, Troutman Sanders LLP, Bank of America Plaza, Suite 3000 600 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30308-2216, Miller Peterson Robinson, King & Spalding LLP, 1180 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 1600, Atlanta, Georgia 30309, Paul Douglas Ivey, Robert Calhoun Martin, Lauren King Dimitri, Hall Booth Smith, P.C., 233 12th Street, Suite 500 P.O. Box 2707, Columbus, Georgia 31902-2707, for Appellant in S19G0496.

Michael Brian Terry, Frank Mitchell Lowrey, Michael Rosen Baumrind, Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, LLP, 1201 West Peachtree Street, N.W. Suite 3900, Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3417, Charles A. Gower, Charles Austin Gower, Charles A. Gower, P.C., P.O. Box 5509, Columbus, Georgia 31906, for Appellee in S19G0496.

Jason Edward Bring, Chesley Sellers McLeod, William Jerad Rissler, Arnall Golden Gregory LLP, 171 17th Street, N.W. Suite 2100, Atlanta, Georgia 30363-1031, Curtis Allen Garrett, James Francis Bogan, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, 110 Peachtree Street Suite 2800, Atlanta, Georgia 30309-4528, Joseph Hixon Huff, Robert Perry Sentell, Kilpatrick Stockton, LLP, P.O. Box 2043, Augusta, Georgia 30903-2106, for Amicus Appellant in S19G0496.

Melton, Chief Justice.

In The Med. Center, Inc. v. Bowden , 348 Ga. App. 165, 168, 820 S.E.2d 289 (2018), the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Superior Court of Muscogee County to certify a class action lawsuit against The Medical Center, Inc. ("TMC"). The class representatives are uninsured patients who received medical treatment from TMC and who claimed that TMC charged them unreasonable rates for their medical care, which rates TMC then used as a basis for filing hospital liens against any potential tort recovery by the patients. The Court of Appeals also ruled on the causes of action raised by the plaintiffs. We granted certiorari to answer three questions: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in its determination that class certification was proper?

(2) Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the denial of summary judgment for TMC on common law claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation? and (3) Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the denial of summary judgment for TMC on the claims under the Georgia RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) Act, OCGA § 16-14-1 et seq. ?¹ For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred with regard to the first two questions, but properly decided the third. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. Factual and Procedural History.

The relevant facts of record and the procedural history of this case are as follows: TMC treated Danielle Bowden for injuries that she suffered in a July 2011 auto accident. Bowden did not have health insurance, and TMC billed her $21,409.59 for her care. TMC filed a hospital lien in the full amount of the hospital's billed charges (the "chargemaster rate"² ) against any potential tort recovery by Bowden.³ Meanwhile, in negotiations with Bowden over her accident claims, the third-party liability insurer of the other vehicle involved in Bowden's accident, Enterprise Leasing Company-South Central, LLC ("Enterprise"), offered to settle with Bowden for its policy limit of $25,000. Bowden ultimately rejected the settlement offer because she and TMC could not reach an agreement on the amount to which TMC would be entitled from these proceeds.

Enterprise then filed an interpleader action against Bowden and TMC, depositing the $25,000 into the court registry. Bowden thereafter filed a cross-claim against TMC, alleging that her hospital bill based on the standard chargemaster rate was grossly excessive and did not reflect the reasonable value of her medical treatment. Bowden pursued claims for, among other things, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Georgia RICO Act.

During the ensuing discovery period, in an effort to support her claim that TMC's chargemaster rates were unreasonable, Bowden sought information from TMC regarding its patient billing, liens, and charges for services provided to insured patients who received the same type of care as Bowden. TMC argued that the information sought by Bowden was irrelevant, but, in an appeal that eventually made its way to this Court, we concluded that

where the subject matter of a lawsuit includes the validity and amount of a hospital lien for the reasonable charges for a patient's care, how much the hospital charged other patients, insured or uninsured, for the same type of care during the same time period is relevant for discovery purposes.

Bowden v. The Med. Center, Inc. , 297 Ga. 285, 286, 773 S.E.2d 692 (2015) (" Bowden I "). We emphasized, however, that the information was relevant only "in the broad discovery sense," not that it was "dispositive of whether TMC's charges for Bowden's care were ‘reasonable’ under OCGA § 44-14-470 (b)." Id. at 292 (2) (a), 773 S.E.2d 692. After further discovery, TMC moved for summary judgment on all of Bowden's claims, which was denied.

Bowden subsequently amended her complaint, adding a request for injunctive relief; moved for leave to join three additional plaintiffs with similar claims, which was granted⁴ ; and filed a petition for class certification on behalf of patients against whom TMC had allegedly filed hospital liens in excess of reasonable charges based on its chargemaster rates. Following a hearing featuring testimony from experts on both sides regarding the reasonableness of TMC's charges and the feasibility of determining damages on a class-wide basis, the trial court granted the petition for class certification, identifying the class as follows:

All persons who have had a hospital lien filed pursuant to OCGA § 44-14-470 et seq., by TMC for the years 2007 to present against a cause of action they possessed and which lien was filed in an amount in excess of what is a reasonable charge for the care and treatment rendered.

In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals majority held, among other things, that (1) although the trial court's stated definition of the class was overbroad, the court's decision to certify the class was nevertheless proper; (2) the trial court properly denied summary judgment for TMC on Bowden's fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims; and (3) TMC was entitled to summary judgment on Bowden's RICO claim. See Bowden , supra, 348 Ga. App. at 183-187, 820 S.E.2d 289. Judge Brown concurred in the judgment only, see id. at 187, 820 S.E.2d 289, and Judge Goss dissented in part, disagreeing that the plaintiffs’ claims met the commonality requirement for a class action. Id. at 188-190, 820 S.E.2d 289. In Case No. S19G0496, TMC challenges the Court of Appeals’ rulings on class certification and on the denial of summary judgment to TMC on the fraud and negligent representation claims, and in Case No. S19G0494, Bowden challenges the Court of Appeals’ ruling in favor of TMC on Bowden's RICO claim.

II. Analysis.

Case No. S19G0496

1. TMC contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision to certify the class in this case. We agree.

(a) Standard of Review.

Because class actions represent "an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only," such actions are permitted "only in the limited circumstances described in OCGA § 9-11-23." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, LP v. Ratner , 295 Ga. 524, 525 (1), 762 S.E.2d 419 (2014). Thus, while the decision to certify a class is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court, any exercise of that discretion must comport with the requirements of the statute. Id. at 526 (1), 762 S.E.2d 419. "The party seeking to represent a class bears the burden of proving [to the trial court] that class certification is appropriate" under the statute, and certification is "appropriate only to the extent that the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the statutory requirements have been satisfied." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. This "rigorous analysis" of the statutory requirements will frequently

entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim. That cannot be helped. The class determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes , 564 U. S. 338, 351 (II) (A), 131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011).⁵ With this framework in mind, we address the Court of...